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This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand the significance 
of, the most important judicial decisions and administrative rulings and regulations promulgated 
by the Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months 
- and sometimes a little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or 
outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be discussed 
in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read them all the way through; just the 
basic topic and Jundamental principles are highlighted - unless one of us decides to go nuts and 
spend several pages writing it up. This is the reason that the outline is getting to be as long as it 
is. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not discussed except to the extent 
that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to administrative rulings and 
regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered 
by the outline, or (4) they provide Dan and Marty the opportunity to mock our elected 
representatives; again, sometimes at least one of us goes nuts and writes up the most trivial of 
legislative changes. The outline focuses primarily on topics of broad general interest (to the 
three of us, at least) - income tax accounting rules, determination of gross income, allowable 
deductions, treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate and partnership taxation, exempt 
organizations, and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with qualified pension and proJit 
sharing plans, and generally does not "deal with international taxation or specialized industries, 
such as banking, insurance, and financial services. Please read this outline at your own risk; we 
take no responsibility.for any misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our advancing ages or 
our increasing indijjerence as to whether we get any particular item right. Any mistakes in this 
outline are Marty's responsibility; any politic;al bias or offensive language is Ira's; and any 
useful information is Dan's. 
I. ACCOUNTING 
A. Accounting Methods 
1. New and improved automatic consent procedures for changes of 
accounting methods. Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-2 C.B. 587 (8/19/08). This revenue procedure 
provides automatic consent procedures for a wide variety of accounting method changes. Rev. 
Proc. 2002-9, 2002-1 C.B. 327, as modified and clarified, is clarified, modified, amplified, and 
superseded. . 
a. Automatic consent updated. Rev. Proc. 2009-39, 2009-38 I.R.B. 
371 (8/27/09). The IRS has updated the procedures for obtaining automatic consent and advance 
consent to change accounting methods. A taxpayer who complies with applicable provisions of 
this revenue procedure has the IRS's consent to change an accounting method. The extensive list 
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of changes is in the Appendix. Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-1C.B. 680 is modified and clarified, and ( 
Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-2 CB 587 is amplified, clarified, and modified. 
• Normally, when automatic consent is sought from the IRS, 
there is no acknowledgment of the request. 
2. Is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the intensive 
care unit? Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 8/22/08) (2-1), cert. 
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (5/18/09). Judge Rogers held that the Article n Appointments Clause 
was not violated by having members of the PCAOB appointed by the SEC commissioners, nor 
was the separation of powers doctrine violated by the for-cause limitation on removal ofPCAOB 
members. 
• Judge Kavanaugh dissented strongly, stating: 
The two constitutional flaws in the PCAOB statute are not matters of mere 
etiquette or protocol. By restricting the President's authority over the Board, the 
Act renders this Executive Branch agency unaccountable and divorced from 
Presidential control to a degree not previously countenanced in our constitutional 
structure. This was not inadvertent; Members of Congress designed the PCAOB 
to have "massive power, unchecked power." 148 CONG.REC. at S6334 (statement 
of Sen. Gramm). Our constitutional structure is premised, however, on the notion 
that such unaccountable power is inconsistent with individual liberty. "The 
purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the 
unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but 
to preserve individual freedom." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the 
branches seek to transgress the separation of powers."). The Framers of our 
Constitution took great care to ensure that power in our system was separated into 
three Branches, not concentrated in the Legislative Branch; that there were checks ( 
and balances among the three Branches; . and that one individual would be 
ultimately responsible and accountable for the exercise of executive power. The 
PCAOB contravenes those bedrock constitutional principles, as well as long-
standing Supreme Court precedents, and it is therefore unconstitutional. 
a. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. There is. less to 
this decision than meets the eye because the PCAOB continues to operate as before but its 
members may be removed without cause by the SEC. _ U.S. _ (6/28/10) (5-4, with the usual 
liberals dissenting). The Court held that the for-cause limitations on the removal of PCAOB 
members contravene the Constitution's separation of powers but that the unconstitutional 
provisions are separable from the rest of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The consequence is that the 
Board may continue to function as before, but its members may be removed at will by the 
Commission. 
3. Just because you might have to perform work in the future and incur 
future costs doesn't necessarily mean you have a long-term contract eligible for deferred 
reporting of income. Koch Industries v. United States, 603 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 4/27/10). In 
connection with a contract to construct a highway for the State of New Mexico, the taxpayer and 
New Mexico entered into a "rehabilitation" contract under which the taxpayer provided a 
"pavement warranty" that required it to perform all work necessary to assure performance of the 
pavement for a period 21.5 years and a "structures warranty" to perform all work necessary to 
assure performance of the bridges, drainage, and erosion structures for 11.5 years, in 
consideration ofa $62,000,000 payment. The taxpayer had no obligation to perform any work on 
the highway or structures unless and until the highway and/or structures failed to meet 
performance standards included in the warranty agreements. The taxpayer sought to use the 
percentage of completion method under § 460 to report the income, but the Court agreed with the 
IRS that the percentage of completion method was unavailable. Neither warranty was a long-
term contract under § 460 because under Reg. § 1.460-1(b)(2)(i) "to be classified as a long-term 
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contract, 'manufacture, building, installation, or construction of property [must be] necessary for 
the taxpayer's contractual obligations to be fulfilled,'" which "necessarily entails a fixed and 
definite obligation on the part of the contractor to provide specified construction services." This 
standard was not met because even though it was virtually certain that some work would be 
performed at some point, the taxpayer "had no obligation to perform any work on the highway 
unless and until the highway andlorstructures thereon failed to meet the performance standards 
included in the warranty agreements." The contracts were "warranties" within the meaning of 
Reg. § 1.460-1(d)(2), and thus the consideration was not eligible for reporting under the 
percentage of completion method. 
B. Inventories 
C. Installment Method 
D. Year of Inclusion or Deduction 
1 . The taxpayer won the substantive issue, but foot-faulted on seeking a 
change in method of accounting, so most of the deficiency is upheld. But in future years, it's 
"ooh la la" for the taxpayer! Capital One Financial Corp. v. Commissioner; 133 T.C. No.8 
(9/21109). This case involved two issues and over $280 million - $175 million for one year 
alone - (apart from penalties). The first issue was the time that third-party credit card issuers 
are required to recognize credit card income known as interchange. Interchange is the difference 
between the amount charged on a credit card and the lesser amount remitted to the merchant by 
the issuing bank. Interchange resembles interest in that it is expressed as a percentage of the 
amount lent, usually with an additional nominal fee, although it is not time-sensitive and does 
not vary as interest rates fluctuate. The government argued that interchange income was credit 
card fee income that was recognized under the all events test at the time the interchange accrued 
- when the cardholder's credit card purchase was settled through either the Visa or MasterCard 
system - while the taxpayer argued that the interchange income was original issue discount 
(OID) that was properly recognized under § 1272(a)(6)(C)(iii), which was added to the Code in 
1997, over the anticipated life of the pool of credit card loans to which the interchange related. 
The Tax Court (Judge Haines) agreed with the taxpayer and held that the interchange income 
was OID. Interchange is not a fee for any service other than the lending of money. However, 
because the taxpayer failed to follow proper procedures to change its accounting methods, the 
OID method was not available for credit card rece.ivables creating or increasing OID in 1998 or 
1999. With certain modifications, the method used by the taxpayer to compute the OID income 
(using a model developed by KPMG) was reasonable. 
• A second issue was whether the taxpayer could currently 
deduct the estimated cost of future redemptions of "miles" it issued to cardholders that could be 
redeemed for airline tickets, the cost of which would be paid by the taxpayer. The court held that 
under § 461(h) and Reg. § 1.461-4, those expenses could not be deducted currently, but instead 
were deductible only to the extent that the amounts were fixed and known under the all events test 
and for which economic performance had occurred. 
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS 
A. Income 
1. This looks pretty good, but at first a few serious questions were 
lurking. The 2009 ARRA, § 1231(a), added Code § 108(i), which defers and then ratably 
includes income arising from business indebtedness discharged by the reacquisition of a debt 
instrument. This new provision allows a taxpayer to irrevocably elect to include cancellation of 
debt income realized in 2009 and 2010 ratably over five tax years, rather than in the year the 
discharge occurs, if the debt was issued in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or 
by a corporation. For partnerships and S corporations, the election is made by the partnership or 
corporation, not by the individual partners or shareholders. I.R.C. § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii). Under the 
§ 108(i) election, income from a debt cancellation in 2009 is recognized beginning in the fifth 
taxable year following the debt cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of 2014 
.through 2018. Income from a debt cancellation in 2010 is recognized beginning in the fourth 
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taxable year following the debt cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of 2014 ( 
through 2018. If a taxpayer elects to defer debt cancellation income under § 108(i), the § 108(a) 
exclusions for bankruptcy, insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, and qualified real property 
business indebtedness do not apply to the year of the election or any subsequent year. 
§ 108(i)(5)(C). Thus, the election cannot be used to move the year of inclusion to a year in which 
it is expected that one of the exceptions will apply. Once the election is made, inclusion is 
inevitable; the statute requires acceleration of inclusion to the taxpayer's final return in the event 
of the intervening death of an individual or liquidation or termination of the business of an entity. 
§ 108(i)(5)(D). The acceleration rule also applies in the event of the sale or exchange or 
redemption of an interest in a partnership or S corporation by a partner or shareholder. 
• Although the statute speaks in terms of cancellation of debt 
income arising from "reacquisition" of a "debt instrument," the statutory defmitions of 
"reacquisition" and "an applicable debt instrument," respectively, are broad enough the provision 
applies to most situations in which the debt is cancelled. Section 108(i)(3)(B) broadly defines "debt 
instrument" to include a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or any other instrument or contractual 
arrangement constituting indebtedness within the meaning of §1275(a). Section 108(i)(4)(B) defmes 
"acquisition" to include (I) an acquisition of the debt instrument for cash, (2) the exchange of the 
debt instrument for another debt instrument, including an exchange reSUlting from a modification of 
the debt instrument (which includes a reduction of the principal amount of the debt), (3) the 
exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, (4) the contribution of 
the debt instrument to capital, and (5) the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of 
the debt instrument. 
• However, the statutory definition of "acquisition" appears to 
omit the cancellation of a debt in connection with a property transfer, for example, a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure, although the legislative history contains some indication that this type of debt 
cancellation is included. 
• Query when and to what extent real estate ownership 
qualifies as a trade or business. 
a. Many of the questions are answered. Rev. Proc. 2009-37, 2009-
36 I.R.B. 309 (8/17/09). This revenue procedure provides the exclusive procedure for taxpayers 
to make § 108(i) elections. Debt cancellation in connection with a property transfer is included in 
§ 108(i). Section 4.04(3) permits partial elections, with the partnership permitted to determine 
"in any manner" the portion of the COD income that is the "deferred amount" and the portion of 
the COD income that is the "included amount" with respect to each partner. Section 4.11 permits 
protective elections where the taxpayer concludes that a particular transaction does not generate 
COD income but fears that the IRS may determine otherwise. A partner's deferred § 752(b) 
amount, arising from a decrease in his share of partnership liabilities, will be treated as a current 
distribution of money in the year that the COD income is included. Taxpayers are allowed an 
automatic one-year extension from the due date to make the election, and taxpayers who made 
elections before the issuance of the revenue procedure will be given until 11116/09 to modifY 
(but not revoke) their existing elections. Corporate taxpayers making a § 108(i) election are 
required to increase earnings and profits for the year of the election. 
b. Temporary Regulations allocate deferred cancellation of debt 
income. T.D. 9498, Application of Section 108(i) to Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R. 
49380 (8/13/10). Section 108(i) provides an election to include cancellation of indebtedness 
income resulting from a reacquisition (broadly defined in § 108(i)(4)) of a debt instrument, 
issued by a C corporation or other person engaged in a trade or business, ratably over five years 
beginning with the fifth year following reacquisition occurring in 2009, and the fourth year 
. following reacquisition in 2010. Under § 108(i)«5)(B)(iii) an election is made by the 
partnership, not the partners individually. Section 108(i)(6) requires a partnership to allocate the 
COD income to partners according to partnership share on the day immediately preceding 
reacquisition and provides that the discharge will not trigger § 752(b) recognition under § 731 
because of a reduction in a partner's share of partnership liabilities. 
• Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(1) provides five safe harbors 
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where debt instruments issued by a partnership or S corporation will be treated as issued in a trade 
or business: (1) The gross fair market value of the trade or business assets of the partnership or S 
corporation represent at least 80 percent of the fair market value of all of its assets on the date of 
issuance, (2) trade or business expenses of the partnership or S corporation represent at least 80 
percent of all expenditures, (3) at least 95 percent of the interest paid on the debt instrument is 
allocable to trade or business expenditures under the interest allocation rules of Reg. § 1.163-8T, (4) 
at least 95 percent of the proceeds from the debt instrument were used to acquire trade or business 
assets within six months of the issue of the debt, or (5) the partnership or S corporation issued the 
debt instrument to the seller of a trade or business to acquire the trade or business. Absent anchoring 
in one of the safe harbors, qualification of a trade or business debt is a matter of facts and 
circumstances. " 
• While § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii) requires the election to be made at 
the partnership level, Temp. Reg. § 1.1 08(i)-2T(b)(1), allows the partnership to allocate both 
deferred and included portions of COD income to the partners. The temporary regulations first 
require that COD income be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately before the 
reacquisition in the manner the income would be included in distributive shares under § 704, then 
the partnership must determine the amount of COD income from the applicable instrument that is 
"the deferred amount includible in the partner's share and the amount that is immediately includible. 
With respect to deferred COD income of an S corporation, the Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(I) 
requires that on an election by the S corporation, deferred income must be shared pro rata on the 
basis of stock ownership immediately prior to the reacquisition. 
• Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(2) provides that a partner's 
basis is not adjusted under § 705(a) to account for the partner's share of partnership deferred COD 
income until the deferred item is recognized by the partner. Likewise, § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(2) provides 
that neither an S corporation shareholder's basis under § 1367 nor the shareholder's accumulated 
adjustment account is adjusted for deferred COD income until the shareholder recognizes the 
deferred COD income. 
• Following the rules of Rev. Proc. 2009-37, and applying the 
rules of § 108(i)(6), Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(3) provides that reduction in a partner's share of 
partnership liabilities is determined under § 752(b) when a debt instrument is reacquired, but that 
the reduction in liabilities is not treated as a distribution of money until deferred COD income is 
recognized by the partner. The temporary regulations provide additional rules for determining a 
partner's deferred amounts where the partner would recognize § 731 gain in the year of the 
reacquisition. 
" • Partners' capital accounts are adjusted as if no § 108(i) 
election were made. 
• Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(3) provides that gain 
attributable to a reduction in a partner's or S corporation shareholder's amount at-risk under 
§ 465( e) will not be taken into account in the year of reacquisition and will be deferred to the date 
the COD income in recognized. 
• In the case of an acceleration event under § 108(i)(5)(D) that 
requires a partnership or S corporation to recognized deferred items, under Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-
2T(c)(3) the partners or S corporation shareholders must account for deferred COD in the year that 
the accelerating event takes place. In addition, the temporary regulations described various 
circumstances in which a partner or S corporation shareholder terminates the interest in the entity 
that will" require acceleration of deferred COD income, including death, liquidation, sale or 
exchange, redemption, or abandonment. 
• Identical proposed regulations were issued simultaneously. 
REG-144762-09, Application of Section 108(i) to Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R. 49427 
(8113110). 
c . Significant guidance on a soon to expire beneficial Code section 
that leaves a nasty hangover. T.D. 9497, Guidance Regarding Deferred Discharge of 
Indebtedness Income of Corporations and Deferred Original issue Discount Deductions, 75 F.R. 
49394 (8/13110). The IRS and Treasury have promulgated Temp. Reg. §§ 1.108(i)-OT through 
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1.108(i)-3T providing detailed rules for C corporations regarding the acceleration of deferred 
COD income and deferred OlD deductions under § 108(i)(5)(D), and the calculation of earnings 
and profits as a result of an election under § 108(i). The regulations also provide rules applicable 
to all taxpayers regarding deferred OlD deductions under § 108(i) as a result of a reacquisition of 
an applicable debt instrument by an issuer or related party. 
• Identical proposed regulations were issued simultaneously. 
REG-142800-09, Guidance Regarding Deferred Discharge of Indebtedness Income of Corporations 
and Deferred Original Issue Discount Deductions, 75 F .R. 49428 (8/13/1 0). 
2. Rev. Rul. 2010-10, 2010-13 I.R.B. 461 (3/25/10) provides standard 
industry fare level cents-per-mile rates and terminal charges for the fIrst half of 2010 for 
determining the value of noncommercial flights on employer provided aircraft. 
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization 
1. Who says § 1060 prevents allocating basis in excess of fair market to 
tangible assets? Not Judge Kroupa of the Tax Court. West Covina Motors. Inc. v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-:291(12/16/09). The taxpayer purchased the assets of another 
corporation and paid various legal and other transactional fees in connection with the acquisition. 
Most, but not all, of the fees were related to a seller-financing arrangement for the purchased 
assets. The parties stipulated that the taxpayer paid $6,050,601 for specific assets, including 
(1) $250,001 for fixed assets, (2) $3.5 million for goodwill, and (3) $2,300,600 for the inventory 
of used vehicles, parts, and miscellaneous items, as well as acquiring $6,258,074 worth of new 
and demonstrator vehicle inventory that was subject to a $6,421,047 floor plan line of credit. 
Those legal and transactional fees that were attributable to inventory financing and physical 
inventory were allocated to the inventory to be taken into account in determining cost of goods 
sold. The IRS argued that because the acquisition was an "applicable asset acquisition" to which 
§ 1060 applied, the remaining legal fees, which were not specifically related to any particular 
asset, were required to be allocated to goodwill and going concern value under § 1060 because 
the fair-market-value limitations of § 1060· precluded an allocation to any other assets. In a 
stunning decision, Judge Kroupa rejected the IRS's position and held that even though the 
acquisition was an "applicable asset acquisition" as defined in § 1060, where the parties, i.e., the 
taxpayer and the IRS, have stipulated "the cost of each asset ... section 1060 does not apply." 
Accordingly, she agreed with the taxpayer that the legal fees should be allocated proportionately 
among all of the acquired assets to increase their bases - 2.03% to fixed assets, 18.69% to used 
vehicles and parts inventory, 50.84% to new and demonstrator vehicles, and 28.44% to goodwill. 
• Former Temp. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(e), which was the 
controlling regulation for the year of the transaction, specifically stated: "Allocation not to exceed 
fair market value. The amount of consideration allocated to an asset (other than Class IV assets) 
[defmed therein as 'intangible assets in the nature of goodwill and going concern value'] shall not 
exce,ed the fair market value of that asset on the purchase date." Although Judge Kroupa's opinion 
cited that provision, she somewhat mysteriously stated that "[the Commissioner] cites no authority 
requiring legal fees to be allocated under the fair-market-value limitations of section 1060 where the 
parties have stipulated the cost of each asset, and we find none." We on the other hand believe that 
former Temp. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(e) does precisely what Judge Kroupa believed that no authority 
required. Former Temp. Reg. § 1. 1.1060-1T(e) was mirrored in former Temp. Reg. § 1.338(b)-
2T(c)(1), and that provision continues to apply in current Reg. § 1.338-6(c)(1). In addition, current 
Reg. § 1.338-6(a)(2)(ii) specifically provides that "[t]ransaction costs are not taken into account in 
allocating ADSP or AGUB to assets in the deemed sale (except indirectly through their effect on the 
total ADSP or AGUB to be allocated)." Even more to the point, current Reg. § 1.1060-1(c)(3) now 
clearly specifically precludes the result in West Covina Motors from occurring: 
The seller and purchaser each adjusts the amount allocated to an individual asset 
to take into account the specific identifiable costs incurred in transferring that 
asset in connection with the applicable asset acquisition (e.g., real estate transfer 
costs or security interest perfection costs). Costs so allocated increase, or 
decrease, as appropriate, the total consideration that is allocated under the residual 
6 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
method. No adjustment is made to the amount allocated to an individual asset for 
general costs associated with the applicable asset acquisition as a whole or with 
groups of assets included therein (e.g., non-specific appraisal fees or accounting 
fees). These latter amounts are taken into account only indirectly through their 
effect on the total consideration to be allocated. 
• Although current Reg. § 1.1060-1(c)(3) post-dates the 
transaction in West Covina Motors, and thus was not technically controlling, it is merely a more 
specific statement of the rule in current Reg. § 1.338-6(a)(2)(ii), which in tum merely clarifies 
current Reg. § 1.338-6(c)(I), which is identical to former Temp. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(c)(l), which 
mirrored former Temp. Reg. § 1.1060-1 T( e), which should have been controlling in West Covina. 
• The bottom line: Don't take the holding in this case too 
seriously. Its reasoning is suspect. 
2 • Those fancy Pyrex® and Oneida® branded kitchen products are 
made by Robinson Knife Manufacturing, which is required to capitalize license fees. 
Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-9 (1/14/09). The 
taxpayer designs and produces kitchen tools for sale to large retail chains. To enhance its 
marketing, the taxpayer paid license fees to Coming for use of the Pyrex trademark and Oneida 
for use of the Oneida trademark on kitchen tools designed and produced by the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer's production of kitchen tools bearing the licensed trademarks was subject to review and 
quality control by Coming or Oneida. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer's licensing fees were 
subject to capitalization into inventory under § 263A under Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(ii)(u), which 
expressly includes licensing and franchise fees as indirect costs that must be allocated to 
produced property. Agreeing with the IRS, the court (Judge Marvel) rejected the taxpayer's 
argument that the licensing fees, incurred to enhance the marketability of its produced products, 
were deductible as marketing, selling, or advertising costs excluded from the capitalization 
requirements by Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(iii)(A). The court noted that the design approval and 
quality control elements of the licensing agreements benefited the taxpayer in the development 
and production of kitchen tools marketed with the licensed trademarks. The court rejected the 
taxpayer's argument that Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331, which allowed a current deduction 
for costs incurred in obtaining ISO 9000 certification as an assurance of quality processes in 
providing goods and services, was applicable to. the quality control element of the license 
agreements. The court noted that although the trademarks permitted the taxpayer to produce 
kitchen tools that were more marketable than the taxpayer's other products, the royalties directly 
benefited and/or were incurred by reason of the taxpayer's production activities. The court also 
upheld the IRS's application of the simplified production method of Reg. § 1.263A-2(b) to 
allocate the license fees between cost of goods sold and ending inventory as consistent with the 
taxpayer's use of the simplified production method for allocating other indirect costs. 
a . But the Second Circuit disagrees. Robinson Knife Manufacturing 
Co. v. Commissioner, 600 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 3/16/10). Like the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals 
rejected Robinson's arguments that the royalty payments were deductible as marketing, selling, 
advertising or distribution costs under Reg. § 1.263-1(e)(3)(iii)(A), or that the royalty payments 
were deductible as not having been incurred in securing the contractual right to use a trademark, 
corporate plan, manufacturing procedure, special recipe, or other similar right associated with 
property produced under Reg. § 1.263A-l(e)(3)(ii)(U). The Court of Appeals concluded, 
however, that "royalty payments which are (1) calculated as a percentage of sales revenue from 
certain inventory, and (2) incurred only upon sale of such inventory, are not required to be 
capitalized under the § 263A regulations." The court held that the royalties were neither incurred 
in, nor directly benefited, the performance of production activities under Reg. § 1.263A-
1 (e)(3)(i). Unlike license agreements, the court concluded that Robinson could have 
manufactured the products, and did, without paying the royalty costs. The royalties were not, 
therefore, incurred by reason of the production process. The court also concluded that since the 
royalties were incurred for kitchen tools that have been sold, "it is necessarily true that the 
royalty costs and the income from sale of the inventory items are incurred simultaneously." The 
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court noted further that had Robinson's licensing agreements provided for non-sales based 
royalties, then capitalization would have been required. 
3. Legal fees incurred resisting states' attorney general challenges to the 
privatization of Blue Shield are capital expenses. Wellpoint. Inc. v. Commissioner, 599 F.3d 
641 (7th Cir. 3/23110). The taxpayer provides health insurance coverage through operating 
subsidiaries that are licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and are a result of 
mergers with Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations that were once characterized as tax-
exempt charitable entities. Several state attorneys general brought cy-pres or charitable trust 
actions against the taxpayer claiming assets of the charitable organizations that were impressed 
with charitable trusts. The taxpayer made payments of nearly $114 million to settle these actions. 
The Circuit Court affirmed the Tax Court holding (T.C. Memo. 2008-236) that the taxpayer's 
legal fees and settlement payments were incurred in a dispute over the equitable ownership of 
assets allegedly impressed with charitable trust obligations, and that the fees and payments were 
thus required to be capitalized. Judge Posner described an expenditure as a capital expense "if its 
'utility ... survives the accounting period' in which it is made" (citing Sears Oil Co. v. 
Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 1966)) and added that "expense incurred to enhance" 
the value of a capital asset must be capitalized, and thus amortized over the asset's remaining 
life." The court concluded that the settlement was based on claims involving Wellpoint's title to 
the assets acquired from the formerly tax-exempt entities. The court rejected the taxpayer's 
argument that the payments were incurred to protect its business practices. 
4. Starting-up is cheaper. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 increases 
the amount of deductible § 195 start-up expenses for investigating or creating an active trade or 
business from $5,000 to $10,000 for expenses incurred in a year beginning in 2010. The phase 
out amount is also increased from $50,000 to $60,000. 
C. Reasonable Compensation 
1. Throwing the TARP over compensation of insurance executives even 
though they never received a TARP. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 162(m) by adding 
subsection (m)(6) to limit deductions for compensation paid by health insurance providers, 
which is defmed as any employer that is a health insurance issuer (as defined in § 9832(b)(2) of 
the Act) not less than 25 percent of the gross premiums of which are received from providing 
health insurance coverage (as defined in § 9832(b)(1) of the Act) "that is minimum essential 
coverage." The deduction for compensation for services rendered in any year is limited to 
$500,000, regardless of whether the compensation is paid during the taxable year or in a 
subsequent taxable year. As under § 162(m)(5) for remuneration from TARP participants, there 
are no exceptions for performance based compensation or compensation under existing binding 
contracts. The limitation applies not only to all officers, directors, and employees, but also to any 
other service providers, such as consultants, performing services for or on behalf of a covered 
health insurance provider. The provision is effective for remuneration paid in taxable years 
beginning after 2012 with respect to services performed after 2009. 
• OMG - Does it apply to outside counsel? 
2 • Multi-Pak Corporation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-139 (6/22110). 
In this case appealable to the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court (Judge Goeke) allowed deductions for 
the full amount of compensation paid to the taxpayer's sole shareholder/CEO and COO, for 2002 
in the amount of $2,020,000, but reduced the allowable compensation deduction for 2003 from 
$2,058,000 to $1,284,104. Both amounts were greater than the $665,000 and $660,000 amounts 
that the IRS asserted as reasonable. The court applied the five factor test of Elliotts, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1243-1245 (9th Cir. 1983): (1) The employee's role in the 
company; (2) comparison with other companies; (3) the character and condition of the company; 
(4) potential conflicts of interest; and (5) internal consistency in compensation. The court 
rejected the opinions of dueling experts, noting that neither expert looked to companies 
comparable to the taxpayer. The court also faulted the taxpayer's expert for not performing the 
"analysis, required in the applicable caselaw, of whether an independent investor would have 
been satisfied by his or her return on investment." Noting that the Court of Appeals in Elliotts 
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found that a 20 percent return on equity would satisfy the hypothetical investor, the court 
indicated that the taxpayer's 2.9 percent return in 2002 supported the salary in light of an 
impressive growth in sales, but the -15.8 percent return in 2003 called into question the amount 
of compensation paid in that year. Finally, the court refused to apply a § 6662(a) accuracy 
penalty. 
D. Miscellaneous Deductions 
1. The ms responds to high gasoline prices. Announcement 2008-63, 
2008-2 C.B. 114 (6/23/08), modifying Rev. Proc. 2007-70. The IRS announced that the business 
mileage rate for the second half of 2008 will be 58.5 cents per mile - an increase of 8 cents per 
mile - and that the medical/moving rate will also increase by 8 cents per mile to 27 cents per 
mile. The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents per mile. 
a. But gas prices abruptly declined in fall 2008. Rev. Proc. 2008-
72, 2008-50 I.R.B. 1286 (11/24/08). The business mileage rate for 2009 will be 55 cents per mile 
- a decrease of 3.5 cents per mile - and that the medicaVmoving rate will decrease by three cents 
to 24 cents per mile. The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents 
per mile. 
b. Mileage rates for 2010. Rev. Proc. 2009-54, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930 
(12/03/09). Mileage rates for business travel after January 1, 2010 drop to 50 cents per mile, 
remain at 14 cents for charitable use, and drop to 16.5 cents for medical or moving use. 
2. Throw another log on the fire! Loss of contemporaneous § 274(d) 
mileage log in a fire doesn't cause loss of mileage deductions too. Freeman v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2009-213 (9/16/09). Judge Gustafson allowed the taxpayer a deduction, at mileage 
rates, for business use of his automobile on the basis of the taxpayer's credible testimony 
regarding the route he drove in connection with his auto parts delivery business. The taxpayer 
had maintained and at one time possessed adequate documentation, in the form of a daily log, to 
comply with § 274(d), but his failure to produce that daily log was the result of an accidental fire 
that destroyed his house and the logbook. Reg. § 1.274-5T(c)(5) allows a taxpayer to 
"substantiate a deduction by reasonable reconstruction of his expenditures or use" when records 
are lost through circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control, including a fire. 
a. But if you lose the mileage log books due to CRS [misplacing 
them], or they're just plain s****y [smudgy?], you're out of luck. Royster v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2010-016 (2/1/10). The taxpayer was denied a deduction for claimed 2003 business 
mileage because he had "lost" his log books. But it probably didn't matter. He was also denied 
any deductions for 2004 and 2005 business mileage because his log books recorded only the 
odometer readings at the beginning and end of each day and had no indications of the business 
purpose of the trips or the destinations. 
3 . Revised per diem rates for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses. 
Rev. Proc. 2009-47, 2009-42 I.R.B 524 (9/30/09). The IRS has provided up dated rules for 
employer provided per diem allowances that do not require substantiation, and which may be 
used by self-employed persons and employees who are not reimbursed for travel expenses. Per 
diem rates for travel within the U.S. are the rates for government travel set forth in 41 C.F.R. ch. 
301, appx. A. Travelers may use the rates in effect for the first nine months of 2009 for all travel 
within 2009, or may use the updated rates for travel between October l.and December 31, 2009. 
Rates for travel outside the continental United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) are 
published by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and are updated monthly. The 
rates are available at www.gsa.gov. A traveler may use per diem allowances for meals and 
incidental expenses along with actual lodging expenses. The revenue procedure also provides 
fixed high-low per diem rates of $258 for a high cost locality, with a list provided, and $163 for 
travel to any other locality. 
4 • Holding herself out as a contract attorney did not establish a trade or 
business. Forrest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-228 (10/5/09). Before 1988 the taxpayer 
worked as a contract attorney performing work for other attorneys. She then went to work for the 
California Department of Corporations, but was terminated from that position in 2000. She 
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worked as a contract attorney in 2000, but not in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 the taxpayer attempted ( 
again to work as a contract attorney, incurring expenses, before she was reinstated with the 
Department of Corporations in 2003. The court (Judge Vasquez) held that the taxpayer's 
activities were not sufficiently regular or continuous to qualify as a trade or business. The court 
also concluded that, even if the taxpayer's prior activities were sufficient to qualify as a trade or 
business, there was insufficient continuity into her activities in 2003 to constitute a continuation 
of her previous trade or business. The court also noted that the taxpayer's attendance at a four 
day ABA meeting and attempts to solicit contract work were not regular and continuous business 
activates, that she did not negotiate or perform contract attorney services during the year, and 
that her efforts were terminated when she resumed employment with the Department of 
Corporations. 
5 . The IRS rescues OlD interest deductions for borrowers that recognize 
COD income under the Cottage Savings regulations as a result of loan modifications that 
don't reduce principal. Notice 2010-11, 2010-4 I.R.B. 326 (12/24/09). Pursuant to 
§ 163(e)(5)(f)(iii), the IRS has extended through 12/31/10 the suspension of the application of 
§ 163(e)(5), which partially disallows interest deductions with respect to certain applicable high 
yield discount obligations (AHYDOs), for "qualified obligations." An obligation is a "qualified 
obligation" only if: (I) the AHYDO is issued after December 31, 2009, and on or before 
December 31, 2010, in exchange (including an exchange resulting from a modification of the 
debt instrument) for an obligation that is not an AHYDO; (2) the issuer (or obligor) of the 
AHYDO is the same as the issuer (or obligor) of the obligation exchanged for the AHYDO; 
(3) the AHYDO does not pay interest that would be treated as contingent interest for purposes of 
§ 871(h)(4) (without regard to § 871(h)(4)(D)); (4) the AHYDO is not issued to a related person 
(within the meaning of § 108(e)(4)); (5) the issue price of the AHYDO is determined under 
§§ 1273(b)(I), 1273(b)(2), 1 273(b)(3), or 1 274(b)(3), whichever is applicable, and the 
regulations thereunder; and (6) the AHYDO would not otherwise be an AHYDO if its issue price 
were increased by the amount of any discharge of indebtedness income realized by the issuer (or ( 
obligor) upon the exchange. 
6. Restitution of insurance fraud proceeds is deductible. Cheating wife 
produces business losses. Cavaretta v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-4 (1/5/10). The 
taxpayer dentist's wife, who managed the billing for the taxpayer's dental practice, billed an 
insurance company for work that had not been done. The dentist was unaware of his wife's false 
claims, but unfortunately for her the insurance company figured it out. She subsequently pled 
guilty to criminal health-care fraud and received a prison sentence followed by supervised 
release. Restitution was not ordered in the criminal proceeding, but the wife had agreed to repay 
$600,000 in civil restitution before sentencing and compliance with the restitution agreement 
was required as condition or supervised release from prison. The repayment was made by the 
taxpayer over three taxable years. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) held, first, that the restitution 
payments, which were made by the husband, were deductible because payment was 
compensatory, not punitive, and thus § 162(f) did not disallow the deduction. He agreed with the 
taxpayer's claim that the repayments were deductible as losses incurred in a trade or business 
under § 165(c)(I) and rejected the IRS's argument that the payments constituted restitution 
deductible as a loss in a transaction entered into for profit under § 165( c )(2), which is not eligible 
for carryback under § 172( d). The court refused to apply the holding of Stephens v. 
Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990), that states that a payment constituting "restitution" 
is never deductible under § 162 and only sometimes deductible under § 165. The court concluded 
that the "restitution" label does not make a repayment automatically ineligible for deduction as a 
business expense. The court distinguished Stephens as involving restitution for criminal fraud 
and embezzlement without any connection to a separate trade or business. The court also rejected 
the IRS argument that because the payments were expenses of committing fraud they cannot be 
considered as business expenses. The court found that the repayment was an ordinary and 
necessary expense of the dental practice. 
7 . Multi-employer life insurance plan too good to be true? Yes, says the 
Tax Court. Curcio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-115 (5/27110). This case consolidated (, 
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( IRS assessments and penalties against three companies that had been involved in The Benistar 
419 Plan and Trust, established by Daniel Carpenter and promoted in a book entitled A 
Professional's Guide to 419 Plans. Participating companies contributed money to a trust account 
which in tum acquired cash rich life insurance policies covering employees insured by the plan. 
Benistar withdrew 9 percent of the surrender value of the policies to cover its expenses. 
Promotional materials promised unlimited deductions, contribution rates that are variable from 
year to year, benefits that could be provided to key employees on a selective basis, that 
contributions to the plan are not limited by qualified plan rules and will not interfere with 
qualified plans, funds inside the Benistar trust accumulate tax free, death benefits are income and 
estate tax free, arrangements can be made for later tax-free distributions, and the funds are secure 
from creditors. Section 419(a) provides that contributions to a welfare benefit fund are 
deductible, limited under § 419(b) to the plan's qualified cost, but only if the contributions are 
otherwise deductible under Chapter 1 of the Code. Section 419(f)(6) provides that contributions 
to a mUlti-employer plan are not subject to the limit of § 419(b). The court (Judge Cohen) held 
that contributions to the plans were not deductible under § 162 because the taxpayers had the 
right to receive the value reflected in the underlying insurance policies in the Benistar plan, and 
that the taxpayers used the plan to funnel pretax business profits into cash-laden life insurance 
policies over which they retained control. The court also held that contributions to the plan were 
constructive dividends rather than deductible expenses. The court found that the costs of 
insurance policies under the plans claimed as deductions far exceeded the costs of providing term 
life insurance to the covered employees, that the taxpayers treated the underlying policies as their 
own, and that the policies could be withdrawn from the plan without cost. 
. • With respect to S corporation employee shareholders in one 
of the cases, the court pointed out that deductions claimed and denied for 2002 would properly 
increase income under § 1366 and basis under § 1367 which would offset subsequent distributions. 
With respect to the S corporation shareholder involved, since the corporation claimed a deduction in 
2002, a year not before the court, and the actual contribution was paid in 2003, there was no 
increase in income in 2003 to create basis. Absent evidence regarding basis at the end of 2002, the 
court presumed that the basis was zero. 
• The· court also affirmed accuracy related penalties assessed 
under § 6662(a), rejecting both the taxpayers' arguments that their positions were supported by 
substantial authority and that they reasonably relied on professionals. On the latter point the court 
found that the accountants on whom the taxpayers asserted reliance had no expertise in employee 
benefit rules and the insurance agents had no tax expertise on which reliance was reasonably 
warranted. 
a. And another one goes down. McGehee Family Clinic. P.A. v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-202 (9/15/10). Same book, same plan, same judge (Cohen, J.), 
different taxpayer, same result with penalties. 
8. This mountain does not blossom into cost of goods. D.L. White 
Construction, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C Memo. 2010-141 (6/28/10). The taxpayer, a C 
corporation, purchased 80 acres in Idaho with plans to construct four houses for sale to 
customers. Unfortunately the access road to the property was owned by another who disputed in 
the Idaho courts the taxpayer's right to an easement. As a consequence the taxpayer claimed the 
purchased land was worthless and claimed the loss as a cost of goods sold. The Tax Court (Judge 
Marvel) rejected the taxpayer's argument that the purchased land represented a cost of goods 
sold. The court noted that § 471 generally prohibits inventory accounting for property that is not 
merchandise and added that that land is not merchandise. The court also rejected the taxpayer's 
claim that it was entitled to a business loss under § 165(a) holding that the taxpayer's claimed 
loss is not evidenced by a closed and completed transaction because the adjacent land owner's 
lawsuit was not finally resolved. 
9 . Have you documented that your own cell phone is used for business 
rather than personal purposes? Tash v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-120 (4/29/08). 
Among the many deductions claimed by a lawyer that Judge Haines disallowed was the 
deduction claimed for his cellular telephone, because "[t]he record did not indicate whether 
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petitioner used his cellular telephone for business and/or personal calls." Inasmuch as cell phones ( 
are listed property, Reg. § 1.274-5(c) and (t) require substantiation for the deduction. 
a. How do you steer the car? It might or might not be OK to 
drive while talking on your cell phone, but it is imperative to take notes in your log book 
while chatting on the phone. Alami v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-42 (2/23/09). Judge 
Vasquez denied the taxpayer's claimed business deductions for cellular telephone service 
because the taxpayer failed to establish the amount of time he used his cell phone for business 
and personal purposes. A cellular phone is "listed property" that is subject to the strict 
. substantiation requirements of § 274(d) pursuant to § 280F(d)(4)(A)(v), and a taxpayer must 
establish the amount of business use and the amount of total use for the property to substantiate 
the amount of expenses for listed property. An alternative ground for denying the deduction was 
that the taxpayer's employer did not require that he have a cell phone. 
eQuery whether there are employer reporting obligations with 
respect to cell phones furnished to employees who fail to keep records? 
b. But, simplified methods for reporting cell phone use are under 
consideration. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068 (6/8/09). IRS is considering methods to 
simplify treatment of employer-provided cell phones, including a (1) "minimal personal use 
method" (if the employee accounts to the employer that he has a personal cell phone for use 
during business hours); and (2) a safe harbor method under which an employer would treat 75 
percent of each employee's use ofthe cell phone as business usage. 
e In a letter to Representative Skelton, INFO 2009-0141 
(7/8/09), the IRS advised that it is seeking clarifying legislation from Congress. 20091NT 216-62. 
c. And the Prez says to Congress "delist" cell phones. President 
Obama's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget calls for Congress to amend § 280F to remove cellular 
telephones from the category of listed property, thereby "effectively removing the requirement of 
strict substantiation and the limitation on depreciation deductions." Department of the Treasury, 
General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2011 Revenue Proposals 26 (February ( 
2010). The substantiation requirements are "burdensome for employers"; it is difficult to 
document the cost of cell phone calls, and "the cost of accounting for personal use often exceeds 
the amount of any resulting income." The proposal specifically contemplates that "a cell phone 
(or other similar telecommunications equipment) provided primarily for business purposes would 
be excluded from gross income." 
d. Finally, there is no longer a need to keep a log book on the 
front seat of your car. Section 2043 of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 removed "cellular 
telephones and similar telecommunications equipment" from the definition of "listed property" 
contained in § 280F(d)(4) for taxable years beginning after 12/31109. This, in tum, eliminates the 
§ 274(d) substantiation requirement for business cell phone use. 
E. Depreciation & Amortization 
1. Now that's a whole lotta expens'n goin' on! For taxable years beginning 
in 2008 and 2009, the 2009 ARRA, § 1202, increases the § 179 maximum deductible amount to 
$250,000 and provides a phase-out threshold of $800,000. The maximum amount allowed to be 
deducted under § 179 is increased by another $35,000 for (a) qualified enterprise zone property, 
I.R.C. § 1397(a)(1), and (b) qualified renewal community property acquired and placed in 
service after 2001 and before 2010. I.R.C. § 1400J. In addition, for both qualified enterprise zone 
property and qualified renewal community property, only fifty percent of the cost of property in 
excess of the threshold for the phase-out is taken into account. I.R.C. § 1397(a)(2). I.R.C. 
§ 179(e) increases the maximum amount allowed to be deducted under § 179 by $100,000, and 
increases the phase-out threshold by $600,000, for qualified disaster assistance property placed 
in service after 2007 (with respect to disasters declared after that date) and before 2010. The 
increased expensing and ceiling limits under the 2009 ARRA also affect the special expensing 
rules for enterprise zone property, renewal property, and for qualified disaster assistance 
property. Thus, the maximum § 179 deduction for qualified enterprise zone and renewal property 
is $285,000 for 2008 and 2009 ($250,000 + $35,000). For qualified disaster assistance property 
12 
in 2008 and 2009 the maximum deduction is $350,000 ($250,000 +$100,000), and the phase-out 
threshold is $1,400,000 ($800,000 + $600,000). 
a. And the tide of the expens'n rolls on. The 2010 HIRE Act 
extended the increased $250,000 ceiling on deducting the cost of equipment under § 179, and the 
increased phase-out threshold of $800,000, through taxable years beginning before 2011. 
b. Rev. Proc. 2010-24, 2010-25 I.R.B. 764 (6/1/10). The Revenue 
Procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R .. B. 617, ~ 3.08, to update inflation adjusted 
§ 179 first year depreciation to reflect increases provided by the 2010 HIRE Act increasing for 
taxable years beginning in 2010 the aggregate cost of § 179 property eligible for expensing to· 
$250,000 and the amount above which the deduction is red~ced to $800,000. 
c. The tide is growing into a tsunami. The Small Business Jobs Act 
of 2010 increases the § 179 increases the deductible amount to $500,000 for tax years beginning 
in 2010 or 2011 and increases the phase-out threshold to $2,000,000. 
d. And certain real property becomes eligible. The Small Business 
Jobs Act of 2010 extends the § 179 deduction to "qualified real property" as defined in § 168( e). 
Section 179(t) allows the deduction of up to $250,000 of capital expenditures for qualified 
leasehold improvement property, qualified restaurant property, and qualified retail improvement 
property. The qualified real property allowance is within the overall $500,000 expenditure limit 
of § 179 and is limited to depreciable real property used in the taxpayer's trade or business. 
e. If that's not enough, 50 percent bonus depreciation is extended 
for 2010. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 extends application of the 50 percent bonus 
depreciation allowance of § 168(k) for one year to property placed in service before 1/1/11. The 
50 percent allowance is available for depreciable machinery and equipment and most other 
tangible personal property, and is available for computer software and certain leasehold 
improvements, the first use of which began with the taxpayer. 
. 2. Converting corn to ethanol is waste reduction and resource recovery, 
not a chemical process. Notice 2009-64, 2009-36 I.R.B. 307 (8/24/09). The notice contains a 
proposed revenue ruling to classify tangible assets used to convert com into fuel grade ethanol as 
belonging to asset class 49.5 of Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, ten year property with a 
seven year MACRS recovery period. The IRS concludes that such assets are not properly 
assigned to asset class 28, manufacture of chemicals and allied products, which has a 9.5 year 
class life and five year MACRS recovery period. 
3. Stimulate the economy, buy a new car, light truck or van and claim 
$100 more depreciation. Rev Proc 2010-18, 2010-9 I.R.B. 427 (2/18/10). The annual dollar 
limit on depreciation for passenger automobiles placed in service in 2010 is generally increased 
by $100 for the first year as follows: $3,060 for the placed in service year, $4,900 for the second 
tax year, $2,950 for the third tax year, and $1,775 for each succeeding year. The limits for light 
trucks and vans are: $3,160 for the placed in service year, $5,100 for the second tax year, $3,050 
for the third tax year, and $1,875 for each succeeding year. 
4. Ouch! Fifteen year recovery period for a one-year lived asset. 
Covenant not to compete from a minority S corporation shareholder is a § 197 intangible. 
Recovery Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-76 (4/15/10). The taxpayer S 
corporation paid a retiring 23 percent shareholder/employee $400,000 for a one-year covenant 
not to compete. The taxpayer asserted that the acquisition of a 23 percent interest was not 
"entered into in connection with an acquisition (directly or indirectly) of an interest in a trade or 
business or substantial portion thereof' as provided in § 197(d)(I)(E), and claimed a full year's 
deduction for the amount paid. The court (Judge Gustafson) upon a careful analysis of the 
statutory phrase concluded that the covenant was part of an acquisition of an interest in a trade or 
business, that the interest was "substantial," and that in any event the term "thereof' in the 
statutory language does not modify "an interest," which, therefore, need not be substantial. 
5. Fiat Lux but only for seven years. Street lights are not land 
improvements. Here, it's better not to be assigned an asset class. PPL Corporation v. 
Commission, 135 T.C. No.8 (7/28/10). The taxpayer public utility company claimed that 
streetlights were depreciable over seven years, as property for which there is no assigned 
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recovery period, while the IRS asserted that the proper recovery period for the streetlights was 20 ( 
years, as electric utility transmission and distribution plant, or alternatively 15 years, as land 
improvements. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that street lighting, including lamps, poles 
and wiring, owned and installed by an electric utility for public and private customers were held 
to constitute property without a class life and were thus eligible for seven year MACRS recovery 
under § 168(e)(2) & (3). Judge Halpern found that the streetlights were neither (1) electric utility 
transmission and distribution plant, because they were "'primarily used' to make light, not to 
distribute electricity," and not used in the distribution of electricity for sale, nor (2) land 
improvements, because they were bolted to wood poles and buildings and not affixed to anything 
in an inherently permanent way. Judge Halpern applied the six factors of Whiteco Industries, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 664 (1975), which focus on the permanence of the depreciable 
property and the damage caused to it or to realty upon removal of the depreciable property: 
(l) "Is the property capable of being moved, and has it in fact been moved?" (2) "Is the property 
designed or constructed to remain permanently in place?" (3) "Are there circumstances which 
tend to show the expected or intended length of affixation, i.e., are there circumstances which . 
show that the property mayor will have to be moved?" (4) "How substantial ajob is removal of 
the property and how time-consuming is it? Is it 'readily removable'?" (5) "How much damage 
will the property sustain upon its removal?" and (6) "What is the manner of affixation of the 
property to the land?" Every factor suggested that street lights, including poles bolted to concrete 
foundations, which were easily moved, were not land improvements. 
a. Entergy Corporation & Affiliated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 
T.C .Memo 2010-166 (7/28/10). Follows PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.8 (7/28/10), 
on essentially similar facts. 
F. Credits 
1. A credit for Vinny Gambini hiring disconnected "yutes." The 2009 
ARRA, § 1221, added two new categories of eligible employees for 2009 and 2010 under the 
existing Code § 51 Work Opportunity Tax Credit: unemployed veterans and "disconnected ( 
youths." To qualify as an unemployed veteran, the employee (1) must have been discharged from 
active duty in the military (after serving at least 180 days or being discharged for a service-
connected disability) during the five-year period eriding on the hiring date, and (2) must have 
received unemployment compensation for at least four weeks during the one-year period ending 
on the hiring date. A disconnected youth is an individual certified by the designated local agency 
who is (1) at least age 16 but not yet age 25 on the hiring date, (2) not regularly attending any 
secondary, technical, or post-secondary school during the six-month period preceding the hiring 
date, (3) not regularly employed during the six-month period preceding the hiring date, and 
(4) not readily employable by reason of,1acking a sufficient number of skills. 
a. Disconnected yutes defined. Notice 2009-28, 2009-24 I.R.B. 
1082 (5/28/09), 2009 ARRA amended § 51 to add two new targeted groups for purposes of the § 
51 work opportunity credit: unemployed veterans and disconnected youths who begin work for 
an employer during 2009 or 2010. This provides guidance on the definition of "disconnected 
youth." It also provides transition relief for employers who hire unemployed veterans or 
disconnected youths after 12/31108, and before 7/17/09. 
b. The IRS is paying you not to fire newly hired people. Code 
§§ 38(b) and 39, as amended by the 2010 HIRE Act, provide a credit for retaining newly hired 
workers. The amount of the credit is the lesser of (1) $1,000 or (2) 6.2 percent of the wages paid 
to the worker during the 52 week period following the commencement of employment in a tax 
year ending after 3/18/10. The credit is not available unless the employee's wages (as defined for 
income tax withholding in § 3401(a)) during the last 26 weeks of the period are at least 80 
percent of the wages for the first 26 weeks of that period. The credit is allowed in the year in 
which the 52 period ends. No portion of the unused business credit under § 38 for any tax year 
that is attributable to the increased credit under the 2010 HIRE Act may be carried to a tax year 
beginning before 3/18/10. 
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( 2 . There is no research credit for foreign research, but foreign gross 
receipts do count in calculating the amount of the allowable credit. Deere & Company v. 
Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 11 (10/22/09). As in effect for the year at issue, § 41(c)(4) provided 
that the § 41 (a) increasing research credit was equal to the sum of 2.65 percent of so much as of 
the qualifying research expenses for the taxable year as exceeded one percent of the average 
annual gross receipts of the taxpayer for the 4 taxable years preceding the credit year, 3.2 percent 
of the amount of qualifying research expenditures that exceed 1.5 percent of the average gross 
receipts, and 3.75 percent of the qualifying research expenditures that exceed 2 percent of the 
average gross receipts for the four year period. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) rejected the 
taxpayer's assertion that average gross receipts under this provision is calculated by excluding 
the annual gross receipts from foreign branches. The court concluded that nothing in the 
structure of § 41 nor the legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to include 
_ foreign gross receipts in the § 41(c)(4) calculation. The court indicated that if Congress had 
intended to exclude foreign gross receipts, it would have so mandated. The court also concluded 
that including the foreign gross receipts is not inconsistent with the focus of the research credit 
on increases in domestic research activities. 
3. Property sold to customers is "supplies." Huh? TG Missouri 
Corporation v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 13 (11112/09). The § 41 research credit includes in 
qualified research expenses the cost of "supplies used in the course of qualified research." Under 
§ 41(b)(2)(C) supplies include tangible personal property, but do not include property subject to 
the allowance for depreciation. The taxpayer manufactures automobile parts for customers. In the 
course of designing and producing new parts the taxpayer designs and engineers production 
molds that it purchases from a third-party tool maker. Once the production molds are ready for 
the production of parts for the customer the taxpayer sells the molds to the customer. However, 
the taxpayer retains possession of the molds as it produces parts for the customer. The IRS 
asserted that the molds are property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation 
regardless of whether the molds are depreciable property in the taxpayer's hands. The Tax Court 
(Judge Marvel) accepted the taxpayer's interpretation of § 41(b)(2)(C) that the exclusion from 
supplies applies to property that is subject to the allowance for depreciation in the hands of the 
taxpayer. The court examined language in § 174(c) to conclude that for both purposes the 
exclusion applicable to depreciable property is applicable to property that is accounted for by the 
taxpayer as depreciable property. By virtue of its sale of the molds to customers, taxpayer did not 
retain an economic interest in the molds entitling it to claim depreciation deductions, 
notwithstanding the taxpayer's continued possession of the molds. The court also looked to 
§§ 1239 and 453 to conclude that references in the Code to depreciable property are not limited 
to the extrinsic nature of the property alone, but depend upon the property being depreciable in 
the hands of the holder. 
4 • The research credit is available for the whole boat. Trinity Industries, 
Inc. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Tex. 1129/10). For purposes of the § 41 research 
credit, research undertaken for the discovery of technological infonnation, substantially all of the 
research activities must constitute elements of a process that related to a new or improved 
function. The tests of § 41 are applied to each "business component" of the taxpayer, which is a 
product or process held for sale or used in the business. § 41(d)(2). A Trinity subsidiary designed 
and built six prototype "first in class" ships. The court rejected the IRS'argument that the special 
order ships were not held for sale because they were not sold out of inventory. The court also 
refused to accept the assertion that because each ship consisted of numerous existing 
subassemblies incorporated into a ship design that the total development cost of each ship does 
not constitute a qualified research expense. Citing Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(6), the court held that as long 
as the taxpayer can demonstrate that 80 percent of a first-in-class ship was part of a process of 
experimentation, the entire cost is a research expenditure. The court also indicated that the 
taxpayer failed to offer evidence from which the court could detennine the amount of research 
expenditure relating to any business component smaller than the entire ship. The court then 
found that 80 percent of the costs of two of the six projects for which the. taxpayer claimed the 
research credit represented qualified experimentation. 
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5. Who says Congress doesn't love small bidnesses? Big bidnesses are ( 
required to buy health insurance for their employees and must pay excise taxes if they 
don't; small bidnesses, which aren't required to buy health insurance for their employees 
get, a tax credit if they do. New § 45R, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, adds to the § 38 
general business credit a credit for health insurance expenses of small business· employers, 
effective for taxable years beginning after 2010. This provision is generally intended to 
encourage small employers, who are not required to provide health insurance to their employees 
under other provisions of the Act, to provide health insurance benefits to their employees. Some 
amount of the credit is available to a business employer with no more than 25 full-time 
equivalent employees (2,080 hours is an FTE), if the employees have average annual full-time 
equivalent wages of no more than $50,000 (as adjusted for inflation after 2014). The full amount 
of the credit is available only to an employer with 10 or fewer full-time equivalent employees, 
whose employees have average annual full-time equivalent wages from the employer of less than 
$25,000 (as adjusted for inflation after 2014). Seasonal workers are not taken into account. 
Employer aggregation rules apply. Self-employed individuals, including partners and sole 
proprietors, two percent shareholders of an S Corporation, and five percent owners of the 
employer (as defined in § 416(i)(I)(B)(i)) are not treated as employees, and sole proprietors 
cannot claim the credit with respect to employees who are family members. The credit applies 
only to contributions under a plan that requires the employer to make a nonelective contribution 
on behalf of each employee who enrolls in certain defined qualifying health insurance offered to 
employees by the employer equal to a uniform percentage (not less than 50 percent) of the 
premium cost of the qualifying health plan. Before the phase-out rules are applied, the amount of 
the credit equals the "applicable percentage" of the employer's mandatory health insurance 
premium for each covered employee; amounts paid under a cafeteria plan are not taken into 
account. For 2010 through 2013, the applicable percentage is 35 percent; for years after 2013, the 
applicable percentage is 50 percent. However, the credit cannot exceed the applicable percentage 
multiplied by the contributions that the employer would have made during the taxable year if ( 
each employee had enrolled in coverage with a "small business benchmark premium" (as defined 
in the statute). The phase out formula depends on (1) whether the employer has more than 10 
employees, (2) whether the employees' average wages exceed $25,000, (3) whether both (1) and 
(2) apply, and whether the year is claimed, i.e., the year after the taxable year with respect to 
which the credit is claimed, is 2011 through 2013 or after 2013. We will not provide the gory 
details. The credit is nonrefundable, but may offset AMT liability. The employer's § 162 
deduction is reduced by the amount of the credit. 
a. Healthy credits. Rev. Rul. 2010-13, 2010-21 I.R.B. 691 (5/3/10). 
Section 45R enacted in the Health Care Act, provides a credit to eligible small employers (fewer 
than 25 employees with average annual wages around $50,000), including tax exempt 
employers, who make nonelective contributions (contributions that are not part of a salary 
reduction agreement) towards employee health care based on a percentage of the lesser of (1) the 
amount of nonelective contributions paid by the small employer and (2) the amount of 
nonelective contributions the employer would have paid if employees were enrolled in a plan 
that required the average premium for the small group market in the state in which the employer 
is offering health care coverage. The ruling sets forth the average premiums for the small group 
market in each state for the 2010 taxable year. The tables include average premiums for both 
single coverage and family coverage. 
b. The IRS tells employers how to count, and throws in some 
transition relief. Notice 2010-44, 2010-22 I.R.B. 717 (5/17/10). This notice provides 
comprehensive (?) guidance regarding the § 45R credit for small employers that make 
nonelective contributions towards their employees' health insurance premiums, including 
guidance for determining eligibility for the credit, calculating the credit, and claiming the credit. 
It explains how to determine the number of hours of service worked by employees during the 
taxable year and how to compute FTEs. The credit is available for add-on dental and vision 
coverage was well as for traditional health insurance. Because the § 45R credit applies to taxable 
years beginning in 2010, including the period in 2010 before its enactment, the notice provides ( 
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( transitional relief under which an employer will be deemed to satisfy the requirement that the 
employer pay a uniform percentage, not less than 50 percent, of the premium cost of the health 
insurance coverage. For taxable years beginning in 2010, this uniformity requirement will be 
deemed to have been met if the employer pays an amount equal to at least 50 percent of the 
premium for single (employee-only) coverage for each employee enrolled in coverage offered to 
employees by the employer, even if the employer does not pay the same percentage of the 
premium for each such employee. 
6 . It will be difficult for Alliantgroup to be retrospectively generating 
these new research credits for clients. Section 48D, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, 
provides a 50 percent nonrefundable investment tax credit for qualif1ed investments in qualifying 
"therapeutic discovery projects," which is a term with a complicated definition. The credit is 
available only to companies having 250 or fewer employees, and the right to claim the credit 
must be awarded by the Treasury company-by-company, in consultation with HHS, to 
companies that apply. Oh, yeah, only a total of $1 billion can be awarded. The many small 
details will probably bore you. 
a. The IRS creates the program. Notice 2010-45, 2010-23 I.R.B. 
734 (5/22/10). This notice establishes the qualifying therapeutic discovery project program and 
provides the procedures under which an eligible taxpayer may apply for certification from the 
IRS of a qualified investment with respect to a qualifying therapeutic discovery project as 
eligible for a credit, or for certain taxpayers, a grant under the program. 
7. Leveraging the new markets tax credit is OK! Rev. Rul. 2010-17, 2010-
26 I.R.B. 769 (6/24/10). Rev. Rul. 2010-17, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (6/8/10). Section 45D(b) 
provides that an equity investment in a qualified community development entity eligible for the 
new markets tax credit is a qualified equity investment in cash. The IRS ruled that, consistent 
with the holding of Rev. Rul. 2003-20, 2003-1 C.B. 465, that an equity investment by an LLC 
which is funded with a nonrecourse loan to the LLC qualifies for the new markets tax credit, an 
equity investment includes cash from a recourse loan obtained by an LLC. 
8. Mid-audit CCA changing the IRS's view doesn't cut the mustard as 
authority to support an asserted deficiency. The Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 106 
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5433 (S.D. Ohio 6/25/10). Section 41 (a)(1) allows a credit of 20 percent of the 
amount by which the taxpayer's qualified research expenditures for the year exceed the 
taxpayer's "base amount" of qualified research expenditures. Generally speaking, the "base 
amount" is the company's "fixed base percentage" - the percentage of the company's gross 
receipts expended for research from 1984 through 1988(subject to a 16 percent ceiling) -
multiplied by the company's average annual receipts for the preceding four years (but the base 
will not be less than 50 percent of the qualified research expenses for the credit year). Section 
41(f) provides that for purposes of computing the credit, all members of the same controlled 
group of corporations will be treated as a single corporation. Reg. § 1.41-6(b), as well Temp. 
Reg. § 1.41-6T(b), which was the controlling regulation for the years in question, provides that 
"[t]he group credit is computed by applying all of the section 41 computational on an aggregate 
basis." Pursuant to § 41(f)(5), a "controlled group" is defmed by a cross reference to § 1563(a), 
substituting 50 percent for 80 percent, and thus should include foreign group members In 
computing its credit, P&G excluded from gross receipts from intercompany transactions within 
its group, including transactions with foreign members. This method was acceptable to the IRS 
under CCA 200233011, but during the course of the audit, the IRS issued CCA 200620023, 
which provided that only research expenditures and not gross receipts within a controlled group 
should be disregarded, the position that the government maintained in the litigation. The court 
held that P&G had properly computed the § 41 research credit by disregarding both research 
expenditures and gross receipts within its controlled group. The court rejected the government's 
argument that Deere & Company v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 11 (10122/09), supported its 
position, concluding that Deere was not relevant because specific statutory and regulatory 
language was controlling. 
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G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits 
1. HIRE tax credits explained. Notice 2010-35, 2010-19 I.R.B. 660 
(4/26/1 0). The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act provides for an irrevocable election 
to receive direct payment of otherwise allowable tax credits to holders of new clean renewable 
energy bonds (§ 54C), qualified energy conservation bonds (§ 54D), qualified zone academy 
bonds (§ 54E), and qualified school construction bonds (§ 54F) that are issued after 3/18/1 O. 
Direct Pay Tax Credit Bonds provide a federal borrowing subsidy through payment of a 
refundable tax credit to issuers with respect to each interest payment. The credit is the lesser of 
(1) the amount of interest payable, or (2) 100 percent of the interest on school construction and 
qualified zone academy bonds and 70 percent of the interest on clean renewable energy bonds 
and qualified energy conservation bonds that .would have been payable if· the interest were 
determined at the tax credit bond rate under § 54A(b )(3). The notice describes requirements for 
qualifying an issue as a direct pay tax credit bonds and requires issuers to elect that status the day 
before issue. Issuers are required to file a revised Form 8038-CP to request payment of a 
refundable credit. The credit will be paid contemporaneously with the applicable interest 
payment date of fixed rate bonds. Payments will be made quarterly with respect to variable 
interest rate bonds. The notice also specifies reporting requirements. 
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs 
1 . Carry me back to those long ago days of yore, when (here were profits 
to be offset by today's NOL. The 2009 ARRA, § 1211(b), amended Code § 172 to permit an 
"eligible small business" to elect to extend the carryback period for a net operating loss arising in 
2008 to any number of years greater than two or fewer than six - i.e., the elected carryback 
period may be five, four, or three years. (Absent an election the normal two year carryback rule 
still applies.) An "eligible small business" is defined in § 172(b)(I)(H)(iv) (through cross 
references to § 172(b)(1)(F») as a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship with average 
annual gross receipts of $15 million or less. An election under § 172(b )(1 )(H) must be made by 
the due date (including extensions) for filing the taxpayer's return for the year the net operating ( 
loss arose (i.e., 2008). If the taxpayer is on a fiscal year, the election can be made with respect to . 
either the taxable ending in 2008 or the taxable year beginning in 2008, but not with respect to 
both taxable years. § 172(b)(1 )(H)(ii),(iii). The election is irrevocable. 
a. And here's instructions on how to get back to those days of 
yore. Rev. Proc. 2009-19, 2009-14 IRB 747 (3/16/09). This revenue procedure provides 
guidance under § 1211 of 2009 ARRA, which amended § 172(b)(1 )(H) to allow a taxpayer that 
is an eligible small business to elect a 3-, 4-, or 5-year NOL carryback for a taxable year ending 
after 2007. 
b. Rev. Proc. 2009-19 was modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 
2009-26. Rev. Proc. 2009-26, 2009-19 I.R.B. 935 (4/25/09). This revenue procedure was issued 
because many eligible small businesses inadvertently failed to make valid elections that 
complied with Rev. Proc. 2009-19. . 
c. Now the carryback is available to larger businesses as well. 
Section 13 of the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (WHABA) 
amends § 172 to permit larger businesses to make the 2009 ARRA 2008 and 2009 NOL 
carryback election of up to five years. The election applies with respect to NOLs incurred in 
either 2008 or 2009, but not both years. In addition, 2008 or 2009 NOLs can be used to offset 
only fifty percent of the taxable income earned in the fifth prior taxable year. This 50 percent 
limit does not apply to carrybacks of 2008 losses by "eligible small businesses." In addition, an 
"eligible small business" may take advantage of the extended carryback rules with respect to 
both 2008 and 2009 losses, rather than the losses of only one of those years. Generally, the 
extended NOL carry back election is not available for TARP recipients or corporations that, at 
any time during 2008 or 2009 were a member of an affiliated group including a T ARP recipient. 
• This provision also increases the use of NOLs to offset a 
corporation's alternative minimum taxable income by the NOLs the taxpayer elects to carry back up 
to five taxable years and removes the 90 percent AMT limit. 
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d. More instructions. Rev. Proc. 2009-52, 2009-49 I.R.B. 744 
(11/20/09). This revenue ruling provides guidance regarding procedures for making the election 
and its effect. The revenue procedure explains which business can elect the net operating loss 
carry back periods provided by WHABA. 
e. Notice 2010-58, 2010-37 I.R.B. _ (8/20/10). This notice 
provides guidance in Q&A format regarding twenty particular issues that have arisen regarding 
the election to carryback NOLs for three, four, or five years under § 172(b)(1 ) (H), as amended 
by the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of2009. 
2. Life for those outside the Rev. Proc. 2009-20 Madoff safe-harbor rule 
is tough. Vincentini v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-255 (11/9/09). Judge Marvel held that 
the taxpayer could not deduct any portion of a $511,500 theft loss incurred in fraudulent 
investment scheme because he failed to prove that he had no reasonable prospect of recovery. 
The taxpayer offered no evidence regarding (1) whether he had received or would receive any 
restitution, (2) the status of any restitution payments, (3) the availability of funds from the 
substantial forfeitures ordered by the state court, (4) whether the perpetrators were judgment 
proof or had insufficient assets to satisfy the restitution orders, (5) that the forfeitures did not 
occur as ordered, or (6) that it was otherwise improbable that he would receive restitution 
pursuant to the restitution orders. 
I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses 
1 . Limited Liability Partnership and Limited Liability Company 
membership interests are not presumptively limited partnership interests under the passive 
activity loss rules. Garnett v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 19 (6/30/09). The taxpayers held a 
number of direct and. indirect interests in limited liability partnerships and LLCs that were 
engaged in agribusiness. Section 469(h)(2) provides that a limited partnership interest will not be 
treated as an interest with respect to which a taxpayer is a material participant, except as 
provided in regulations. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) provides that a limited partner materially 
participates in a partnership activity only if (1) the taxpayer devotes more than 500 hours to the 
activity in the year, (2) the taxpayer materially participates in the activity for five of the 
preceding ten taxable years, or (6) the activity is a personal service activity in which the 
taxpayer materially participated for any. three preceding years. defines a limited partnership 
interest as an interest designated as a .limited partner interest in a partnership agreement or an 
interest for which the partner has limited liability. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(ii) has an 
exception from the material participation rule for an interest of a limited partner who also holds a 
general partner interest. The court (Judge Thornton) concluded that in the case of an interest in a 
limited liability partnership or a limited liability company, both of which the court describes as 
different from a limited partnership, the interests are not to be treated as limited partnership 
interests under § 469(h)(2). Holders of such interests are not barred by state law from materially 
participating in the affairs of the entity and thus hold their interests as general partners within the 
meaning of the temporary regulations. Thus, whether or not the taxpayer is a material participant 
requires a full factual inquiry and an LLC member can satisfy the material . participation 
requirement under any of the seven tests in Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a). 
a . The Court of Federal Claims agrees. Thompson v. United States, 
87 Fed. Cl. 728 (7/20/09). The court (Judge Block) granted summary judgment treating the 
taxpayer member/manager of an LLC as a material participant. The taxpayer's degree of 
participation was stipulated and the only question was whether § 469(h)(2) precluded treating the 
taxpayer as a material participant in a Texas LLC. The court noted that § 469(h)(2) treats limited 
partners differently because of an assumption that limited partners do not materially participate 
in their limited partnerships. In an LLC, on the other hand, all members have limited liability but 
members may participate in management. The court noted that Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) 
treats a partnership interest as a limited partner interest if the holder has limited liability "under 
the law of the State in which the partnership is organized." The court held that the quoted 
language applies only to an entity that is a partnership under state law, which does not include an 
LLC that isa different state law entity that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes. The 
19 
taxpayer was both a member and manager of the LLC. Unlike a limited partner, a member ( 
manager does not lose limited liability by participation in the management of the LLC. The court 
also recognized that shareholders of an S corporation have limited liability as shareholders, but 
participate in management, and are not subject to being automatically treated as passive 
participants. The taxpayer, therefore, was "able to demonstrate his material participation in the 
activity by using all seven of the Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) tests." 
b. Ditto. Hegarty v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Ope 2009-153 
(10/6/09), is to the same effect. 
c. Ditto again. Newell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-23 
(2/16110). Relying on Garnett v. Commissioner, supra, Judge Marvel held that the interest of a 
managing member of a California LLC was not a limited a partnership interest for purposes of 
Reg. § 1.469-5T(c)(1). Taxpayer's losses were not passive activity losses because the IRS 
conceded that the taxpayer met the "significant participation" test of Temp. Reg. § 1469-
5T(a)(4). 
d. The IRS acquiesces. AOD 2010-02, 2010-14 I.R.B. _ (3/9/10). 
The IRS acquiesces in the result in Thompson. 
2 . Deciding on whether to uphold the Commissioner's rejection of this 
horse lover's losses is like pulling teeth. Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-194 
(8/31/09). The' taxpayer, a New York dentist, claimed losses from five partnership horse 
activities in California on returns prepared by a tax return preparer. The court (Judge Cohen) 
found that the taxpayer had no knowledge of whether or not the horse activities occurred as 
represented in the partnership returns. He relied on representations by the return preparer in 
deducting the partnership losses against their other income. The taxpayer's suggestion that the 
court Google the return preparer to ascertain that the taxpayer was mislead by a charlatan and 
that paying the tax would result in financial hardship did not impress Judge Cohen, and the 
deficiency was upheld. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that he had reasonable 
cause for failing to file a timely return and imposed penalties under § 6651(a)(I). ( .. ~ 
3 . Reporting self-help slicing, dicing, gluing, and pasting of passive 
activities. Tell the IRS about grouping trade or business activities. Rev. Proc. 2010-13, 2010-
4 I.R.B. 329 (1/6/10). This revenue procedure requires taxpayers to report to the IRS their 
groupings and regroupings of activities and the addition of activities within their existing 
groupings of activities under Reg. § 1.469-4( c) for purposes of § 469. A written statement must 
be filed with the original income tax return for the first taxable year in which two or more trade 
or business activities or rental activities are originally grouped as a single activity. The statement 
must contain a declaration that the grouped activities constitute an appropriate economic unit for 
the measurement of gain or loss under § 469. A similar statement must be filed with a return for 
first taxable year of a regrouping or the taxable year in which a new trade or business activity or 
a rental activity to an existing grouping. A partnership or S corporation must disclose as required 
on the entity's tax return and by separately stating the amounts of income and loss for each 
grouping, and a partner or shareholder is not required to make a separate disclosure unless the 
partner or shareholder (l) groups together any of the activities that the entity does not group 
together, (2) groups the entity's activities with activities conducted directly by the partner or 
shareholder, or (3) groups the entity's activities with activities conducted through other entities. 
• A taxpayer is not required to file a report of groupings in 
existence prior to the 112511 0 effective date of the revenue procedure. 
a. Contrary to Jackie Gleason, this was not a "good group." 
Grouping activities under § 469 requires an explicit election, not merely a reporting 
position. Trask v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-78 (4115/10). The taxpayer failed to make 
an explicit election on his return to aggregate rental real estate activities as required by Reg. 
§ 1.469-9(g). the Tx Court (Judge Goeke) held that merely aggregating real estate rental activity 
losses on his returns was not an effective election. Thus, although the taxpayer established that 
he was a "real estate professional" as defmed in § 469( c )(7), all of the claimed losses were 
disallowed because he failed to prove that he materially participated any of the rental activities 
on an activity-by-activity basis. ( 
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b. Elect to aggregate, or be segregated. Shiekh v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2010-126 (6/10/10). On facts substantially similar to the facts in Trask, . the Tax 
Court (Judge Wells) reached a similar result. The taxpayer materially participated in the 
operation of rental properties in Miami Beach, Florida, and owned additional properties 
including properties in Ventura and Culver City, California. The taxpayer did not file the election 
required by § 469( c) which would have allowed the taxpayer, as a real estate professional, to 
aggregate all of his real estate activities into a single activity for purposes of treating all of the 
real estate income and losses as active. The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that aggregating 
properties on a return filed in the year the taxpayer claimed ordinary loss on the sale of his 
Ventura property was not adequate notice of an election to aggregate properties under Reg. 
§ 1.469-9(g)(3). The taxpayer was found not to be a material participant with respect to his 
Ventura and Culver City properties. The taxpayer was allowed to reduce capital gain in the year 
he sold the Ventura property by expenses incurred in the year of sale. 
4. A song and a dance doesn't make the law practice a professional real 
estate business, but renting your building to the law practice is active. Langille v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-49 (3118110). The taxpayer Deanna Langille, formerly known 
as Deanna Birdsong, worked long hours in her law practice and devoted somewhat less of her 
time to her rental real estate activities. Unfortunately for the taxpayer she resigned from her law 
practice in lieu of disciplinary proceedings implemented for misappropriation of funds from her 
firm's client trust accounts. To make matters worse, after an unsuccessful negotiation for the sale 
of her law practice, the potential buyer reported to the IRS that the taxpayer maintained two sets 
of books for the practice, which resulted in a criminal investigation and a guilty plea to one count 
of a tax fraud indictment. In the civil tax matter the Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) found that the 
taxpayer willfully failed to report income from her law practice and residential real estate rental 
activities (from which she had no profit). The taxpayer was unable to establish the number of 
hours she worked on her residential real estate activities and thus was unable to establish herself 
as a real estate professional under the 50 percent of all personal services requirement of 
§ 469(c)(7)(B)(i) or that she satisfied the 750 hour requirement of § 469(c)(7)(B)(ii). In addition, 
the court held that income from the taxpayer's rental of office space to her law practice in which 
she was a material participant was not passive activity income under Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6). 
5 . An activity log that reflects work days in excess of 24 hours isn't very 
. credible (unless you were on an airplane to the West Coast). Goolsby v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2010-64 (4/1/10). The taxpayers owned several rental real estate properties with respect 
to which they claimed net losses. The IRS disallowed the losses as passive activity losses, and 
the taxpayers claimed that one of them spent more than 750 hours a year managing the properties 
and that under the § 469( c )(7)(B) real estate professional rule, the losses were treated as active 
business losses. Judge Wells rejected the taxpayers' arguments. He found that the activity log 
purporting to document the hours of management activity was not credible. It was created after 
the taxpayers' return was selected for audit and solely for purposes of the case in controversy. 
The taxpayers "presented no evidence of contemporaneous records, such as appointment books, 
calendars, or narrative summaries, that would credibly support the ... activity log. Incredibly, the 
... activity log lists days during which [the taXpayer] allegedly logged more than 24 hours of 
work." 
6. New market tax credits are not treated as passive activity credits. Rev. 
Rul. 2010-16, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (6/8/10). Section 45D provides a new market credit for an 
equity investment in a qualified community development entity, an entity that invests in or loans 
money to a qualified active low-income community business, purchases loans from another 
qualified community development entity, provides fmancial counseling to residents of low-
income communities, or loans money or makes an equity investment in a qualified community 
development entity. A qualified community development entity does not itself need to be 
engaged in a trade or business. Thus, the Ruling concludes that when an individual acquires an 
equity investment in a qualified community development entity that is not in connection with the 
conduct of a trade or business by the individual, § 45D credits are not passive activity credits 
under § 469(d)(2) because a passive activity is defined in §469(c) as an activity that is a trade or 
21 
business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. The ruling also concludes that ( 
new market credits derived from acquisition of an equity interest in a qualified community 
development entity by a partnership that is not in connection with the partnership's conduct of a 
trade or business are not passive activity credits. 
7. Here's an example of why Tax Court Summary Opinions aren't and 
shouldn't be precedential. Ajah v Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-90 (7/8/10). This 
otherwise unremarkable summary opinion, denying the taxpayer's claim that he rental real estate 
losses from two properties were not subject to the § 469 passive activity loss rules because she 
was real estate professional under § 469( c )(7) is notable only for a glaring error of law that likely 
did not affect the outcome, but demonstrates that some decided cases contain statements that are 
just flat out wrong and should be ignored. The taxpayer was held not to qualify because her 
"method of calculating her time spent participating in the rental activities constitutes an 
impermissible 'ballpark guesstimate'" that under Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(:t)(4) was not an 
acceptable method of establishing her participation She had no records and simply testified that 
she worked at least 20 hours a week for 52 weeks on the two rental properties. Not content to 
stop there, the judge continued by finding that the taxpayer had failed to properly aggregate the 
two rental properties into a single activity because merely aggregating items on Schedule E is 
insufficient - a point on which he was correct - and then concluding that because she had not 
aggregated the activities, to qualify as a real estate professional under § 469(c)(7)(B) she "would 
need to perform 750 hours of service for each rental real estate interest for a total of 1,500 hours 
to meet the test" - a conclusion that every kindergartner knows is not what is required by the 
statute. 
• Section 469(c)(7)(B)(ii) requires that "such taxpayer 
performs more than 750 hours of services during the taxable year in real property trades or 
businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates." This langliage clearly means that the 750 
hours requirement refers to the aggregate number of hours in all real property trades or businesses in 
which the taxpayer materially participates and is not a property-by-property requirement. Only ( 
material participation· is determined on a property-by-property basis, except with respect those . 
properties. Trask v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-78 (4/15/10), which was cited in this case as 
the basis for the errant holding, did not so hold. A careful reading of Trask indicates that in that 
because the taxpayer who was able to prove that he devoted more than one-half of his time and 
more than 750 hours of total time to managing over thirty rental properties he was held to qualify as 
a real estate professional under § 469(c)(7)(B), but because he failed properly to elect to treat all of 
his rental properties as a single activity for purposes of § 469(c)(7)(A) and he "did not contend that 
he materially participated in each of his rental activities when viewed separately," he did not qualify 
for the exception. Section 467(c)(7) removes from the passive activity basket only those rental 
activities in which the real estate professional materially participates. 
8. Estate of K. Roberts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-165 (7121110). 
The deceased taxpayer was the sole owner of a leasing LLC organized for the purpose of leasing 
trucking equipment to the taxpayer's solely owned S corporation. The taxpayer "lent" the LLC 
$425,000 for a promissory note. The LLC issued a cashier's check in the same amount which 
was used to fund a portion of the $1.4 million purchase price of a luxury RV. The court (Judge 
Goeke) found that the RV was not used by the LLC in its leasing activity and therefore the 
taxpayer was not at-risk under § 465 for the contribution to the LLC because the funds were not 
borrowed for use "in an activity" as required by § 465(b )(2). 
9. Stangeland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-185 (8/16/10). The 
deceased taxpayer was an investor in numerous business enterprises, all of which were 
independently managed. One of the businesses, R&L Air, L.L.C. was formed to own and lease 
two airplanes. The airplanes were managed by a third party under contract. The taxpayer also 
maintained a consulting business as a sole-proprietor to help manage his businesses. He worked 
approximately 50 hours per week for the consulting business. The taxpayer periodically leased 
the R&L airplanes for use in his consulting business and also used the airplanes in the course of 
charitable activities and in pursuit of private investment activities .. The court (Judge Cohen) first 
held that the taxpayer's consulting activities did not constitute a trade or business but described ( 
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( the consulting activity as being engaged to increase the value of the taxpayer's numerous 
investments. The court thus disallowed deductions of expenses incurred in the consulting 
activity. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the consulting business should be 
combined the airplane leasing business as a single activity in which the taxpayer participated for 
more than 500 hours. To combine the two activities under Reg. § 1.469-4( c), both must be found 
to constitute a trade or business, a test which the consulting activity failed. The court also 
rejected the taxpayer's argument that his participation in the two activities qualified under the 
significant participation test of Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(4), again because the consulting activity 
failed to qualify as a trade or business. However, for one of the three tax years at issue, the court 
. found that the taxpayer participated in activities of various businesses for more than 500 hours 
and in the activities of the airplane leasing activity for at least 100 hours, and that the losses from 
the airplane leasing activity were not passive activity losses for that year. 
10. Time off from the nuclear power plant is not being a real estate 
professional. Moss v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 18 (9/20/10). The taxpayer, who worked full 
time as a maintenance planner at a nuclear power plant, owned several rental real estate 
properties. The taxpayer recorded the days, but not the time worked in maintenance on the rental 
properties in a daily calendar. The taxpayer claimed that he worked a total of 645 hours on rental 
properties (including travel time) and attempted to add time that he was "on-call" anytime he 
was not working at the power plant in order to satisfy the minimum 750 hour requirement of 
§ 469(c)(7)(B)(ii) to qualify as a real estate professional. The court (Judge Wells) held that only 
time for services actually performed could be counted towards the 750 hour requirement, which 
did not include time while the taxpayer was on call. However, the court also found that the 
taxpayer actively participated in the rental real estate activities and was, therefore, entitled to the 
§ 469(i) $25,000 allowance, but subject to being phased out to the extent the taxpayer's income 
exceeded $100,000. The court also held that the taxpayer was subject to the § 6662 accuracy 
related penalty. 
ITI. INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME 
A. Gains and Losses 
1. Gross income without cash upon surrender of life insurance policy 
with outstanding policy loans. Barr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-250 (11/3/09). When 
an insurance company withholds from the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy upon its 
surrender amounts necessary to repay policy loans, the withheld amount is constructively 
realized by the owner of the policy and is included in the amount taxable under § nee). 
2. Pizza is the eighth deadly sin, and the ninth is stealing the sausage 
process, even if the damages are taxable. Freda v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-191 
(8/25/09). The taxpayer supplied Pizza Hut with pre-cooked sausage prepared with the 
taxpayer's patented process. The taxpayer also entered into license and royalty agreements to 
provide its trade secrets to other Pizza Hut suppliers. After discovering that Pizza Hut disclosed 
the process to an unlicensed supplier who also sold pre-cooked sausage to Pizza Hut, the . 
taxpayer recovered damages from Pizza Hut for misappropriation of trade secrets. The court 
(Judge Chiechi) held that the damages were received as compensation for lost profits, and thus 
were taxable as ordinary income. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the damages 
were for injury to or destruction of the trade secret, a capital asset. 
. 3. New rules for determining basis in securities. The Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], Act § 403, amends § 1012 to create new rules 
for determining the basis of securities acquired after 12/31/10. The FIFO or other conventions 
for determining the basis of securities when sold must be applied on an account-by-account 
basis. Thus, with· respect to a taxpayer who holds the same stock in more than one account, 
determining the basis of sold securities from any account will be determined solely with regard 
to the basis of securities in that account. In addition, § 1012(d) provides for averaging the basis 
of stock acquired in a dividend reinvestment plan. Stock in a dividend reinvestment plan is 
treated as held in a separate account for purposes of determining basis. 
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a. No more fooling the IRS about basis. The Emergency Economic ( 
Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], § 403, adding § 6045(g), requires brokers to report the 
customer's basis in a "covered security" and whether gain or loss is long-term or short-term, in 
addition to the existing requirement that the broker report gross sales proceeds. In general, the 
customer's basis is to be reported on a first-in first-out method, unless an average basis method is 
permissible. Covered securities include securities acquired through an account with the broker or 
transferred to the broker from another account on or after an applicable date. January 1,2011, is 
the applicable date for stocks. January 1,2012, is the applicable date for stocks unde.r the average 
basis method. January 1, 2013, or such later date as specified by the IRS, is the applicable date 
for any other security. Under § 6045A, a taxpayer transferring securities to a broker will be 
required to report information required by regulations necessary to permit the broker to meet its 
reporting requirements. Section 6045B requires the issuer of any security to report information 
describing any organizational action that affects the basis of the security. 
. b . And the IRS begins to gear up. REG-l 0 1896-09, Basis Reporting 
by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Stock, 74 F.R. 67010 (12/17/09). These 
proposed· regulations relate to reporting sales of securities by brokers (prop .. Reg. § 1.6045-1) 
and determining the basis of securities. (prop. Reg. § 1.1012-1). The proposed regulations reflect 
changes in the law made by the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 that require 
brokers when reporting the sale of securities to the IRS to include the customer's adjusted basis 
in the sold securities and to classify any gain or loss as long-term or short-term. The proposed 
regulations under § 1012 alter how taxpayers compute basis when averaging the basis of shares 
acquired at different prices and expand the ability of taxpayers to compute basis by averaging 
. with respect to RIC shares and shares specifically held in a dividend reinvestment plan. Brokers 
must furnish information statements to customers by February 15th. The proposed regulations 
provide for the implementation of new reporting requirements imposed upon persons that 
transfer custody of stock and upon issuers of stock regarding organizational actions that affect 
the basis of the issued stock. It also contains proposed regulations reflecting changes in the law ( 
that alter how brokers report short sales of securities. 
4 • Question: When is the amount for which you could sell something 
much less than its value for determining a bargain purchase? Answer: When it's a whole 
life insurance policy sold from a pension plan to the insured plan participant. Matthies v. 
Commissioner, 134 T.e. No.6 (2/22110). Pursuant to a prearranged plan, the taxpayer rolled 
over approximately $1.3 million from an IRA to a profit sharing plan; the profit sharing plan 
then purchased a life insurance policy on the insured for $1.3 million and sold the policy to the 
taxpayer for approximately $300,000; and the taxpayer transferred the life insurance policy to a 
trust for estate planning purposes. At the time of the sale of the policy from the profit sharing 
plan to the taxpayer, the life insurance policy had an "account value" of approximately $1.3 
million, but was subject to a "surrender charge" of approximately $1,000,000, thereby reducing 
its cash surrender value to approximately $300,000. The surrender charge would diminish over 
time and be completely phased out after 20 years. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer recognized 
$1,000,000 of income on the bargain purchase because it was not an arm's length transaction, 
and Judge Thornton agreed with the IRS. First, he found that on the facts, the transaction was not 
arm's length because the only trustees of the profit sharing plan were the taxpayer and his wife. 
Turning to the valuation issue, Judge Thornton rejected the taxpayer's argument that the value of 
the insurance policy was its cash surrender value, which was equal to the amount the taxpayer 
paid the profit sharing plan for the policy. He reached the same result as the IRS, but via a 
slightly different road. Judge Thornton concluded that under §§ 402 and 72(e), the amount of a 
distribution in the form of a life insurance policy is the cash surrender value determined without 
any surrender charges, rather than the new surrender value. Finally, he concluded that the excess 
of the cash surrender value determined without any surrender charges, minus the amount paid by 
the taxpayer - approximately $1,000,000 - was gross income under § 61. 
S. Ex-post recharacterization is not an option for taxpayers. United 
States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 4/16/10). The Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary 
judgment for the government in an erroneous refund suit. The taxpayer exchanged her 
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partnership interest in Ernst & Young for stock of Cap Gemini, a corporation' acquiring E& Y' s 
consulting business, in a transaction that was not a statutory nonrecognition event; however, the 
stock was held in escrow to enforce a forfeiture provision if the seller-taxpayer failed to perform 
certain services as an employee of the acquiring corporation. The taxpayer initially reported that 
all of the Cap Gemini shares received vested in the year 2000 (the year of the exchange), but 
after the stock declined in value took the position that income was realized in 2000 only to the 
extent of cash received in that year and the remainder of the income was recognized in 2003 
(when the stock was worth less than one-fifth of its 2000 value). The court held that if a taxpayer 
exchanges one property for a different property, the gain realized on the exchange must be 
recognized in the year the exchange occurs, even though the property received in the exchange is 
forfeitable if contractual provisions or representations in the contract for exchange are not 
subsequently satisfied and even though the property received in the exchange is held in escrow to 
assure enforcement of the forfeitability provisions. Furthermore, the court refused to accept the 
taxpayer's argument that the transaction could be recast into a form different than that which it 
had taken. 
To put it plainly, we have bound taxpayers to "the 'form' of their transaction" 
when they attempt to recharacterize an otherwise valid agreement bargained for in 
good faith. [citation omitted] We have also refused to entertain arguments "that 
the 'substance' of their transaction triggers different tax consequences." [citation 
omitted] This precept not only maintains the vital public policy of enforcing 
otherwise valid contracts, but also assures the reliability of agreed tax 
consequences to the public fisc .... 
There is no "disparity" in allowing "the Commissioner alone to pierce formal" 
agreements as "taxpayers have it within their own control to choose in the first 
place whatever arrangements they care to make." [citation omitted] 
'. Earlier cases that reached the same result for other taxpayers 
involved in the same transaction include United States v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 4/10/09); 
United States v. Cu/p, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-618,2007-1 U.S.T.C. ~50,399 (M.D. Tenn. 12/29/06); 
and United States v. Nackel, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-474 (C.D. Cal. 10/20/09). 
6. When does a debt instrument that has in effect become a proprietary 
interest because the creditor is insolvent remain a debt instrument? REG-106750-10, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing, Modifications of Debt 
Instruments, 75 F.R. 31736 (6/4/10). The Treasury Department has proposed amendments to 
Reg. § 1.1001-3, which deals with when a modification of a debt instrument results in an 
exchange for purposes of § 1001 (gain or loss realization by creditor) and § 61(a)(l2) (realization 
of COD income by debtor). Under Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(5), a modification of a debt instrument 
that results in an instrument or property right that is not debt for tax purposes is a significant 
modification. An analysis of all of the factors relevant to a debt determination of the modified 
instrument at the time of an alteration or modification is required. However, Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-
3(f)(7) would clarify that any deterioration in the financial condition of the issuer between the 
date the debt instrument was issued and the date it was altered or modified, insofar as it relates to 
the issuer's ability to repay the debt instrument, will not be not taken into account in determining 
whether the instrument has been c·onverted to another type of interest, unless there is a 
substitution of a new obligor or the addition or deletion of a co-obligor. Thus, any decrease in the 
fair market value of a debt instrument (whether or not publicly traded) is not taken into account 
to the extent that the decrease in fair market value is attributable to the deterioration in the 
financial condition of the issuer, rather than to a modification of the terms of the instrument, but 
only for purposes of determining the nature of the instrument. According to the preamble, 
"[ c ]onsistent with this rule in the proposed regulations, if a debt instrument is significantly 
modified and the issue price of the modified debt instrument is determined under Reg. § 1.1273-
2(b) or (c) (relating to a fair market value issue price for publicly traded debt), then any increased 
yield on the modified debt instrument attributable to this issue price generally is not taken into 
account to determine whether the modified debt instrument is debt or some other property right 
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for Federal income tax purposes. However, any portion of the increased yield that is not 
attributable to deterioration in the fmancial condition of the issuer, such as a change in market 
interest rates, is taken into account." 
• The provisions of Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3(:£)(7) will be 
effective upon fmalization, but taxpayers may rely on paragraph (:£)(7) of this section for alterations 
of the terms ofa debt instrument occurring before that date. See Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3(h)(2) 
7 . Should the name of the promoter of this tax scam been "Devious," 
instead of "Derivium?" Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.3 (7/8/10) (reviewed). In 
2001 the taxpayer entered into an agreement with D~rivium Capital LLC pursuant to· which he 
transferred 990 shares of ffiM common stock to Derivium under its 90-percent-stock-Ioan 
program. The terms of the agreement characterized the transaction as a loan, with the mM stock 
pledged as collateral. (Derivium was not registered with the New York Stock Exchange or the 
National Association of Securities DeaIerslFinancial Industry Regulatory Authority.) The 
purported loan was nonrecourse; interest accrued but was not payable until maturity; all 
dividends were applied against interest due; prepayment during the 3-year term of the purported 
loan was prohibited. The terms of the agreement allowed Derivium to sell the stock and retain 
the proceeds, which it did immediately upon receipt, receiving $103,918.18. The taxpayer 
received $93,586.23 from Derivium, the amount of the payment being determined, and payment 
being made, only after Derivium had sold the stock. Upon maturity of the 'loan," the taxpayer 
had the option of (1) paying the balance due and having an equivalent amount of mM stock 
returned to him, (2) renewing the purported loan for an additional term, or (3) satisfying the 
"loan" by surrendering any right to receive mM stock. At maturity in August 2004 the balance 
due was $124,429.09, which was $40,924.57 more than the then $83,318.40 value of the mM 
stock. (Derivium had credited against the accrued interest the amount of dividends that would 
have been received had the stock not been sold, but the taxpayer never received a Form-1099-
DIV or included any dividends in income.) The taxpayer elected to satisfy his purported loan by 
surrendering any right to receive ffiM stock. The taxpayer never made any payments toward 
either principal or interest on the purported loan. Citing Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 
U.S. 331 (1945), and Gregory v. Haltering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), for the proposition that 
substance controls over form, the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion by Judge Ruwe (with no 
dissents but Judges Halpern, Wherry, and Holmes concurring in result only), held that the 2001 
transaction between taxpayer and Derivium was a sale, not a loan, under the test factors set forth 
in Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221(1981). The taxpayer had 
transferred all the benefits and burdens of ownership of the stock to Derivium. Legal and 
equitable title, as well as possession and control of the stock were transferred in exchange for 
$93,586.23 with no obligation to repay that amount. "At best [the taxpayer] had an option to 
purchase an equivalent number of ffiM shares after 3 years at a price equivalent to $93,586.23 
plus 'interest.'" The transaction was not a true loan because "[fjor a transaction to be a bona fide 
loan the parties must have actually intended to establish a debtor-creditor relationship at the time 
the funds were advanced." There was no such intent. After the 2001 transaction the taxpayer 
never treated the transaction as a loan; in 2004 he did not report either a sale of the stock or 
cancellation of debt income, positions which were inconsistent with treating the transaction as 
loan. Because Derivium was not acting as a broker, the court also rejected the taxpayer's 
argument that the transaction was analogous to the securities lending arrangement in Rev. Rul. 
57-451, 1957-2 C.B. 295, which held that no sale occurred when the owner of stock deposited 
shares with a broker who could lend the securities until such time as the shareholder received 
from the broker property other than identical securities. Nor was the transaction equivalent to a 
securities lending arrangement under § 1058, because the agreement did not meet the 
requirements of that provision, which under Samueli v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 37 (2009), 
requires that the transferor of the stock retain "all of the benefits and burdens of ownership of the 
transferred securities" and the right to "be able to terminate the loan agreement upon demand." 
Because the taxpayer could not regain possession of the stock for three years, his opportunity for 
gain was diminished. 
• Section 6662 accuracy related penalties were sustained. 
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( • Judge Hapem's concurring OpInIOn emphasized that the 
Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. test, while appropriate for determining whether there had been a sale of 
property that was not fungible, were not useful in the of fungible property, such as corporate stock. 
It was enough for him that the taxpayer "gave Derivium the right and authority to sell the IBM 
common stock in question for its own account, which Derivium in fact did." 
• Holmes's concurring opinion emphasized that the majority's 
test for a sale was too broad and could be applied to treat too wide a range of collateralized 
nonrecourse loan arrangements as sales. He concluded that the majority erred in treating the 
taxpayer's transfer of the stock to Derivium and Derivium's subsequent sale of the stock as one 
integrated transaction, because Derivium had represented to its customers that it would hold the 
stock and never told them of the quick sale. Instead, he would have treated Derivium's sale of the 
stock as the event triggering recognition by the taxpayer, under the Tufts principle that "when a 
nonrecourse liability is discharged by sale of collateral, the borrower must recognize income at that 
point - the amount realized is the amount of nonrecourse liability discharged as a result of the sale," 
since Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(i) provides that "the sale ... of property that secures a nonrecourse 
liability discharges the transferor from the liability." He recognized that under his analysis, ''the tax 
consequences to Calloway would be remarkably similar to those flowing from the result reached by 
the majority." 
• The Tax Court majority opinion noted in a footnote that other 
cases involving Derivium transactions are pending in the Tax Court. From 1998 to 2002 Derivium 
engaged in approximately 1,700 similar transactions involving approximately $1 billion. The 
Government estimated the total tax loss associated with Derivium's scheme to be approximately 
$235 million. . 
• Nagy v. United States, 104 AF.T.R.2d 2009-7789, 2010-1 
U.S.T.C. ,50,177 (D. S.C. 2009), and United States v. Cathcart, 104 AF.T.R.2d 2009-6625,2009-
2 U.S.T.C. '50,658 (N.D. Calif. 2009) held, in § 6700 penalty cases, that the 90-percent stock-
loan-program transactions offered by Derivium were sales of securities, not bona fide loans. 
a. District Court had enjoined Derivium Capital USA from promoting 
its 90 percent loan program. United States v. Cathcart, 105 AF.T.R.2d 2010-1293 (N.D. Calif 
3/5/10). . 
b. Does this case make Monty Python "substantial authority"? 
Shao v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-189 (8/26/10). As in Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 
T.C. No.3 (7/8/10), the taxpayer in this case engaged in transaction with Derivium Capital under 
its "90-percent-stock-loan program." In this case, however, the taxpayer conceded that she had 
sold her stock and the only issue was whether the § 6662 accuracy related penalty the IRS 
asserted would be upheld. The taxpayer asserted a reasonable cause and good faith defense to the 
penalty, and the Tax Court (Judge Holmes) agreed with the taxpayer. The court reasoned as 
follows. 
In Shao's case we don't find the circumstances that led the Court to penalize 
Calloway - there is no evidence of a wink-wink-nudge-nudge-say-no-mote 
arrangement with Derivium. See Monty Python's Flying Circus: How To 
Recognise Different Types of Trees From Quite a Long Way Away (BBC 1 
television broadcast Oct. 19, 1969). Shao had legitimate, nontax motivations for 
wanting to structure her deal as a loan instead of a sale-she wanted to reduce risk 
and use some of the stocks' value without selling her nest egg. Her naivete, but 
not (we expressly find) her negligence, is especially prominent in her renewal of 
the loan at a steep price after three years. Unlike Calloway, Shao treated her 
transaction like a loan throughout its existence, provitig her good faith. 
S • When all is said and done, the sum of the parts of the deal was really a 
current sale of stock. Anschutz Co. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 5 (7/22/10). An S 
corporation, through a Q-Sub (TAC) entered into transactions with Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 
Securities (DLJ) involving appreciated stock that it owned. The agreements were merriorialized 
by a master stock purchase agreement (MSPA) that included "Prepaid Variable Forward 
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Contracts" (PVFCs) and share-lending agreements (SLAs) with respect to the shares subject to 
the PVFCs. The PVFCs required DLJ to make an upfront payment to TAC in exchange for a 
promise by TAC to deliver a variable number of shares to DLJin ten years. The amount of the 
payment was 75 percent of the fair market value of the shares subject to the PVFCs. If the stock 
subject to the PVFCs appreciated over the term of the contract, TAC was entitled to retain 50 
percent of the appreciation, and the remainder accrued to DLJ. TAC pledged the shares of stock 
at issue in the PVFCs as collateral for the upfront payment and to guarantee TAC's performance 
under the PVFC. The pledged shares were delivered to a trustee. Before each stock transaction 
DLJ executed short sales of that stock in the open market. After TAC lent shares to DLJ pursuant 
to the SLAs, DLJ used the shares to close out the short sales. TAC received upfront payments 
under the PVFCs totaling $350,968,652 and $23,398,050 in prepaid lending fees under the 
SLAs. 
• The taxpayer claimed that TAC executed two separate 
transactions- PVFCs and SLAs - and neither constituted a current sale for tax purposes, relying, 
in part, on § 1058. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) agreed with the IRS that the shares subject to the 
PVFCs and lent pursuant to the SLAs were sold for income tax purposes. The transaction consisted 
of two integrated legs, one of which called for share lending, but the two legs were clearly related 
and interdependent. Analyzing the MSPA as a whole, in exchange for valuable consideration TAC 
transferred to DLJ the benefits and burdens of ownership, including (l) legal title to the shares; 
(2) all risk of loss; (3) a major portion of the opportunity for gain; (4) the right to. vote the stock; and 
(5) possession of the stock. Although the SLAs provided that TAC could terminate share loans and 
recall the shares, in reality any share recalls were really TAC borrowing shares from DLJ. Because 
DLJ closed out its original short sales with the lent shares, the shares later transferred to TAC were 
in substance DLJ borrowing shares from third parties and delivering them to TAC. Gain was 
recognized with respect to the upfront cash payments received in the transactions. The taxpayer's 
reliance on § 1058 was rejected because it relied on the argument that the PVFCs were separate 
from the SLAs. The MSPA violated the requirement of § 1 058(b )(3) that the agreement not limit the 
lender's risk of loss or opportunity for gain, because the agreements eliminated TAC's risk of loss 
with regard to the lent shares. 
• On the bright side ©, Judge Goeke rejected the IRS's 
alternative argument that the transactions were also either a constructive short sale by TAC under 
§ 1259(c)(l)(A) or a constructive forward contract sale under§ 1259(c )(l)(C). TAC did not enter 
into any short sale because DLJ was acting as a principal and not as an agent in making the short 
sales. the transactions were not forward contract constructive sales because they were not forward 
contracts as defined in § 1259(d)(l) in that they did not provide for delivery of a substantially fixed 
amount of property for a substantially fixed price. 
9 . The small business act helps small business stock. Gain realized on a 
sale or exchange of Qualified Small Business stock under § 1202, which is acquired after the 
date of enactment of the 2010 Small Business Act (9127/10) and before 1/1/11, is subject to 100 
percent exclusion from gross income. The Act also changed the period for exclusion of 75 
percent of such gain from 2/17/09 to the date of enactment (previously the 75 percent rate would 
have applied up to 1/1/11). Gain attributable to Qualified Small Business stock acquired between 
9127/10 and 1/1/11 is not treated as an AMT preference item. The exclusion is applicable to 
noncorporate shareholders who acquire stock at original issue and hold the stock for a minimum 
of five years. Under the former 50 percent and 75 percent exclusions, included gain was subject 
to tax at the 28 percent capital gains rates. The amount of excluded gain attributable to anyone 
corporation is limited to the greater often times the taxpayer's basis in a corporations stock sold 
during the taxable year or $10 million reduced by gain attributable to the corporation stock 
excluded in prior years. Qualified Small Business Stock is stock issued by a C corporation 
engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business with gross assets (cash plus adjusted basis of 
assets) not in excess of $50 million. 
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( B. Interest, Dividends, and other Current Income 
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions 
1. Dang that AMT. Gralia v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2009-219 
(9/21/09). The taxpayer diverted funds from an S corporation in which another shareholder held 
a minority interest, and by which both shareholders were employed. When the minority 
shareholder sued him, the taxpayer settled the suit by paying substantial damages. Judge Halpern 
held that the damage payments, as well as the taxpayer's attorney's fees to defend the suit, were 
deductible only as either § 212 expenses or employee business expenses under § 162, and thus 
were miscellaneous itemized deductions. Because the taxpayer was in the AMT, no tax savings 
resulted from the deductions. 
2. The IRS still can't figure out Knight. Notice 2010-32, 2010-16 I.R.B. 
594 (4/1/10). This notice provides that pending further guidance, taxpayers are not required to 
determine the portion of a "bundled fiduciary fee" that is subject to the § 67 two-percent of AGI 
floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year beginning before 1/1/10. 
Taxpayers may deduct the full amount of the bundled fiduciary fee; payments by the fiduciary to 
third parties for expenses subject to the two-percent floor must be treated separately. It modifies 
and supersedes Notice 2008-116, 2008-11 I.R.B.593, which provided similar relief for years 
beginning before 1/1/09. 
D. Section 121 
1. "Congress intended the terms 'property' and 'principal residence' to 
mean a house or other dwelling unit in which the taxpayer actually resided." Gates v. 
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.1 (7/1/10) (reviewed, 8-5). The married taxpayers had owned and 
occupied a house as a principal residence for at least two years. They wanted to enlarge and 
remodel the house but were advised by an architect that more stringent building and permit 
restrictions had been enacted since the house was built. In 1999, rather than remodel the house, 
they completely demolished it and constructed a new house on the property. The taxpayers never 
occupied the new house, and in 2000 they sold it for $1,100,000, realizing a gain of $591,406. 
They claimed that $500,000 of the gain was excludable under § 121, but the IRS took the 
position that they did not qualify for the § 121 exclusion because they had never occupied the 
new structure and it thus never was their "principal residence," even though it occupied land on 
which had been located their former principal residence. The IRS's argument interpreted "the 
term 'property' [in § 121(a)] to mean, or at least include, a dwelling that was owned and 
occupied by the taxpayer as his "principal residence" for at least 2 of the 5 years immediately 
preceding the sale." The taxpayers argued that the term "property" in § 121(a) includes not only 
the dwelling but also the land on which the dwelling is situated, and that the requirements of 
§ 121(a) are satisfied if the taxpayer lived in any dwelling on the property for the required 2-year 
period, even if that dwelling is not the dwelling that was sold. Under this theory, because they 
used the original house and the land on which it was situated as their principal residence for the 
required term, the land and building that were sold qualified as their principal residence. Finding 
that the statute did not define the terms "property" and principal residence," the Tax ·Court in a 
divided (8-5) opinion by Judge Marvel looked to dictionaries and the legislative history for 
guidance. After examining the background of § 121, including its statutory predecessors, former 
§ 1034 and its predecessor in the 1939 Code, the majority held that: 
Congress intended the term "principal residence" to mean the primary dwelling or 
house that a taxpayer occupied as his principal residence .... Although a principal 
residence may include land surrounding the dwelling, the legislative history 
supports a conclusion that Congress intended the section 121 exclusion to apply 
only if the dwelling the taxpayer sells was actually used as his principal residence 
for the period required by section 121(a). 
• The majority found further support for its conclusion in the 
case law under former § 1034. 
• In a footnote the court's opinion noted that Reg. § 1.121-
1(b)(3), as currently in effect allows gain from the sale ofland alone to qualify under § 121 if the 
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taxpayer also sells "a 'dwelling unit' that meets the requirements under sec. 121 within 2 years 
before or after the sale of the land." 
• A concurring opinion by Judge Cohen (in which 6 other 
members of the majority joined) noted that the taxpayers did not argue in the alternative for a partial 
exclusion of gain attributable to the sale of the land and did not introduce any evidence that would 
have permitted the court to allocate gain between the new house and the land. 
• The dissent by Judge Halpern would have allowed the 
exclusion, treating the demolition and reconstruction no differently from a renovation. It expressed 
concern that drawing the line between a "remodeling," which presumably would not start the 2-year 
clock running anew and a "rebuilding," which under the majority opinion does start the 2-year clock 
running anew is a difficult line to draw: "is there some level of remodeling that does (1) terminate 
the use of the home as the taxpayer's principal residence, and (2) set the temporal clock to zero?" 
E. Section 1031 
1. "[1]t appears that these transactions took their peculiar structure for 
no purpose except to avoid § 1031(1)." Teruya Bros., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 580 F.3d 1038 
(9th Cir. 9/8/09), qff'g 124 T.C. 45 (2005). The taxpayer transferred properties to a qualified 
intermediary, who sold them to unrelated third parties and used the proceeds to purchase like-
kind replacement property from a related party. In the Tax Court, Judge Thornton held that the 
transactions were economically equivalent to direct exchanges between the taxpayer and related 
party, followed by the related party's sale of the properties to unrelated third parties, and that 
they were structured to avoid the purposes of § 1031(t). He further held that taxpayer failed to 
prove that avoidance was not one of the principal purposes of the transactions under the 
§ 1031(t)(4) exception. The taxpayer argued that even though more gain was recognized by the 
related party on some of the properties, the only tax consequences of the gain recognition were 
reduction of the related party's net operating loss - as opposed to current taxation for taxpayer. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Curt's decision, stating, "it appears that these transactions 
took their peculiar structure for no purpose except to avoid § 1031(t)"; "Teruya could have 
achieved the same property dispositions through far simpler means." 
2. Don Quixote tilted at the windmill and deflected only the penalty, not 
the deficiency. Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.6 (3/31/09). This opinion 
by Judge Halpern applied § 1031(t) to deny tax-free like-kind exchange treatment in the 
following situation: (1) The taxpayer transferred appreciated real property (Wesleyan Station) to 
a qualified intermediary; (2) an unrelated third party purchased the Wesleyan Station property 
from the qualified intermediary for cash; (3) a partnership related to the taxpayer sold like-kind 
property (Barnes & Noble Comer) to the qualified intermediary for cash; and (4) the qualified 
intermediary transferred the like-kind Barnes & Noble Comer property to the taxpayer. But for 
the application of § 1031(t)(4), the exchange with the qualified intermediary would have 
qualified for § 1031 nonrecognition. The taxpayer, who wanted the replacement property to be in 
the same general geographic area, Le., middle Georgia, as the surrendered property, argued that 
the reason for the acquisition of replacement property from a related person was that it was 
unable to locate a suitable replacement property within the time limits imposed on deferred like-
kind exchanges by § 1031(a)(3) and Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b). A careful reading of the facts, 
however, reveals that the taxpayer entered into the agreement to acquire the replacement 
property only five days after the relinquished property was sold and actually closed the purchase 
before the 45-day identification period had even lapsed. As argued by the Commissioner, Judge 
Halpern held that § 1031(t)(4) required recognition because the taxpayer had "structured" the 
transaction "to avoid the purposes" of the rule of § 1031 (t) denying non recognition for an 
exchange to a related person if the transferee sells the property within two years. Based on the 
legislative history, he concluded that the "basis shifting" that resulted from the transaction 
"suppl[ied] the principal purpose of tax avoidance." The basis shift effected an approximately 
$1.8 million reduction in taxable gain, because if the related party had acquired Wesleyan Station 
from the taxpayer in a like-kind exchange for Barnes & Noble Comer, the related party's 
substituted basis in Wesleyan Station, which in the taxpayer's hands was only around $716,164, 
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( would have been $2,554,901 (equal to the related person's basis in Barnes & Noble Comer). In 
addition, if § 1031 applied, the gain on the sale of Wesleyan Station would have been taxed at 
only 15 percent, the applicable rate for capital gains taxed to the partners of the related 
partnership, instead of the 34 percent rate that would have applied had the taxpayer sold the 
property. Judge Halpern further found the case to be substantially similar to Teruya Bros., Ltd. & 
Subs. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 45 (2005), in which the taxpayer transferred properties to a 
qualified intermediary, who sold them to unrelated third parties and used the proceeds to 
purchase like-kind replacement property from a related party. In Teruya Bros., Judge Thornton 
held that the transactions were economically equivalent to direct exchanges between the taxpayer 
and related party, followed by the related party's sale of the properties to unrelated third parties, 
and that they were structured to avoid the purposes of § 1031 (t). The taxpayer argued that unlike 
the taxpayer in Teruya Bros., it did not have a prearranged plan to use property from a related 
person to complete a like-kind exchange, but Judge Halpern found that the presence of the 
prearranged plan in Teruya Bros. was not a critical element of the holding in that case. 
Nevertheless, the taxpayer avoided the § 6662 negligence penalty because (1) the return 
reporting the transaction as a § 1031 like-kind exchange was prepared by an accountant with 
extensive experience in representing real estate developers, (2) the accountant was aware of all 
relevant facts, and (3) when the taxpayer filed its return, the Tax Court had not yet decided 
Teruya Bros., and while Rev. Rul. 2002-83, 2002-2 C.B. 927 (presaging the result in Teruya 
Bros.) had been issued, Judge Halpern did "not think that the ruling left the result free from 
doubt." 
a. "Congress enacted § 1031 (t) because of its disapproval of 
taxpayers' use of § 1031 to cash-in on a low-basis investment property, but to pay taxes as if it 
were cashing in on the high basis property; here, Ocmulgee Fields and Treaty Fields cashed in on 
the low-basis property, Wesleyan Station, but paid taxes only on the gains from Treaty Fields' 
sale of the high-basis property, the Barnes & Noble Comer." Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 2010-2 U.S.T.C. ~50,565, 106 AF.T.R.2d 2010-_ (11th Cir. 8/13/10). In an 
opinion by Judge Ebel, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The court 
characterized the taxpayer's argument as being based on the proposition that neither it nor the 
related party "had any intent to circumvent the purposes of § 1031(t)," which it described as a 
challenge to the Tax Court's fact finding that the taxpayer "engaged in a series of transactions 
structured to avoid the related party rules, cash in on its investment in Wesleyan Station, and 
avoid taxation," and affirmed because the Tax Court's finding was not clearly erroneous. The 
court found evidence of the taxpayer's intent in the use of the a qualified intermediary in a multi-
cornered exchange, stating that, 
[W]e can look to the unneeded complexity in the series of transactions to help us 
in inferring Ocmulgee Fields' intent. ... Ocmulgee Fields could have achieved the 
same result by simply engaging in a direct exchange of property with Treaty 
Fields, and Treaty Fields could have then sold Wesleyan Station .... If Ocmulgee 
Fields had taken this approach, however, § 1031(t)(1) would have automatically 
disallowed nonrecognition treatment for the exchange because Treaty Fields 
disposed of Wesleyan Station within two years of the exchange. 
• The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the related 
party exchange was "merely a fall-back position," because that argument was inconsistent with the 
fact that the taxpayer had examined only a small number of alternative properties and entered into 
the transaction after only six days. 
3 . I woulda completed my like-kind exchange, but the QI went belly-up. 
Can you help me Mr. Commish? No; unfortunately, there is no relief which would allow 
the taxpayer to complete the § 1031 exchange. Rev. Proc. 2010-14, 2010-12 I.R.B. 456 
(3/5/10). This revenue procedure provides a safe harbor method for reporting gain or loss by 
taxpayers who are unable to complete deferred like-kind exchange solely because the QI has 
defaulted on its obligation to acquire and transfer replacement property as a result of the QI's 
bankruptcy or receivership under federal or state law, provided three additional conditions have 
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been met. The taxpayer must have (1) transferred the relinquished property to a QI in accordance ( 
with Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4); (2) properly identified replacement property within the 
identification period (unless the Ql's default occurs during that period); and (3) not actually or 
constructively receive any proceeds from the disposition of the relinquished property (excluding 
the Ql's assumption of debts on the relinquished property) before the QI entered bankruptcy or 
receivership. Under the safe-harbor, the taxpayer may report gain ,under a "safe harbor gross 
profit ratio method" provided in the revenue procedure, which is essentially the § 453 installment 
method. However, unlike normal § 453 installment reporting, § 1245 and § 1250 recapture gain 
may be reported under the "safe harbor gross profit ratio method"; however, depreciation 
recapture income is recognized before any § 1231 or capital gain is recognized. Interest must be 
imputed under § 483 or § 1274, as appropriate. For this purpose, the taxpayer is treated as selling 
the relinquished property on the date of the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan or other court 
order that resolves the taxpayer's claim against the QI. Thus, if the only payment in full 
satisfaction of the taxpayer's claim is received by the taxpayer on or before the date that is six 
months after the safe harbor sale date, then no interest is imputed. If a loss is realized, the timing 
of a loss deduction is governed by normal § 165 principles. 
• We think this could result in open transaction treatment for 
loss recognition. , 
4. The April's Fool joke is on the taxpayer. Goolsby v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2010-64 (4/1/10). A residence acquired in an exchange was not property held for 
investment or for use in a trade or business and the exchange of the surrendered property did not 
qualify for nonrecognition under § 1031, even though the taxpayer made minimal efforts to rent 
out the property before taking up residence. The taxpayer moved into the property within months 
after acquiring it, and the residence was more than temporary. The contract for purchase was 
contingent upon the sale of the taxpayer's prior principal residence. The taxpayer's interaction 
with the qualified intermediary evidenced a lack of investment intent at the time of the exchange. 
Before purchasing the property, the taxpayer sought advice regarding whether he could move ' 
into the property if renters could not be found, evidencing contemplation of use of the property ( 
as a personal residence. In addition, the taxpayer began preparations to improve the property as a 
personal residence within weeks of purchasing the property. 
F. Section 1033 
G. Section 1035 
H. Miscellaneous 
1 . Sorting out derivatives in this "major/minor" transaction. The 
treatment turns on the nuances ofthe definitions. Summitt v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 12 
(5/20/10). An S corporation of which the taxpayer was a shareholder acquired reciprocal put and 
call foreign currency options that exactly offset each other. Subsequently, the corporation 
assigned a depreciated major currency (euro) call option and an appreciated minor currency 
(Danish krone) call option to a charity pursuant to an agreement in which the charity was 
substituted with respect to the obligations under the call options. The taxpayer took the position 
that the depreciated major currency call option was a "foreign currency contract" subject to the 
mark-to-market rules of § 1256, which were triggered by § 1256(c) upon the disposition, but that 
the appreciated minor currency call option was not so treated. The taxpayer argued that there are 
no economically significant differences among foreign currency forwards, futures, and options. 
The Tax Court (Judge Haines) held that foreign currency options are not "foreign currency 
contracts" as defined in § 1256(b)(2) and (g)(2) and the mark-to-market rules of § 1256 thus do 
not apply. The only options subject to § 1256 are listed nonequity options, dealer equity options, 
and options on dealer securities futures, all of which are traded on a qualified board or exchange. 
An interbank market is not' a qualified board or exchange, and because the options in question 
were purchased in an interbank market, they could not be "nonequity options" under § 1256. 
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( IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES 
( 
A. Fringe Benefits 
1. Involuntarily terminated employees will receive assistance with their 
COBRA premiums for a while. The 2009 ARRA § 3001 (in Title III - Premium Assistance for 
COBRA Benefits) provides premium assistance for COBRA benefits to the extent of 65 percent 
of the otherwise applicable COBRA premium. Eligibility for this benefit is more restrictive than 
eligibility for COBRA, wit~ elimination of the premium subsidy for high-income individuals as 
well as· for those eligible for another form of medical coverage, e.g., retiree medical. The DOL 
has provided a model notice to individuals pursuant to ARRA § 3001. 
~ The premium subsidy is only provided with respect to 
involuntary terminations that occur on or after 9/1/08 and before 1/1/10. 
a. And for a while longer. H.R. 3326, § 1010, extends the COBRA 
subsidy period from nine months to 15 months and extends the subsidy to terminations occurring 
in the first two months of2010. Notification requirements are provided for individuals who may 
have previously lost assistance but became eligible for the extended subsidy period. 
b. Another COBRA subsidy extension is provided, but no more 
extensions will be needed as President Obama focuses with "laser-like intensity" on the jobs 
issue. The Temporary Extension Act of2010 extends the COBRA subsidy for another month to 
cover terminations that took place from 9/1/08 through 3/31/10. 
c. Wrong again, Moosebreath. The Continuing Extension Act of 
2010 extends the COBRA subsidy to 5/31/10. 
d. A further extension of the COBRA subsidy is included in the 
pending Small Business Jobs Tax Relief Bill of 2010, H.R. 5486, which passed the House on 
6/15/10. 
2 . New tax Code rules permeate every nook and cranny of health care 
reform: American Health Benefit Exchanges can't work as substitutes for employer-
provided health insurance without special tax rules. Pursuant to § 10108 of the 2010 Health 
Care Act, employers offering minimum essential health care coverage through an eligible 
employer-sponsored plan and paying a portiori of that coverage must provide "qualified 
employees" with a voucher whose value can be applied to purchase a health plan through an 
American Health Benefit Exchange established under § 1311 of the Act. (An American Health 
Benefits Exchange must be established by each state (the cost of the establishment of which is 
subsidized by the U.S. Treasury) to facilitate the purchase of qualified health insurance plans.) 
"Qualified employees" are employees (1) whose (a)required contribution for employer 
sponsored minimum essential coverage exceeds 8 percent, but does not exceed 9.5 percent of the 
employee's household income for the taxable year, and (b) total household income does not 
exceed 400 percent of the poverty line for the family, and (2) who do not participate in the 
employer's health plan. The value of a voucher equals the employer's contribution to the 
employer's health plan. Vouchers can be used to purchase a qualified health plan in the 
Exchange. If the value of the voucher exceeds the premium, the employee receives cash for the 
excess value. Under new § 139D, added to the Code by the 2010 Health Care Act, the value of 
the voucher is not includable in gross income to the extent it is used for the purchase of a health 
plan. But any rebate received by the employee is includable in the employee's gross income. If 
an individual receives a voucher, the individual is disqualified from receiving any tax credit or 
cost sharing credit for the purchase of a plan in the Exchange. New § 162(g) allows the employer 
a deduction for the amount of the voucher. This provision is effective after 12/31/13. 
3 . A little added tax benefit to encourage the kids not to cut the apron 
strings. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 amended § 1 05(b) of the 
Code to extend the exclusion for reimbursement of medical care expenses under an employer-
provided accident or health plan to any child of an employee who has not attained age 27 by the 
close of the taxable year, without regard to whether the child is the taxpayer's dependent. A 
similar amendment to § 162(1) to allows self-employed individuals a deduction for any such 
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child of the taxpayer. Similar amendments to §§ 401 and 501 apply to VEBAs and qualified ( 
plans providing retiree health benefits. The new rules are effective as of the date of enactment. 
a. With a little leeway for the year the kid turns 26. Notice 2010-
38, 2010-20 I.R.B. 682 (5/17/10). This notice provides guidance on the exclusion from 
employees' gross income under §§ 105 and 106 for employer-provided accident and health plan 
coverage for employees' children under age 27, on the employment tax treatment of these 
benefits, and on the parallel amendments to § 401(h) for retiree health accounts in pension plans, 
§ 501(c)(9) for VEBAs, and the deduction under § 162(1) for self-employed individuals. The 
value of any employer-provided health coverage for an employee's child for the entire taxable 
year the child turns 26 may be excluded under § 105 if the coverage continues until the end of 
that taxable year. For example, if a child turns 26 in March, but stays on the plan past December 
31st (the end of most individual's taxable year), the health benefits up to December 31st are a 
tax-free fringe benefit. 
b . Health insurance that covers dependent children is no longer a tax-
free fringe benefit unless all of the employee's kids under age 27 are covered. T.D. 9482, Interim 
Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Dependent 
Coverage of Children to Age 26 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 F.R. 
27122 (3/13/10). The Affordable Care Act amended the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act) to 
add § 2714, which requires group health. plans and health insurance issuers that provide 
dependent coverage of children to continue to make such coverage available for an adult child 
until age 26. This requirement is incorporated by § 9815 of the Code. These interim final 
regulations, Reg. § 54.9815-2714T, provide that for a health insurance (or self-insured) plan that 
makes available dependent coverage of children to qualify under § 105, the plan may not deny or 
. impose special requirements for coverage of either minor children or adult children under age 26. 
With respect to a child who has not attained age 26, a plan or issuer may not define dependent 
for purposes of eligibility for dependent cov~rage of children other than in terms of a relationship 
between a child and the participant. Thus, for example, a plan or issuer may not deny or restrict ( . 
coverage for a child who has not attained age 26 based on the presence or absence of the child's 
financial dependency (upon the participant or any other person), residency with the participant or 
with any other person, student status, employment, or any combination of those factors. Nothing 
in the regulations requires an employer's plan to cover dependent as a condition for eligibility to 
be a tax-free fringe benefit. The regulation applies for phm years beginning on or after 9123110, 
and the regulation expires "on or before" 5/13/13. Transition rules are provided. 
4. How about a little consistency in tax-free drug use? The 2010 Health 
Care Act added § 106(f), dealing with employer sponsored Health Flexible Spending 
Arrangements and Health Reimbursement Arrangements, and amended § 223( d)(2), dealing with 
HSAs (for individuals with high deductible health plans, whether through an employer or 
individually) and § 220(d)(2), dealing with individual Archer MSAs, to disallow reimbursement 
under any such plan for the cost of over-the-counter medicines unless the medicine is prescribed 
by a physician. Thus, reimbursement is allowed only if the medicine or drug is a prescribed drug, 
without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescription, or is insulin, which is the 
rule for deductibility of medicine as a medical expense under § 213. The new provisions are 
effective after 12/31/10. 
a. And the IRS takes steps to make it more difficult to buy beer 
and cigs using health FSA and HRA debit cards. Notice 2010-59, 2010- 39 I.R.B. _ 
(9/311 0). Current debit card systems are not capable of substantiating compliance with § 106(f) 
with respect to over-the-counter medicines or drugs because the systems are incapable of 
recognizing and substantiating that the medicines or drugs were prescribed. For expenses 
incurred on' and after January 1, 2011, health FSA and HRA debit cards may not be used to 
purchase over-the-counter medicines or drugs. Nevertheless to facilitate the significant changes 
to existing systems necessary to reflect the statutory change, the IRS will not challenge the use of 
health FSA and HRA debit cards for expenses incurred through January 15,2011 if the use of the 
debit cards complies with prior guidance. However, on and after January 16, 2011, over-the-
counter medicine or drug purchases at all providers and merchants (whether or not they have an \. 
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( inventory information approval system (lIAS)) must be substantiated before reimbursement may 
be made. Substantiation is accomplished by sUbmitting the prescription (or a copy of the 
prescription or other documentation that a prescription has been issued) for the over-the-counter 
medicine or drug, and other information from an independent third party that satisfies the 
requirements under Prop. Reg. § 1.125-6(b )(3)(i). . 
• Sections 106(f), 220(d)(2) and § 223(d)(2)(A) do not apply to 
items that are not medicines or drugs, including equipment such as crutches, supplies such as 
bandages, and diagnostic devices such as blood sugar test kits; such items may qualify as medical 
care if they otherwise meet the defmition of medical care in § 213(d)(1). 
b. Rev. Rul. 2010-59, 2010-39 I.R.B. _ (9/3/10). To reflect the 
limitations in § 106(f), the IRS has obsoleted Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-2 C.B. 559, which had 
held that reimbursements by the employer of amounts expended for medicines or drugs available 
without a prescription are excludable from gross income under § 1 05(b). 
5. No more deduction for spending tax-free government subsidies on 
drugs for retirees. However, companies that made required balance sheet adjustments 
became subject to congressional hazing because they made Obama look bad. Section 139A 
excludes from gross income federal subsidy payments, made pursuant to 42 USC § 1395w-132, 
to a sponsor of a qualified retiree prescription drug plan. The 2010 Health Care Act amended 
§ 139A to provide that for taxable years beginning after 12/31/12, the amount of any deduction 
allowable for retiree prescription drug expenses is reduced by the amount of the excludable 
subsidy payments received. . 
6 . Enlisting cafeteria plans in health insurance reform. 
a. Congress forces employees to pay more of the health care costs 
with after-tax dollars to fight rising health care costs. The 2010 Health Care Act amended 
§ 125 by adding new § 125(i) (and renumbering former §§ 125(i) and (j) as §§ 125(j) and (k)) to 
limit allowable salary reduction contributions to a health flexible spending under a cafeteria plan 
to $2,500. The 2010 Reconciliation Act extended the effective date until years after 12/31/12. 
The $2,500 limitation is indexed for inflation after 2013. A plan that does not include the $2,500 
ceiling does not qualify as a cafeteria plan under § 125. 
b. Employers can't easily duck the responsibility to pay a healthy 
chunk on health insurance premiums by putting the whole kit and caboodle into a cafeteria plan. 
Section 125(f )(3), added by the 2010 Health Care Act, restricts the ability of employers to 
provide reimbursement, or direct payment, under a cafeteria plan for the premiums for coverage 
under any qualified health plan offered through an American Health Benefits Exchange. Such a 
benefit qualifies only if the employer is a "qualified employer" as defined in § 1312(f)(2) of the 
Act. A "qualified employer" is a small employer that elects to make all its full-time employees 
eligible for one or more qualified plans offered in the small group market through an Exchange. 
For this purpose, a "small employer" (defined in § 1304(b)(2) of the Act) is an employer who 
employed an average of not more than 100 employees on business days during the preceding 
calendar year and who employs at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year. Unless it 
qualifies under § 125(f)(3), reimbursement (or direct payment) for the premiums for coverage 
under any qualified health plan offered through an Exchange is not a qualified benefit under a 
cafeteria plan. Thus, any employer that is not a qualified employer cannot offer to reimburse an 
employee for the premium for a qualified plan that the employee purchases through the 
individual market in an Exchange as a health insurance coverage option under its cafeteria plan 
without disqualifying the plan. This provision applies to taxable years beginning after 12/31/13. 
c. To us, the new "Simple Cafeteria Plan" rules appear to be just as 
complex as the old, still generally applicable cafeteria plan rules. The 2010 Health Care Act 
amended § 125 by adding new § 1250) (and renumbering former §§ 1250) and (k) as §§ 125(k) 
and (l)) to provide for "simple cafeteria plans" for "eligible small employers," to which the 
otherwise generally applicable nondiscrimination requirements, for both the cafeteria plan itself 
and benefits under the plan (e.g., group term life insurance, self-insured medical expense 
reimbursement plan, and dependent care assistance program), do not apply. Under the safe 
harbor, a cafeteria plan and the specified qualified benefits are treated as meeting the 
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nondiscrimination rules if the cafeteria plan satisfies special (1) minimum eligibility and 
participation requirements and (2) minimum employer contribution requirements. The eligibility 
requirement is met only if (1) all employees (other than excludable employees) are eligible to 
participate, and (2) each eligible employee may elect any benefit available under the plan under 
terms and conditions applicable to all participants. Excludable employees include employees who 
(1) have not attained the age of 21 before the close of a plan year, (2) have fewer than 1,000 
hours of service for the preceding plan year, (3) have not completed one year of service with the 
employer as of any day during the plan year, or (4) are covered under a collective bargaining 
agreement if there is evidence that the benefits 90vered under the cafeteria plan were the subject 
of good faith bargaining. Shorter service and younger age requirements can apply only if the 
shorter service or younger age applies to all employees. The minimum contribution requirement 
requires the employer to make a contribution for each nonhighly compensated employee 
(employee who is not a highly compensated employee (as defined in § 414(q)) or a key 
employee (as defined in § 416(i)) in addition to any salary reduction contributioris made by the 
employee. The minimum contribution may be either a matching contribution or a "nonelective 
contribution," but the same method must be used for calculating the minimum contribution for 
all nonhighly compensated employees. The minimum matching contribution is the lesser of 
(1) 100 percent of the salary reduction contribution made by the employee for the year or (2) six 
percent of the employee's compensation for the year. Matching contributions in excess of the 
minimum may be made only if matching contributions with respect to any highly compensated 
employee or key employee are not at a higher percentage than the matching contributions for any 
nonhighly compensated employee. Under the nonelective contribution method the employer 
must contribute is an amount equal to a uniform percentage (not less than two percent) of each 
eligible employee's compensation for the year, whether or not the employees makes any salary 
reduction contribution. Generally speaking, an eligible small employer is an employer who 
employed an average of 100 or fewer employees on business days during either of the two 
preceding years. If an employer was an eligible employer and maintained a simple cafeteria plan, 
but subsequently employs more than 100 employees, it remains an eligible small employer until 
the year after which it employs an average of 200 or more employees during the year. There are 
aggregation rules for controlled groups and special rules treating leased employees as employees. 
• The devil might be in the details that we have omitted in the 
name of quasi-brevity. 
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans 
1. Section 72(t) has no catchall hardship exception. Dollander v. 
Commissioner, T.e Memo. 2009-187 (8/19/09). There is no general exception to the § 72(t) 
penalty tax for premature withdrawals from a qualified retirement plan based on the need to 
withdraw funds due to general "fmancial hardship." 
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options 
1. My employer cheated on me (and a lot of others) but it's still income. 
Gourley v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6119 (Fed. Cl. 8/26/09). The taxpayer, a 
WorldCom employee, exercised nonqualified stock options for 90,300 shares of WorldCom 
stock valued at $42,125 per share on January 28,2000. The value of the stock was reflected in a 
W -2 issued to the taxpayer by WorldCom. The taxpayer disposed of the stock during 2000 and 
2001. On June 25, 2002, WorldCom announced a major restatement of its financials admitting 
that because of fraudulent accounting practices it incurred undisclosed losses from 2000 to 2001. 
The taxpayer thus claimed in a refund action that the stock he received in January 2000 was 
worth only $12.52 per share and that the W-2 issued by WorldCom was grossly inflated. The 
court rejected the refund action pointing out that the known fair market value of the WorldCom 
stock on the date of the taxpayer's exercise formed the basis of the taxpayer's gross income. The 
court pointed out that the market price based on imperfect information is nonetheless the 
prevailing market price. 
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D. Individual Retirement Accounts 
1. An employment tax penalty injury leads to an income tax insult. 
Swanton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-140 (6/24110). The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held 
that $289,017 seized from taxpayer's IRA by the IRS in satisfaction of a § 6672 penalty tax 
liability constituted a distribution from the IRA includable in gross income. 
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS 
A. Rates 
1. The government isn't mandating anybody have health insurance, it's 
just raising your taxes if you don't. Beginning in January of2014, new § 5000A (which all by 
itself constitutes new Chapter 48 of the Code), added by the 2010 Health Care Act, imposes a 
penalty - that's exactly the concise and elegant statutory language - on any individual who 
does not maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage, unless the individual is exempt. 
Minimum essential health insurance coverage includes government sponsored programs, eligible 
employer-sponsored plans, plans in the individual market, grandfathered group health plans and 
other coverage as recognized by HHS in coordination with the Treasury. The penalty is phased in 
over the period 2014-2016 and becomes fully effective in 2016. The penalty applies month-by-
month, but there is a once a year exception for a coverage gap of less than three consecutive 
months. The monthly penalty is 1112 of an annualized penalty amount. Starting in 2016, the 
annualized penalty is the greater of: (1) 2.5 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer's 
household income for the taxable year exceeds the threshold amount of income requiring an 
income tax return to be filed for that taxpayer, or (2) $695 per uninsured adult in the household 
(indexed for inflation after 2016) .. (Household income is the sum of gross income (including all 
foreign earned income) and tax-exempt interest, minus trade and business deductions, allowable 
losses from sales of property, deduction attributable to rent and royalty income, and alimony. 
Note that deductions for contributions to IRAs, Archer MSAs, etc., are not allowed for this 
purpose.) The penalty for an uninsured individual under age 18 is one-half of the penalty for an 
adult. (If an individual without minimum essential health insurance coverage is a dependent of 
another taxpayer, the other taxpayer is liable for the penalty with respect to the individual.) 
During the phase-in, the flat sum adult penalty is $95 for 2014, and $325 for 2015; the household 
income penalty percentage is 1 percent for 2014 and 2 percent for 2015. The total household 
penalty may not exceed the lesser of (1) three times the adult penalty, or (2) the national average 
annual premium for bronze level health plan - exactly what is a bronze level health plan is way 
too difficult to explain here - offered through an American Health Benefits Exchange that year 
for the taxpayer's household size. (An American Health Benefits Exchange must be established 
by each state (the cost of the establishment of which is subsidized by the U.S. Treasury) to 
facilitate the purchase of qualified health insurance plans.) Individuals who cannot afford 
coverage because their required contribution for employer sponsored coverage or the lowest cost 
bronze plan in the local American Health Benefits Exchange exceeds eight percent (indexed after 
2014 for increases in health insurance premium costs) of household income for the year are 
exempt from the penalty. In years after 2014, the eight percent exemption is increased by the 
amount by which premium growth exceeds income growth. (Members of a recognized religious 
sect exempt from self-employment taxes and members of Indian tribes also are exempt, as are 
prisoners.) The penalty is due upon notice and demand, and is subject to normal assessment 
procedures. However, it cannot be collected by lien and levy. Thereare no criminal or civil 
penalties for failure to pay, and interest does not run on late payment. 
2 . Even though it's domiciled in new Chapter 2A, and titled 'Unearned 
Medicare Contribution," it feels like an income tax surtax on investment income. New Code 
§ 1411 of the Code, added by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
imposes a 3.8 percent tax on investment income of individuals, estates, and trusts in taxable 
years beginning after 12/31112. For individuals (except nonresident aliens), the tax applies only 
to the lesser of (1) net investment income or (2) the excess of adjusted gross income (increased 
by net foreign earned income excluded under §·911(a)(I» over a threshold amount. The 
threshold amount is $250,000 for spouses filing a joint return or a surviving spouse, $125,000 for 
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married individuals filing separate returns, and $200,000 for single taxpayers (including heads of 
household). Modified adjusted gross income is adjusted gross income increased by the amount 
(net of the deductions and exclusions disallowed with respect to the foreign earned income). For 
estates and trusts, the tax is levied on the lesser of (1) undistributed net iIivestment income, or 
(2) the excess of adjusted gross income (as defined in § 67(e» over the dollar amount at which 
the highest income tax bracket applicable to an estate or trust begins. The tax does not apply to a 
trust that is tax-exempt under § 501, is a charitable remainder trust tax-exempt under § 664, or all 
of the interests of which are devoted to charitable purposes. Net investment income is investment 
income reduced by the deductions allocable to that income. Investment income is the sum of 
(1) gross income from interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and rents (other than income 
derived from any trade or business to which the tax does not apply), (2) other gross income 
derived from any business to which the tax applies, and (3) net gain (to the extent taken into 
account in computing taxable income) attributable to the disposition of property other than 
property held in a trade or business to which the tax does not apply. The § 1411 tax applies to 
trade or business income from (1) a passive activity, and (2) trading financial instruments or 
commodities (as defined in § 475(e)(2». It does not apply to any other trade or business income. 
Gain or loss from the disposition of a partnership interest or stock in an S corporation is taken 
into account only to the extent gain or loss would be taken into account by the partner or 
shareholder if the entity had sold all its properties for fair market value immediately before the 
disposition. Thus there is a deemed basis adjustment that has results in taking into account only 
the net gain or loss attributable to the entity's property that is not attributable to an active trade or 
business. However, all income, gain, or loss on working capital is subject to the tax. Investment 
income does not include any distributions from a qualified retirement plan or any income subject 
to self-employment tax. Unlike self-employment taxes, no part of the § 1411 tax is deductible in 
computing taxable income under Chapter 1. 
3. Domestic partners = one; breeders = zero. PLR 201021048 (5/5/10). 
Registered California domestic partners must each report one-half of the combined income 
earned from the performance of personal services and one-half of the combined income derived 
from their community property assets. The resulting income is then taxed to each of the domestic 
partners at the more favorable § l(c) single rates, as opposed to the higher rates paid by married 
couples. Also, no federal gift tax is payable on the vesting of earnings of one partner in the other 
partner under California law. 
• See also, ILM 201021049 (5/6/10) (holding that the IRS 
could consider the assets of taxpayer's registered domestic partner when determining whether to 
accept an Offer in Compromise); and ILM 201021050 (5/5/10) (the treatment of a registered 
domestic partner who reported earned income in accordance with CCA 200608038 in years 
beginning before 6/1/10). 
B. Miscellaneous Income 
1 . Treasury proposes to reverse. a principle established in a Supreme 
Court decision that the government won. REG-127270-06, Damages Received on Account of 
Personal Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness, 74 F.R. 47152 (9/15/09). The Treasury has 
published proposed regulations (prop. Reg. § 1.104-1(c» under § 104(a)(2) to reflect 
amendments to § 104 enacted since the current regulations were promulgated and certain judicial 
decisions. The proposed regulations provide that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies to personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness. Emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or 
physical sickness. However, the proposed regulations provide that dainages for emotional 
distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excludable under § 104(a)(2). 
Under the proposed regulations, the term damages means an amount received (other than 
workers' compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or through a settlement 
agreement entered into in lieu of prosecution. Notably, the proposed regulations eliminate the 
requirement in the current regulations that to be excludable under § 104(a)(2) the damages must 
be "based upon tort or tort type rights." Thus, damages for physical injuries may qualify for 
exclusion under § 104(a)(2) even though the injury giving rise to the damages is not defined as a 
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( tort under state or common law. The reason for the change was the Treasury Department's 
concern that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the tort type rights test in United States v. 
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), limiting the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages for personal injuries 
for which the full range of tort-type remedies is available, could precluded an exclusion under 
§ 104(a)(2) for redress of physical personal injuries under a "no-fault" statute that does not 
provide traditional tort-type remedies. 
• Taxpayers may apply the proposed regulations· to amounts 
paid pursuant to a written binding agreement, court decree, or mediation award entered into or 
issued after September 13, 1995 and received after August 20, 1996. 
2 . Some bad tax news for over-burdened consumer credit card debtors 
who beat the bank. They don't beat the mS! Forgiven accrued but unpaid interest on a 
consumer loan is COD income. Payne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-66 (3/18/08). Judge 
Haynes held that the compromise of credit card debt, including interest, incurred for personal 
living expenses resulted in recognition of COD income for a cash method taxpayer. The § 
108(e)(5) exception for cancellation of purchase money debt did not apply because the only 
relationship between the debtor and creditor was the debtor-creditor relationship and there Was 
no property sale and purchase between the creditor and debtor that gave rise to the debt. 
a. The result must have been so obvious that the Tax Court was 
affirmed per curiam. Payne v. Commissioner, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7783 (8th Cir. 12/22/09). 
3 . The out of pocket cost of compromising consumer debt does not 
reduce the amount of COD income. Melvin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-199 (9/8/09). 
The taxpayers owed Chase Manhattan Bank $13,084 on a consumer credit cards, and Chase 
agreed to accept $4,579 to settle the debt. The taxpayers paid a third party (Arbitronix) 25 
percent of the $8,505 savings, or $2,126 to negotiate the compromise. The Tax Court (Judge 
Halpern) held that the taxpayers recognized COD income in the full amount of the cancelled 
debt. The "[taxpayers] received goods and services (and cash advances) on credit; when Chase 
relieved them of their corresponding obligation to pay, petitioners without question received an 
'accession to income.'" The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that under § 61(a)(12) itself 
only the net benefit of the debt cancellation was includable in gross income - that is they should 
have been allowed to offset their "phantom' income" with the "loss" they suffered when they 
paid the fee. Judge Halpern held that § 61(a)(12) "manifestly does not provide for any kind of 
deduction." The taxpayers did not argue for a deduction under § 162 because they acknowledged 
that the amount was not paid with respect to a business, and they did not argue for a § 212 
deduction because they were in the AMT. 
• One of our colleagues who specializes in consumer law 
commented, "What a rip-off. If the people had called Chase themselves they probably could have 
gotten an even better deal than the third party did, and saved 25 percent." 
4. The IRS was not entitled to rely on a naked Form l099-C to show 
cancellation of indebtedness income occurred in a particular year. Linkugel v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-180 (12/1/09). The taxpayer's house was foreclosed upon 
in 2000, and the mortgagee secured a deficiency judgment in the amount of $35,247, which it 
made no effort to collect. Citigroup acquired the mortgagee in late 2000 and also engaged in no 
efforts to collect upon the judgment. In 2007, a Citigroup subsidiary issued a Form 1099-C in the 
deficiency amount for the 2006 taxable year. The taxpayer failed to include the cancellation of 
indebtedness income on his 2006 return, and IRS determined a deficiency. The taxpayer asserted 
that the cancellation of debt income occurred in an earlier year. Special Trial Judge Armen held 
that taxpayer was entitled to a shift in the burden of proof under § 6201 (d), which required the 
IRS to present other evidence to support the incidence of the cancellation of debt income in 
2006. The IRS failed to meet its burden of production. 
• The court relied on Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 
(5th Cir. 1991), which was codified as § 6201(d) in the 1996 second Taxpayer Bill of Rights. 
5. Police arrest procedures did n()t result in "physical injury." Stadnyk v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-289 (12/22/08). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that 
damages received on account of false imprisonment were not excludable under § 104(a)(2), even 
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though the taxpayer was detained, handcuffed and searched, because she suffered no physical ( 
harm. The damages received in the settlement compensated the taxpayer for "the ordeal ... 
suffered as a result of her arrest, detention, and indictment" as the result of her bank erroneously 
stamping a check ''NSF'' when it had been stopped for "dissatisfied purchase." The damages 
were "stated in terms of recovery for nonphysical personal injuries: Emotional distress, 
mortification, humiliation, mental anguish, and damage to reputation." Judge Goeke also rejected 
summarily the taxpayer's claim that damages received for personal injuries are not gross income 
within the meaning of § 61(a) and that "section 104(a)(2) conflicts with section 61(a) and 
violates the Sixteenth Amendment to the extent that it taxes compensatory damages received for 
personal injuries." 
a. The Sixth Circuit agrees that police arrest procedures did not 
result in "physical injury." Stadnyk v. Commissioner, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1130 (6th Cir. 
2/26/10), qff'g T.C. Memo. 2008-289 (12/22/08). In an nonprecedential opinion, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court opinion (Judge Goeke) holding that damages received on account 
of false imprisonment were not excludable under § 104(a)(2), even though the taxpayer was 
detained, handcuffed and searched, because she suffered no physical harm. The Tax Court found 
that the damages received in the settlement compensated the taxpayer for "the ordeal ... suffered 
as a result of her arrest, detention, and indictment" as the result of her bank erroneously stamping 
a check ''NSF'' when it had been stopped for "dissatisfied purchase." The damages were "stated 
in terms of recovery for nonphysical personal injuries: Emotional distress, mortification, 
humiliation, mental anguish, and damage to reputation." The Court of Appeals declined "to 
create a per se rule that every false imprisonment claim necessarily involves a physical injury," 
stating as follows: 
To be sure, a false imprisonment claim may cause a physical injury, such as an 
injured wrist as a result of being handcuffed. But the mere fact that false 
imprisonment involves a physical act-restraining the victim's freedom-does 
not mean that the victim is necessarily physically injured as a result of that (" 
physical act. 
• Section 104(a)(2) did not apply, because the taxpayer 
"unequivocally testified that she suffered no physical injuries as a result of her physical restraint." 
thus she had not suffered personal physical injuries or physical sickness. 
• The Court of Appeals also rejected as meritless the 
taxpayer's claim that damages received for personal injuries are not gross income within the 
meaning of § 61(a) and that "§ 104(a)(2), as amended by Congress in 1996, violates the Sixteenth 
Amendment to any extent that it purports to subject compensation for personal injuries to income 
tax." 
• Apparently the government did not cross appeal the Tax 
Court's failure to impose penalties. In the Tax Court Judge Goeke had refused to uphold the 
penalties asserted by the IRS because taxpayers had received "disinterested advice" that the 
damages were not includable in income. The advice came from taxpayer's lawyer, the defendant's 
lawyer, and the mediator who negotiated the settlement. He concluded that the taxpayers "acted 
reasonably and in good faith when following their advice and preparing their own return as they 
have done for over 40 years, because "[a]lthough though none of those individuals had specialized 
knowledge in tax law, they were experienced in personal injury lawsuits and settlements." 
6 . It looks like damages for physical sickness caused by emotional 
distress can be excluded if they go beyond mere symptomatic manifestations of the 
underlying emotional distress. Domenyv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010.:.9 (1113110). The 
taxpayer received approximately $33,000 in settlement of a claim for claims for wrongful 
termination of employment one-third of amount received in settlement of claims for wrongful 
termination of employment and violations of various civil rights statutes. The taxpayer's former 
employer paid approximately $8,000 to her that was reflected on a .Form W -2 as employee 
compensation, $8,000 to the taxpayer's lawyer, for which no information return was filed, and 
$17,000 to the taxpayer that was reflected on a Form 1099-MISC as "nonemployee 
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( compensation." The Tax Court (Judge Gerber) held that the $8,000 paid directly to the taxpayer 
was includable wage compensation, and the remaining amount was excludable under § 104(a)(2) 
as damages for physical injuries attributable to exacerbation of multiple sclerosis caused by a 
hostile work environment. The payor-former employer's intent in settlement of the claim was 
evidenced by the issuance of separate checks and different information returns; these facts 
indicated that the former employer intended amount in excess of wages due to be in settlement of 
tort claims for physical injuries attributable to the exacerbation of mUltiple sclerosis. 
• The legislative history indicates that physical manifestations 
of emotional distress, such as insomnia, headaches, and stomach disorders, are not to be treated as 
physical injuries. H.R. Rep. No. 737, 104thCong., 2d Sess. 143, n.56 (1996). 
7 . When the taxpayer lives in Florida, the gross income tax a/k1a the 
AMT doesn't bite as hard. Campbell v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.3 (1121110). The taxpayer 
recovered a gross award of $8.75 million as a relator in a qui tam action on behalf of the United 
States government against a military contractor, and paid $3.5 million of attorney's fees, which 
amount was retained by the taxpayer's attorney to whom the $8.75 million had been remitted; the 
taxpayer received only $5.25 million from his attorney. The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that 
entire gross award of $8.75 million was includable in gross income, and the $3.5 million of 
attorney's fees was deductible as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. 
• "Qui tam" is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitor," which means "who pursues this action on our 
Lord the King's behalf as well as his own." 
• The tax year involved in this case (2003) pre-dates the 
effective date of 2004 amendments to § 62(a), which now permits attorney's fees in a False Claims 
Act case to be an above-the-line deduction. 
S . Protecting the tax-free treatment of Indian medical care provided 
from casino profits. The 2010 Health Care Act added new § 139D, which expressly excludes 
from gross income the value of certain Indian tribe health care benefits. 
• These benefits might have been excludable in any event 
under the 'common law" general welfare exclusion, but Congress was concerned by statements of . 
some IRS officials to the effect that the general welfare exclusion might not apply universally to 
Indian tribe health care benefits. Although the exclusion extends only to specified, benefits, it 
broadly covers most health insurance, medical benefits, and accident coverage .. 
9. BP is gonna have to send out a whole lot of Form 1099s. This will 
result in some claimants having to file tax returns for the first time in their lives. IR-201O-
078 (6/25/10), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=224886,00.html. The IRS has 
published guidance for individuals and businesses affected by the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
(1) Taxpayers must include in gross income payments received for lost business income, lost 
wages or lost profits. (2) Self-employed individuals who receive a payment that represents 
compensation for lost income of the individual's trade or business must include the amount of 
the payment in calculating of the self-employment tax. (3) A payment to an individual to 
compensate for lost wages is subject to the social security tax Medicare taxes, and generally is 
not subject to income tax withholding, unless backup withholding applies. (4) A person making 
payments to an individual or partnership (including an LLC) for lost business income, lost 
wages, or lost profits must report the payments on a Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, if 
the payments aggregate $600 or more.· The document also describes the standard rules regarding 
casualty loss deductions and involuntary conversions, and the inclusion in gross income of 
damages for emotional distress. 
• The obvious remedy is for BP to gross up its payments for 
the taxes claimants would not have paid absent the oil spill. 
10. Having a heart attack can improve your tax heath. Parkinson v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-142 (6/28/10). The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that one-
half of the amount received by the taxpayer in settlement of suit for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress was excludable under § 104(a)(2), because the payor intended it to be 
compensation for a heart attack suffered as a result of the emotional distress. He reasoned that "a 
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heart attack and its physical aftereffects constitute physical injury or sickness rather than mere 
sUbjective sensations or symptoms of emotional distress." The other one-half of the settlement 
was not excludable because it was compensation for the emotional distress itself. 
C. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes 
1 . Mucking stalls for 60 horses helps avoid the hobby loss limitations. 
Helmick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-220 (9/22/09). The taxpayers' conducted a horse 
breeding activity involving 40-60 horses on property on which they lived. They incurred 
substantial losses for eleven consecutive years and never made a profit. Their other income was 
a modest salary. Judge Gustafson allowed the claimed losses, and stated: 
Although their intention to make the activity eventually profitable was objectively 
unreasonable, it was their genuine subjective intention. By the time of the years in 
issue, the Helmicks had invested so much time and effort in this failing activity 
that they could see no way out except to somehow make the thing work. No other 
possible purpose explains their willingness to persist in an activity that had 
become so frustrating and unpleasant. 
2 . She bet that the ball wouldn't stop on § 183 and won the right to 
deduct gambling losses on schedule C instead of on Schedule A. Chow v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2010-48 (3/18/10). Judge Cohen applied Reg. § 1.183-2(b) to determine that the 
taxpayer's gambling activity was engaged in for profit. Accordingly, the taxpayer was a 
professional gambler, and her losses were deductible on Schedule C, rather than as itemized 
deductions. Nevertheless pursuant to § 165( d), her losses were not deductible to the extent they 
exceeded her gambling winnings. 
D. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses 
1 . Helping entry-level homebuyers invest in the bear housing market. 
Code § 36, added by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, provides a refundable credit for a 
"first-time home buyer" who purchases a principal residence on or after 4/9/08, and before 
111109. The amount of the credit is the lesser of 10 percent of the purchase price or $7,500 
($3,750 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return). If two or more unmarried 
persons purchase a principal residence together, the total amount of the credit will be allocated 
among them as prescribed by the IRS. The credit is phased out over the modified adjusted 
income range of $75,000 to $95,000 ($150,000 to $170,000 in the case of a joint return). A 
person qualifies as a "first-time homebuyer" if neither the person nor the person's spouse (if any) 
owned a principal residence at any time during the three-year period ending on the date of 
purchase of the credit-generating residence. The credit is not available if the taxpayer purchased 
the property from a related person or acquired it by gift, or if the taxpayer's basis in the property 
is determined under § 1014. (Persons are related for this purpose if they are related for purposes 
of § 267 or § 707, except that the family of an individual under § 267(c)(4) is limited for this 
purpose to his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.) The credit is also not available: (1) if a 
credit under § 1400C (relating to first-time homebuyers in the District of Columbia) has ever 
been allowable to the taxpayer; (2) if the taxpayer's financing is from tax-exempt mortgage 
revenue bonds; (3) if the taxpayer is a nonresident alien; or (4) if the taxpayer disposes of the 
residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence before the close of the taxable year. 
• The amount of the credit is recaptured ratably over the 15-
year period beginning with the second taxable year following the taxable year in which the credit-
generating purchase was made. For example, if a taxpayer properly claimed a credit of $7,500 for a 
purchase in 2008, the recapture amount would be $500 in 2010, with another $500 recapture 
amount in each of the next 14 years. Thus, the credit actually functions as an interest-free loan from 
the government to the taxpayer. If, prior to the end of the 15-year recapture period, a taxpayer 
disposes of the credit-generating residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence, the 
recapture of any previously unrecaptured credit is accelerated. ill the case of a sale of the principal 
residence to an unrelated person, the recapture amount is limited to the amount of gain (if any) on 
the sale. There is no recapture (either regular or accelerated) after the death of a taxpayer, and there 
is no accelerated recapture following an involuntary conversion of a residence if the taxpayer 
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( acquires a new principal residence within the next two years. If a credit-generating residence is 
transferred between spouses or incident to a divorce, in a transaction subject to § 1041, any 
remaining recapture obligation is imposed solely on the transferee. 
• Although the credit is ordinarily allowed with respect to the 
year in which the credit-generating purchase occurred, a taxpayer purchasing a home in 2009 
(before July 1) may elect to treat the purchase as having been made in 2008, for the purpose of 
claiming the credit on his 2008 tax return. If the election is made, the fIrst year of the recapture 
period will be 2010, rather than 2011. 
. a. The homebuyer credit started out as an interest-free loan, but 
now it's outright free money from the federal government. Section 1006 of the 2009 ARRA 
amended Code § 36(h) to extend the life of the fIrst-time homebuyer credit through November 
30,2009, and to increase the amount of the credit to $8,000 for 2009. It also amended § 36(f) to 
eliminate the recapture of the credit for ahome purchased in 2009, unless the home is sold or 
ceases to be the taxpayer's principal residence within 36 months of the date of purchase. 
b. Extended and modified in the Worker, Homeownership, and 
Business Act of 2009. Section 11 of the WHABA of 2009 amends Code § 36 to extend the 
credit for homespufchased before 5/1/10 (before 7/1/10, if subject to a binding contract before 
5/1/10). 
• An individual (and, if married, the individual's spouse) who 
has maintained the same principal residence for any fIve-cons~cutive year period during the eight-
year period ending on the date of the purchase of a subsequent principal residence is treated as a 
fIrst-time homebuyer. The maximum allowable credit for such taxpayers is $6,500. This provision 
applies to residences purchased after 11/30/09. 
• There are, of course, income limitations for the credit, with 
phaseouts between $225,000 and $245,000 of AGI, as well as a purchase price limit of $800,000. 
c. Closing deadline extended to give banks (and Congress) time to 
do the paperwork. The Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement Act of 2010 extended the 
closing deadline for the § 36 homebuyer's credit from 6/30/10 to 9/30/10 for any eligible 
homebuyer who entered into a binding purchase contract on or before 4/30/10 to close on the 
purchase of the home on or before 6/30/10. The new law addresses concerns that many 
homebuyers might be unable to meet the original 6/30/10 closing deadline because of 
circumstances beyond their control. One of these circumstances is the failure of Congress to 
provide for the extension of federal flood insurance after the former program expired. 
2 . The IRS recedes from Tax Court victories on the scope of "home 
equity indebtedness." ILM 200940030 (8/7/09). Home mortgage indebtedness in excess of 
$1,000,000 may qualify as home equity indebtedness under § 163(h)(3)(C). The position taken in 
the memo is inconsistent with Pau v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-43, and Catalano v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-82, but it is consistent with the instructions in IRS Pub. No. 
936, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction. 
• Shouldn't this position be stated in a published revenue 
ruling since Tax Court decisions are the law and instructions in IRS Publications are not the law? 
3 . Taxpayer whose blood contained 0.09 percent alcohol was not drunk 
enough to be grossly negligent. At . least he drove more than 400 yards before crashing. 
Rohrs v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-190 (12/10/09). The Tax Court (Judge Gerber) 
held that a taxpayer who totaled his 2Y2-month-old $40,000 pickup truck was entitled to a 
$33,629 casualty loss deduction because driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.09 percent is 
not "willful negligence" for purposes of Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3). The court held that taxpayer took 
care to secure transportation to and from a party he attended, and believed he was not impaired 
when he drove to his parents' house and failed to successfully negotiate a tum resulting in his 
truck sliding off an embankment and rolling over. The court saw no reason to rely on public 
policy to deny the loss deduction, and the court held that taxpayer was not liable for the 
§ 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty. 
4. Sex reassignment surgery is not nondeductible cosmetic surgery, but 
the boob job is. O'Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.4 (2/2/10). The taxpayer was a 
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genetic male who suffered from gender identity disorder, which is a condition recognized in ( 
medical reference texts, in which an individual experiences persistent psychological discomfort 
. concerning his or her anatomical gender. Pursuant to medical advice the taxpayer underwent sex 
reassignment surgery, including breast augmentation surgery, and claimed a § 213 medical 
expense deduction for the cost of the surgeries, feminizing hormones, and other related expenses. 
The IRS disallowed the deductions. In a reviewed opinion by Judge Gale the majority (8 judges) 
held as follows: (1) Gender identity disorder is a "disease" within the meaning § 213(d)(1)(A) 
and (9)(B); (2) the taxpayer's hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery were "for the ... 
treatment ... of' and "[treated]" disease within the meaning of § 213(d)(I)(A) and (9)(B); and 
(3) because they were for the treatment of disease, the procedures were not "cosmetic surgery" 
that is excluded from the definition of "medical care" by § 213(d)(9)(A). However, (4) the 
taxpayer's breast augmentation surgery was "directed at improving ... [her] appearance," because 
the taxpayer failed to prove that the· breast augmentation surgery either "meaningfully 
[promoted] the proper function of the body" or "[treated] ... disease" within the meaning of 
§ 213(d)(9)(B), the breast augmentation surgery was "cosmetic surgery" that is excluded from 
the definition of deductible "medical care." 
• Judge Halpern concurred. Judges Goeke and Holmes 
concurred only in the result. 
• Judge Foley, joined by Judges Wells, Vasquez, Kroupa, and 
Gustafson, concurred in disallowance of the deduction for the breast augmentation surgery and 
dissented with respect to allowing deductions for hormone therapy and sex reassignment. He 
reasoned that ''the fact that a procedure treats a disease is not sufficient to exclude the procedure 
from the definition of 'cosmetic surgery,'" because § 213(d)(9)(A) provides that the term "medical 
care" includes "cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures" only if the "surgery or procedure is 
necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a disfiguring disease. "To 
yield a deduction, an appearance-improving procedure must treat 'disease' (as opposed to treating a 
patient or a symptom)." 
• Judge Gustafson, joined by Judges Foley, Wells, and Kroupa, 
concurred in disallowance of the deduction for the breast augmentation surgery and dissented with 
respect to allowing deductions for hormone therapy and sex reassignment. He reasoned as follows: 
A procedure that changes the patient's healthy male body (in fact, that disables his 
healthy male body) and leaves his mind unchanged (Le., with the continuing 
misperception that he is female) has not treated his mental disease. On the 
contrary, that procedure has given up on the mental disease, has capitulated to the 
mental disease, has arguably even changed sides and joined forces with the 
mental disease. In any event, the procedure did not (in the words of Havey v. 
Commissioner, 12 T.e. at 412) "bear directly on the *** condition in question", 
did not "deal with" the disease (per Webster's), did not "treat" the mental disease 
that the therapist diagnosed. Rather, the procedure changed only petitioner's 
healthy body and undertook to "mitigat[ e]" the effects of the mental disease. 
S . The sun will never set on increased adoption credits, and the day gets 
permanently longer, unlike mere daylight savings time. The 2010 Health Care Act amended 
§ 23(b) to raise the ceiling on the adoption credit from $10,000 to $13,170 (and adjusting the 
inflation adjustment rules) and to make the credit refundable for taxable years after 12/31/09. 
The Act also exempted all changes in § 23 adoption credit from the EGTRRA sunset rules. 
6 . Reducing health care costs by discouraging health care spending. The 
2010 Health Care Act amended § 213 to increase the 7.5 of AGI threshold for deducting 
unreimbursed medical expenses to 10 percent of AGI for taxable years beginning after 12/31/12. 
However, the increased threshold does not apply for the years 2013 through 2016, if either the 
taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse turns 65 before the end of the year. The 10 percent of AGI 
threshold for deducting medical expenses under the AMT remains unchanged. 
7. How about a little consistency in tax-free drug use? The 2010 Health 
Care Act amended § 220( d)(2); dealing with individual Archer MSAs, to disallow 
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reimbursement from an Archer MSA for the cost of over-the-counter medicines unless the 
medicine is prescribed by a physician. Reimbursement is allowed only if the medicine or drug is 
a prescribed drug, without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescription, or is 
insulin, which is the rule for deductibility of medicine as a medical expense under § 213. The 
new rule is effective after 12/31110. 
a. Notice 2010-59 2010- 39 I.R.B. _ (9/3/10). Section 220(d)(2) 
does not apply to disallow items that are not medicines or drugs, including equipment such as 
crutches, supplies such as bandages, and diagnostic devices such as blood sugar test kits; such 
items may qualify as medical care if they otherwise meet the definition of medical care in 
§ 213(d)(I). 
8 . Making it little bit more difficult to use an Archer MSA to save for 
that vacation trip of a lifetime you dreamed is in your future. The 2010 Health Care Act 
amended § 220(f)(4)(A), dealing with individual Archer MSAs, and § 223(f)(4)(A), dealing with 
HSAs (for individuals with high deductible health plans, whether through an employer or 
individually) to increase additional tax on distributions from an HSA or an Archer MSA that are 
not used for qualified medical expenses from 10 percent to 20 percent of the distribution. The 
new rule is effective after 12/31/10. 
9. And now for the piece de resistance - the tax Code pays for health 
insurance for poor, and much of the middle c1ass, l but only as long as they are not getting 
abortions. Section 36B, added by the 2010 Health Care Act provides a "premium assistance" 
credit for eligible individuals and families who purchase health insurance through an American 
Health Benefits Exchange established under § 1311 of the Act. (An American Health Benefits 
Exchange must be established by each state (the cost of the establishment of which is subsidized 
by the U.S. Treasury) to facilitate the purchase of qualified health insurance plans.) The credit is 
payable in advance directly to the insurer to subsidize the purchase of health insurance through 
an Exchange. The individual then pays the difference between the premium tax credit amount 
and the total premium charged for the plan. (Alternatively, an individual may elect to purchase 
health insurance out-of-pocket and apply to the IRS for the credit at the end of the taxable year). 
The amount of the reduction in premium is required to be included with each bill sent to the 
individual. For employed individuals who purchase health insurance through an Exchange, the 
premiums are paid through payroll deductions. The premium assistance credit is available for 
individuals (single or joint filers) with household incomes (as defined in the statute) whose 
income is less than 400 percent of the Federal poverty level for the family size involved and who 
do not received health insurance through an employer. The exact amount of the premium 
depends on household income, based on the percentage of income the cost of premiums 
represents. The baseline for the credit equals the full premium for s "second lowest cost silver 
plan" - whatever that might provide - but may be used to purchase any plan, including bronze, 
silver, gold and platinum level plans, through an Exchange. (We will not pretend to understand 
the details of the different plans; we don't even understand our own health insurance plans.) The 
credit is phased out on a sliding scale for households whose income is above the poverty level 
and is completely phased out at 400 percent of the poverty level. We will not attempt to amuse 
you with the details ofthe complicated phase-out formula, except to note that it is linear. Married 
taxpayers must file a joint return to be eligible, and dependants are ineligible. An employee who 
is offered minimum essential coverage through an employer-provided health insurance plan is 
not eligible for the premium tax credit for health insurance purchased through an Exchange. But 
an employee for whom offered coverage is unaffordable is eligible for the credit. An employee 
also is eligible for the credit if the employer's plan benefits are less than 60 percent, and the 
employee declines the employee coverage and satisfies the other conditions for receiving the 
credit. (An employer will be notified if an employee is eligible for a premium assistance credit 
1 Some amount of health insurance premium credit is the health insurance premium credit probably will 
be available to over one-half of all households, because the credit is not fully phased out until median 
household income is 400 percent of the federal poverty level, which in many states, for many different 
size households, is an amount that exceeds median household income. 
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because the employer does not provide minimal essential coverage, or the employer does offer ( 
minimum essential coverage but it is not affordable; the notice will explain the employer may be 
liable for an "assessable payment" - Q; Is it an excise tax, a penalty, or merely an exaction? A; 
It's an excise tax - under § 4980H.) Individuals who apply for the credit must provide massive 
amounts of personal information to the American Health Benefits Exchange, including copies of 
their last two tax returns. If the credit received through an advance payment exceeds the amount 
of credit to which the taxpayer is entitled, the excess is treated as an increased tax liability. For 
individuals whose household income is below 400% of the federal poverty level, the increased 
tax cannot exceed $400. If the advance payment credit is less than the amount of the credit to 
which the taxpayer is entitled, the shortfall reduces tax liability. Premium assistance credits are 
not available for months in which an individual has a free choice voucher. Premium assistance 
credits, or any amounts that are attributable to them, cannot be used to pay for abortions for 
which federal funding is prohibited. The provision is effective for taxable years ending after 
12/31/13. 
• There's oh so much more that could be explained, but we ran 
out of time and space and, most of all, patience to explain the mind-numbing complexity of it all. 
E. Divorce Tax Issues 
F. Education 
G. Alternative Minimum Tax 
VI. CORPORATIONS 
A. Entity and Formation 
1. To check the box 75 days is extended to 3 years and 75 days. Rev. 
Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 I.R.B. 439 (9/3/09). Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(I) provides that an election by 
an unincorporated entity to be taxed as an association is effective on a date specified in the 
election on Form 8832, or on the date the form is filed if no date is specified. The effective date 
cannot be more than 75 days before or twelve months after the date on which the Form 8832 is ( 
filed. Under Reg. § 301.7701-3(d)(I), an election affecting a foreign entity is relevant when its . 
classification affects the tax liability of any person for federal tax or information purposes. The 
revenue procedure extends the provisions for relief provided in Rev. Prbc. 2002-59, 2002-2 c.B. 
615, to include both an election with respect to newly electing entities and a change in an 
existing election. The revenue procedure provides for an application to an IRS service center for 
relief from failure to timely file the form 8832 for up to three years and 75 days after the 
effective date of the election. Relief is available if the entity can establish reasonable cause for its 
failure to timely file its Form 8832, the application includes a completed Form 8832, and all tax 
returns affected by the election have been filed consistently with the elected status. The revenue 
procedure also provides that relief may be sought by an entity not eligible for relief under the 
terms of the revenue procedure by filing a request for a letter ruling that includes a statement that 
all required tax and· information returns have been timely filed as if the entity classification 
election had been in effect on the effective date requested. 
B. Distributions and Redemptions 
1. Section 162(k)'s bite is as loud as its bark. Ralston Purina Co. v. 
Commissioner, 131 T.C. 29 (9/10/08). Ralston Purina claimed a deduction under § 404(k) for 
payments made to its ESOP in redemption of Ralston Purina preferred stock owned by the ESOP 
to fund distributions to employees terminating participation in the ESOP.· The Commissioner 
argued the redemption payments were not deductible under either § 404(k)(1) or (5), or 
alternatively that the deduction was barred by §162(k). The Tax Court, in a unanimous reviewed 
opinion by Judge Nims, held that because Ralston Purina's payments were "in connection with 
the redemption of its own stock," § 162(k) applied to disallow the deduction. The Tax Court 
refused to follow the contrary opinion on almost identical facts in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United 
States, 329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003). In Boise Cascade the Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase 
"in connection with" to include only expenses that have their origin in a stock redemption 
transaction, excluding expenses that have their origin in a "separate, although related, 
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transaction." The Tax Court previously had rejected the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of 
the phrase "in connection with" in Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 345 (1994), 
and did so again in Ralston Purina. The court rejected Ralston Purina's argument that because 
the payments were an applicable dividend under 404(k), the transaction was excepted from the 
application of § 162(k) under § 162(k)(2)(A)(ii). The Tax Court reasoned that the entire 
transaction potentially deductible as an applicable dividend under § 404(k) - payment from the 
corporation to the ESOP and the distribution to the ESOP participants - must also pass muster 
under § 162(k), and that the 'otherwise allowable' deduction was disallowed because the 
payment was 'in connection with' a repurchase of stock. 
a. And the Third Circuit agrees with the Tax Court, not with the 
Ninth Circuit. Conopco. Inc. v. United States, 572 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 7/13/09), aff'g 100 
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5296 (D. N.J. 7/18/07). The court held that assuming that Conopco's payments 
were applicable dividends under § 404(k)(1) - an issue that it did not reach - "where a 
corporation makes payment to an ESOP trust in redemption of its stock, the otherwise allowable 
§ 404(k)(1) deduction for an applicable dividend inevitably involves an 'amount paid or incurred 
by a corporation in connection with the reacquisition of its stock' and is therefore barred by 
§ 162(k)(l)." 
b. The dog food corporation precedent wasn't the people's food 
corporation's best friend. General Millsv. United States, 554 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1/26/09). 
General Mills claimed a deduction under § 404(k) for payments made to its ESOP in redemption 
of General Mills stock owned by the ESOP to fund distributions to employees terminating 
participation in the ESOP. In a very brief opinion, the court (Judge Benton) held that § 162(k) 
barred the deduction for the "applicable dividend" otherwise allowable under § 404(k). The court 
followed the Tax Court's decision in Ralston Purina Co. v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 29 
(9/1 0/08), and refused to follow the contrary opinion in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 
329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003), because it disagreed with the reasoning of Boise Cascade. 
c. And the people food precedent comes around to bite the dog's 
tail. Nestle Purina Petcare Co. v. Commissioner, 594 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2/19/10). Following its 
holding in General Mills the court affirmed the tax court holding in Ralston Purina Co. v. 
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 4 (9/1 0/08), that § 162(k)(1) barred a dividends paid deduction 
under § 404(k) where payments are made to redeem stock from the distributors ESOP. In the 
Eighth Circuit the taxpayer asserted, in an argument not extensively considered by the Tax 
Court, that its distribution constituted a dividend under § 561 (dividends paid in determining 
accumulated taxable income, undistributed personal holding company income, investment 
company taxable income and REIT taxable income) that was subject to an exception from the 
limitation provided in § 162(k)(2)(A)(ii), allowing deductions of dividends paid within the 
meaning of § 561. The court rejected the argument pointing that § 404(k) does not reference 
dividends paid under § 561 and that the plain language of the statute does not incorporate 
§ 404(k) distributions within the meaning of dividends paid under § 561. 
2. Reducing E&P for nondeductible expenses. Rev. Rul. 2009-25, 2009-38 
I.R.B. 365 (9/4/09). Interest paid by a corporation on a loan to purchase a life insurance policy 
on an individual for which a deduction has been disallowed under § 264(a)(4) reduces earnings 
and profits for the taxable year in which the interest would have been allowable as a deduction 
but for its disallowance under § 264(a)(4). It does not further reduce earnings and profits when 
the death benefit is received under the life insurance contract. 
C. Liquidations 
D. S Corporations 
1. Roth IRA is not an eligible S corporation shareholder. Taproot 
Administrative Services. Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.9 (9/29/09) (reviewed, 12-4). The 
taxpayer corporation's sole shareholder was a custodial Roth IRA account. Eligible S 
corporation shareholders as defined in § 1361 include individuals, estates, certain specifically 
designated trusts and certain exempt organizations. With an effective date after the year involved 
in this case, § 1361(c)(2)(A)(iv) was enacted to allow a bank whose stock is held by an IRA or 
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Roth IRA to elect S corporation status. Reg .. § 1.1361-1 (e)(1) provides that a person for whom S 
corporation stock is held by a nominee, guardian, custodian or agent is deemed to be the S 
corporation shareholder. However, in Rev. Rul. 92-73, 1992-2 C.B. 224, the IRS ruled that a 
trust that qualifies as an IRA is not a permitted S corporation shareholder. Declaring the issue as 
one of first impression, and indicating that under Skidmore deference to revenue rulings depends 
upon their persuasiveness, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry) agreed with the IRS's rationale in the 
ruling that IRAs are not eligible S corporation shareholders because the beneficiary of the IRA is 
not taxed currently on the trust's share of corporate income unlike the beneficiary of a custodial 
account or the grantor of a grantor trust who is subject to tax on the pass-through corporate 
income. (The income of the corporation owned by a Roth IRA would never be subject to tax.) 
• Judge Holmes dissented in a beautifully-reasoned opinion 
which made the point that an IRA account is owned by a custodian for the benefit of an individual, 
who is to be treated as the shareholder, and any unwarranted tax benefits would not accrue because 
the income of the IRA would be taxed under § 511 as UBIT. His opinion concluded: 
This case is a reminder that tax law does not cascade into the real world through a 
single channel. It meanders instead through a vast delta, and any general 
principles tugged along by its current are just as likely to sink in the braided and 
re-braided rivulets of specific Code provisions and the murk of regulations as they 
are to survive and be useful in deciding real cases. Taproot thinks it found a 
course through the confluence of the subchapter S and IRA rules that it could 
successfully navigate. Its route would be new, but the stakes are not that great, 
and the sky will remain standing if we had just read and applied the regulation as 
it is. 
2 . Revenge for Gitlitz? T.D. 9469, Section 108 Reduction of Tax Attributes 
for S Corporations, 74 F.R. 56109 (10/30/09). The Treasury Department has promulgated final 
regulations proposed in REG-l 02822-08, Section 108 Reduction of Tax Attributes for S 
Corporations, 73 F.R. 45656 (8/5/08). Section 108(d)(7)(A) provides that if an S corporation 
excludes COD income under § 108(a), the excluded amount reduces the S corporation's tax 
attributes under § 108(b)(2); section 108(b)(4)(A) provides that the reduction occurs after the S 
corporation's items of income, loss, deduction and credit for the taxable year of the discharge 
pass through to its shareholders. Pursuant to § 108(d)(7)(B), Reg. § 1.108-7(d) treats any 
§ 1366(d)(3) shareholder carryover losses from prior years and any passed through losses from 
the current year in excess of the shareholders' bases as a "deemed NOL" of the S corporation 
that would be reduced under § 1 08(b). Where an S corporation has more than one shareholder 
during the taxable year of the discharge, a shareholder's disallowed losses or deductions equal a 
pro rata share of the total losses and deductions allocated to the shareholder under § 1366(a) 
during the corporation's taxable year (including losses and deductions disallowed under 
§ 1366(d)(I) for prior years that are treated as current year losses and deductions with respect to 
the shareholder under § 1366(d)(2». The regulations provide that the deemed NOL allocated to a 
shareholder consists of a proportionate amount of each item of the shareholder's loss or 
deduction that was disallowed under § 1366( d) (1 ) in the year of the debt cancellation. The 
regulations were effective on 10/30/09. 
3. Disregarded QSub is still a bank subject to reduced interest 
deductions for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt obligations. Vainisi v. Commissioner, 
132 T.C. No. 1 (1/15/09). Sections 291 (a)(3), (e)(1)(B), and 265(b)«3) disallow interest 
deductions of a financial institution incurred to carry tax-exempt obligations, but allow an 80 
percent deduction for interest on tax-exempts acquired after 12/31/82, and before 8/7/86, and for 
certain qualified tax exempt obligations as defined in § 265(b)(3)(B). Section 1361 allows certain 
financial institutions to elect to be treated as an S corporation, and further allows an S 
corporation to treat a financial institution as a qualified S corporation subsidiary (QSub). Under 
§ 1361(b)(3)(A), a QSub is not treated as a separate corporation except as provided in 
regulations. Reg. § 1. 1361-4(a)(3) provides that in the case of a bank that is an S corporation or a 
QSub of an S corporation, any special rules applicable to banks will apply to an S corporation or 
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a QSub that is a banle The court (Judge Foley) held that under these provisions the limitations of 
§ 291 (a)(3) are applicable to interest deductions claimed by a parent S corporation for interest 
expense generated by the S corporation's QSub bank. The court also held that Reg~ § 1.1361-
4(a)(3) is consistent with the enactment of § 1361(b)(3)(A) and its legislative history. 
a. But in the Seventh Circuit Judge Posner sees things differently, as 
he often does, and S corporation banks in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin gain a competitive 
advantage over C corporation banks. Vainisi v. Commissioner, 599 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 3/17/10). 
The Tax Court's decision was reversed on appeal. Judge Posner noted that by ovirtue of 
§ 1363(b)(4), § 291 applies to an S corporation only if it had been a C corporation within three 
years preceding the taxable year in question. Because the taxpayer's S corporation had not been a 
C corporation within the preceding three taxable years, § 291 could not apply. Nothing in Reg. 
§ 1.1361-4(a)(3) could change that result. He rejected the government's argument that because 
§ 291 was enacted before a bank could elect to be an S corporation or a QSub, Congress did not 
intend § 1363(b)(4) to prevent the application of § 291 to a bank, and that thus the Treasury was 
authorized to rescind that application by regulation. Instead, he concluded that the regulation 
"merely requires that the special banking rules be applied to banks that are S corporations or 
QSubs at the corporate level so that a bank's S corporation status will not emasculate the rules .... 
But nothing ... suggests that section 1363(b)(4) is to be overridden with regard to banks." He 
went on to reject the government's argument as follows: 
Missing from the government's analysis is recognition that the only S 
corporations to which section 291, the source of the special banking rule at issue 
in this case (the 80 percent rule), applies are S corporations that were C 
corporations in one of the three immediately preceding years. Nothing in the 
regulation suggests a purpose to change that rule. ... 0 
Of course, unless abrogated, the privilege conferred by section 1363(b)(4) will 
perpetuate a competitive advantage enjoyed by S or QSub banks that have never 
been C corporations or that converted from C to S earlier rather than later. Later 
converters - not to mention all existing C corporation banks (the majority of all 
banks) - may be gnashing their teeth in fury at the additional interest deduction 
that many of their S or QSub bank competitors can take. But the difference in 
treatment, and whatever consequences flow from it, are built into section 
1363(b)(4). 
• Finally, Judge Posner concluded: 
The regulation was promulgated a decade ago and the Treasury Department has 
thus had ample time in which to decide whether the favored treatment of Sand 
QSub banks is a bad idea. The Internal Revenue Service thinks it a bad idea, the 
Tax Court thinks it a bad idea, but the institUtions authorized to correct the 
favored treatment of these banks - Congress by statute, and the Treasury 
Department (we are assuming without deciding), as Congress's delegate, by 
regulation - have thus far left it intact. 
• On the reasoning, its game, set, and match, we think. 
4. A Solomon-like valuation by Judge Wells. The Ringgold Telephone 
Company v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-103 (5/10/10). This case involved valuation of the 
taxpayer's assets on the date it converted from C corporation status to S corporation status, for 
the purpose of computing the built-in gain tax under § 1374 upon the subsequent sale of its assets 
within 10 years of electing S corporation status. The only asset in question was a minority 
partnership interest in a partnership that itself held a minority interest in a lower tier partnership. 
The taxpayer valued the partnership interest at $2,600,000 on the effective date of its election, 
but it sold the partnership interest less than a year later for $5,220,423 to Bell South, which 
indirectly controlled the lower tier partnership. Judge Wells found that the taxpayer's expert 
witness's testimony which valued the interest at $2,980,000, based on° averaging $3,243,000 
using a "distribution yield analysis" and $2,718,000 using a business enterprise analysis with a 
5% minority discount, to be more persuasive than the IRS's expert witness's valuation of 
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$5,155,000. However, he also concluded that while Bell South had not paid a control premium 
for the partnership interest, the price paid by Bell South was "probative, but not conclusive 
evidence of the value if the [partnership] interest on the valuation date." Accordingly, he valued 
the partnership interest at $3,727,141, by weighing equally - that means averaging - (1) the 
$3,243,000 value using a "distribution yield analysis," (2) the $2,718,000 value using a business 
enterprise analysis, and (3) the $5,220,423 paid by Bell South. 
s. Gitlitz by analogy? "Not," says the Tax Court. Nathel v. Commissioner, 
131 T.C. 262 (12117/08). Prior to 2001, the taxpayer had claimed losses passed-though from an S 
corporation in an amount that exceeded his stock basis but which were properly allowable under 
§ 1366(d)(I)(B) because there were outstanding loans to the corporation from the taxpayer-
shareholder. The taxpayer's basis in the loans to the corporation was reduced under 
§ 1367(d)(2)(A) to $112,547. In 2001 the corporation paid $649,775 on the loan, which exceeded 
the taxpayer's $112,547 basis in the loan by $537,228. Later in 2001, pursuant to a restructuring 
of the ownership of the S corporation and two other corporations owned by the taxpayer, his 
brother, and a third party (which left the taxpayer with no ownership in the corporation), the 
taxpayer made a capital contribution of $537,228 to the S corporation, which equaled the amount 
by which the loan repayment exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the debt. The consideration for the 
contribution was the assumption by another shareholder of the taxpayer's obligation on 
guarantees of loans from banks to the corporation. In calculating the gain realized upon receipt of 
the loan repayment, the taxpayer treated the capital contribution as income under § 1366(a)(I) to 
the S corporation, although excludable income under § 118, and therefore as restoring or 
increasing under § 1367(b)(2)(B) his bases in the outstanding loans before repayment (rather 
than increasing his stock basis), thus eliminating any gain. Relying on Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 
531 U.S. 206, 216 (2001), the taxpayer argued that because § 118 excludes capital contributions 
from the gross income of an S corporation, capital contributions are "permanently excludible" 
and are thus "tax-exempt income" under Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii), and that as such it is 
included as an item of the S corporation's income to for purposes of § 1366(a)(1) and the 
resulting § 1367 basis adjustments. The Tax Court (Judge Swift) rejected the taxpayer's 
argument and upheld the deficiency. 
By attempting to treat petitioners' capital contributions to [the corporation] as 
income to [the corporation], [taxpayers] in effect seek to undermine three cardinal 
and longstanding principles of the tax law: First, that a shareholder's contributions 
to the capital of a corporation increase the basis of the shareholder's stock in the 
corporation; ... sec. 1.118-1, Income Tax Regs.; second, that equity (i.e., a 
shareholder's contribution to the capital of a corporation) and debt (i.e., a 
shareholder's loan to the corporation) are distinguishable and are treated 
differently by both the Code and the courts ... ; and third, that contributions to the 
capital of a corporation do not constitute income to the corporation; sec. 118; ... 
sec. 1.118-1, Income Tax Regs. 
We do not believe that the Gitlitz holding or the provisions of subchapter S, 
namely sections 1366(a)(I), 1367(a)(1)(A), and 1367(b)(2)(B), should be 
interpreted to override these three longstanding principles of tax law. 
• Reg. § 1.118-1 provides that "if a corporation requires 
additional funds for conducting its business and obtains such funds through *** payments by its 
shareholders *** such amounts do not constitute income." Thus, shareholder capital contributions 
are not treated as items of income to an S corporation under § 1366(a)(I) and are not taken into 
account in calculating the "net increase" under § 1367(b )(2)(B) for the purpose of restoring or 
increasing a shareholder's tax basis in loans a shareholder made to an S corporation. Such capital 
contributions are not "tax-exempt income" under § 1366(a)(1) nor under Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii) 
and do not restore or increase the bases in shareholder loans under § 1367(b )(2)(B). 
a. Affirmed, after a trip down memory lane reviewing classic 
Supreme Court decisions on the parameters of gross income. Nathel v. Commissioner, 105 
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2699 (2d Cir. 6/2/10). After a lengthy review of the classic case law dealing 
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with the parameters of gross income, ranging from Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), 
through Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1925), to Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Second Circuit (Judge Koeltl) held that capital contributions 
traditionally are not considered to be "income" and, therefore, should not be considered "items of 
income" under § 1366(a)(1)(A). Furthermore, in enacting § 118, Congress "has specifically 
recognized that capital contributions are not income" in that "the legislative history of § 118 
indicates that the purpose of that section was to codify pre-1954 court decisions holding that 
certain payments to corporations by nonshareholders should be treated as capital contributions 
and not as income to the corporations, just as shareholder contributions were not treated as 
income to the corporations." Furthermore, Reg. § 118-1, which provides that "'voluntary pro rata 
payments'" to a corporation from its shareholders for the purposes of providing '''additional 
funds for conducting [the corporation's] business ... do not constitute income'" to the 
corporation," is entitled to deference and "is fatal to the [taxpayer's] position." 
• The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that based on the 
reasoning of Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001), there would be no reason for § 118 to 
exclude contributions to capital from gross income if they were not already included in gross 
income by § 118, concluding that the taxpayer's view of § 118 was belied by its legislative history. 
The court also rejected other variations of the same argument. Finally, the court rejected the 
taxpayer's alternative argument that they should have been allowed to deduct their capital 
contributions to the S Corporation under § 165( c )(2) as losses incurred in a transaction entered into 
for profit. The Tax CQurt had found that the taxpayers had not made the contributions for the "'sole 
purpose of being released from their guarantees on the bank: loans'" and, as a result, it found that the 
contributions were not deductible pursuant to § 165( c )(2). The Second Circuit concluded that the 
Tax Court's test was too stringent, holding instead that to be deductible as losses incurred in a 
transaction entered into for profit the capital contributions needed only to have been made for the 
primary purpose of obtaining the releases. Nevertheless, the Tax Court's error was harmless because 
the taxpayers failed to prove that the primary purpose of the contributions was to obtain the releases 
from the guarantees. 
6 . The lifetime of built-in gain gets shorter every year. The Small 
Business Jobs Act of2010 shortened the holding period under § 1374 for recognizing unrealized 
built-in gain on conversion from a C corporation to an S corporation to five years preceding the 
corporation's tax year beginning in 2011. Before the change the holding period was ten years for 
sales or exchanges in tax years beginning before 2009, and seven years for tax years beginning in 
2009 or 2010. 
E. Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations 
1 _ As the old saying goes, "There's no tax free basis step-up without a 
funeral." This "midco" tax shelter was rejected by the court. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc. v. 
United States, 553 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 3/31/08). In a transaction substantially similar to 
the transaction described in Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730, the taxpayer (Midcoast) acquired 
the assets of a selling corporation (Bishop) through an intermediary (K-Pipe). Midcoast desired 
to acquire the Bishop assets with a cost basis, but Bishop's shareholder (Langley) was unwilling 
to engage in an asset sale, insisting on a stock sale and purchase. Midcoast's tax advisor, PWC, 
arranged for the formation of an intermediary, K-Pipe ~erger, and the financing necessary for 
K-Pipe Merger to purchase the Bishop stock, with the loan to K-Pipe Merger being secured by 
Midcoast assets. After a downstream merger of K-Pipe Merger into Bishop, Bishop, which 
changed its name to K-Pipe Group, sold the Bishop assets to Midcoast. (K-Pipe purportedly 
offset the gain with built-in loss on assets contributed to it by its shareholder in a pre-§ 362(e) 
year.) Thereafter, K-Pipe engaged in no business activity and was merely a shell. On cross 
motions for summary judgment, the District Court (Judge Harmon) upheld the IRS's treatment of 
the transaction from Midcoast's perspective as a stock sale followed by a § 332 liquidation, 
which resulted in denying the step-up in basis on which Midcoast's claimed depreciation 
deductions were based. After disregarding K-Pipe because it had rio substance other than as a 
vehicle to allow Midcoast to claim a cost basis in the Bishop assets in a stock sale transaction 
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without a § 338 election, the court addressed what was the real substance of the transaction: a ( 
sale of stock or a sale of assets. Because Langley would not agree to a direct sale of Bishop's 
assets, "the only way in which Midcoast could have obtained the Bishop Assets was to purchase 
the Bishop Stock and liquidate." Assessment of the § 6662(d) substantial understatement penalty 
was upheld, and because the transaction was a "tax shelter," neither the substantial authority nor 
adequate disclosure exceptions applied. Alternatively, there was not substantial authority because 
the weight of authority in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases was held to have required 
disregarding K-Pipe. 
a. Affirmed! Substance over form is alive and well in the Fifth 
Circuit. Enbridge Energy Co. v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7289 (5th Cir. 11110/09). 
In a nonprecedential per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit applied the substance over fonn 
doctrine in affirming the District Dourt's decision upholding the IRS's treatment of a "midco" 
transaction arranged by the buyer as a stock purchase followed by a § 332 liquidation, which 
resulted in denying the step-up in basis on which the taxpayer's claimed depreciation deductions 
were based. Imposition of a 20 percent § 6662 penalty also was affirmed. 
2. All cash (D) reorgs are now in the final regulations. T.D. 9475, 
Corporate Reorganizations; Distributions Under Sections 368(a)(I)(D) and 354(b)(I)(B), 74 F.R. 
67053 (12/18/09). In 2006, the Treasury Department promulgated Temp. Reg. § 1.368-2T, 
providing that the distribution requirement under §§ 368(a)(l)(D) and 354(b)(l)(B) is deemed to 
have been satisfied despite the fact that no stock andlor securities are actually issued in a 
transaction otherwise described in § 368(a)(l)(D) if the same person or persons, directly or 
indirectly, own all of the stock of the transferor and transferee corporations in identical 
proportions. T.D. 9303, 71 F.R. 75879 (12/19/06). To a limited extent, the attribution rules in 
§ 318 are invoked to determine whether the same person or persons own, directly or indirectly, 
own all of the stock of the transferor and transferee. An individual and all members of his family 
that have a relationship described in § 318(a)(l)are treated as one individual; and stock owned 
by a corporation is attributed proportionally to the corporation's shareholder without regard to ( 
the 50 percent limitation in § 318(a)(2)(C). Ownership in absolutely identical proportions is not 
required. A de. minimis variation in shareholder identity or proportionality of ownership in the 
transferor and transferee corporations is disregarded. The regulations give as an example of a de 
minimis variation a situation in which A, B, and C each own, respectively, 34%, 33%, and 33% 
of the transferor's stock and A, B, C, and D each own, respectively, 33%, 33%, 33% and 1% of 
the transferee's stock. Stock described in § 1504(a)(4) - nonvoting limited preferred stock that is 
not convertible - is disregarded for purposes of determining whether the same person or persons 
own all of the stock of the transferor and transferee corporations in identical proportions. When a 
transaction qualifies as a § 368(a)(l)(D) reorganization under the regulations, a nominal share of 
stock of the transferee corporation will be deemed to have been issued in addition to the actual 
consideration. That nominal share of stock is deemed to have been distributed by the transferor 
corporation to its shareholders and, in appropriate circumstances, further transferred to the extent 
necessary to reflect the actual ownership of the transferor and transferee corporations. Identical 
proposed . regulations were simultaneously published. The proposed regulations have been 
finalized, with certain modifications. As Reg. § 1.368-2(1). First, if no consideration is received, 
or the value of the consideration received in the transaction is less than the fair market value of 
the transferor corporation's assets, the transferee corporation is treated as issuing stock with a 
value equal to the excess of the fair market value of the transferor corporation's assets over the 
value of the consideration actually received in the transaction. If the value of the consideration 
received in the transaction is equal to the fair market value of the transferor corporation's assets, 
the transferee corporation will be deemed to issue a nominal share of stock to the transferor 
corporation in addition to the actual consideration exchanged for the transferor corporation's 
assets. In addition, Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2)(iii) has been amended to provide that in a reorganization 
in which the property received consists solely of non-qualifying property equal to the value of 
the assets transferred, as well as a nominal share described in the regulations, the shareholder or 
security holder may designate the share of stock of the transferee to which the basis, if any, of 
the stock or securities surrendered will attach. ( 
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• If an all-cash transaction subject to these regulations occurs 
between members of a consolidated group, the selling member (S) is treated as receiving the 
nominal share and additional stock of the buying member (B) under § 1.1502-13(f)(3), which it 
distributes to its shareholder member (M) in liquidation. Immediately after the sale, the B stock 
(with the exception of the nominal share which is still held by M) received by M is treated as 
redeemed in a distribution to which § 301 applies. M's basis in the B stock is reduced under Reg. 
§ 1.1502-32(b)(3)(v), and under Reg. § 1.302-2(c), any remaining basis attaches to the nominal 
share. 
3. Q: What does the IRS do when Temporary Regulations expire? A: 
Allow taxpayers to rely on the identical proposed regulations. Notice 2010-25, 2010-14 
I.R.B. 527 (3/18/10). Temp. Reg. § 1.368-1T(e)(2), T.D. 9316, Corporate Reorganizations; 
Guidance on the Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 72 F.R. 12974 (3/20/07), dealing with 
continuity of interest in corporate reorganizations, expired on March 19,2010, pursuant to 
§ 7805(e)(2). This notice permits taxpayers to rely on Prop. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) until new 
regulations are promulgated. However, "the target corporation, the issuing corporation, the 
controlling corporation of the acquiring corporation if stock thereof is provided as consideration 
in the transaction, and any direct or indirect transferee of transferred basis property from any of 
the foregoing, may not apply the provisions of the proposed regulations unless all such taxpayers 
elect to apply the provisions of such regulations. This requirement will be satisfied if none of the 
specified parties adopts treatment inconsistent with this election." 
a . REG-146247 -06, Corporate Reorganizations; Guidance on the 
Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 72 F.R. 13058 (3/20/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) 
would amend Reg. § 1.368-1(e), as promulgated in 2005. (The proposed regulations are identical 
to now expired Temp. Reg. § 1.368-1T.) Under the 2005 regulations, the value of consideration 
received in a reorganization for purposes of determining whether shareholders received a 
sufficient proprietary interest in the acquiring corporation was to be determined as of the last 
business day before the contract is binding. The proposed regulations apply the signing date 
value only where the contract provides for a fixed consideration. The definition of fixed 
consideration is modified to provide that consideration is fixed where the contract specifies the 
number of shares of the issuing corporation to be exchanged for all or each proprietary interest in 
the target corporation. Definitions referring to the percentage of proprietary interests are deleted. 
The regulations treat transactions that allow for shareholder elections as providing for fixed 
consideration regardless of whether the agreement specifies a maximum amount of money or a 
minimum amount of stock of the issuing corporation. (In any event the shareholders are subject 
to the economic fortunes of the issuing corporation as of the signing date.) The rule that 
modifications of the contract that increase the number of shares to be issued does not change the 
signing date is broadened to also state that a modification that decreases the amount of cash or 
other property to be issued also does not change the signing date. The regulations also tighten the 
contingent consideration rules by providing that a contract will not be treated as providing a 
fixed consideration if provisions for contingent consideration prevent the target shareholders 
from being subject to the economic benefits and burdens of ownership of the issuing corporation 
as of the signing date. Finally the regulations provide that the signing date value must be 
adjusted to take into account the effect of any anti-dilution clause adjustments to reflect changes 
in the issuing corporation capital structure. 
4. Prepaid income is not recognized built-in gain. T.D. 9487, Built-in 
Gains and Losses Under Section 382(h), 75 F.R. 33990 (6/16/10). Reg. § 1.382-7 provides that 
for purposes of computing § 382 limitations following an ownership change, prepaid income is 
not recognized built-in gain. Prepaid income is defined as "any amount received prior to the 
change date that is attributable to performance occurring on or after the change date." Examples 
include, but are not limited to, income received prior to the change date that is deferred under 
§ 455, Reg. § 1.451-5, or Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-1 C.B. 991 (or any successor revenue 
procedure). This regulation applies to corporations that have undergone an ownership change on 
or after 6/11/1 0, but it merely mirrors former Temp. Reg. § 1.382-7T, which it replaced. 
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5. Measuring owner shifts of loss corporations under § 382. Notice 2010- ( 
50,201O-271.R.B. 12 (6/11/10). This notice provides guidance under § 382 for measuring owner 
shifts of loss corporations that have more than one class of stock outstanding when the value of 
one class of stock fluctuates relative to another class of stock. The IRS will accept use of the 
"full value methodology," under which all shares are "marked to market" on each testing date. 
Under this method, the percentage of stock owned by any person is determined with reference to 
of "the relative fair market value of the stock owned by such person to the total fair market value 
of the outstanding stock of the corporation .... [C]hanges in percentage ownership as a result of 
fluctuations in value are taken into account if a testing date occurs, regardless of whether a 
particular shareholder actively participates or is otherwise party to the transaction that causes the 
testing date to occur .... " The IRS also will accept use of the "hold constant principle." Under 
this methodology, "the value of a share, relative to the value of all other stock of the corporation, 
is established on the date that share is acquired by a particular shareholder. On subsequent testing 
dates, the percentage interest represented by that share (the "tested share") is then determined by 
factoring out fluctuations in the relative values of the loss corporation's share classes that have 
occurred since the acquisition date of the tested share. Thus, as applied, the HCP is 
individualized for each acquisition of stock by each shareholder." The "hold constant principle" 
has several variations that the notice identifies as acceptable. An acquisition is not an event upon 
which the acquiring shareholder marks to fair market value other shares that it holds under any 
HCP variation. To be acceptable, whichever methodology is selected must measure the increased 
percentage ownership represented by a stock acquisition by dividing the fair market value of that 
stock on the acquisition date by the fair market value of all of the outstanding stock of the loss 
corporation on that date. Any alternative treatment of an acquisition as inconsistent with 
§382(l)(3)(C) and is not acceptable. Any method selected, whether the full value methodology" 
or a particular variation of the "hold constant principle" must be applied consistently to all 
testing dates in a "consistency period." With respect to any testing date, the consistency period 
includes all prior testing dates, beginning with the latest of: 1) the first date on which the (' 
taxpayer had more than one class of stock; (2) the first day following an ownership change; or 
(3) the date six years before that testing date. 
6 . A district court decision, if followed, makes it much much more 
difficult ever to have personal goodwill as an employee-shareholder. Howard v. United 
States, 2010-2 U.S.T.C. ~50,542 (E.D. Wash. 7/30/10). The taxpayer was a dentist who practiced 
through a solely owned (before taking into account community property law) professional 
corporation until the practice was sold to a third party. He had an employment agreement with 
the corporation with a noncompetition clause that survived for three years after the termination 
of his stock ownership. The purchase and sale agreement allocated $47,100 to the corporation's 
assets, $549,900 for the taxpayer-shareholder's personal goodwill, and $16,000 in consideration 
of his covenant not to compete with the purchaser. The corporation did not "dissolve" until the 
end of the year following the sale. The taxpayer reported $320,358 as long-term capital gain 
income resulting from the sale Of goodwill (the opinion does not explain how the remainder of 
the sales price was reported, but the IRS recharacterized the goodwill as a corporate asset and 
treated the amount received by the taxpayer from the sale to the third party as a dividend from 
the taxpayer's professional service corporation. Because the sale occurred in 2002, when 
dividends were taxed at higher rate than capital gains, a deficiency resulted. The government's 
position was based on three main reasons: (1) the goodwill was a corporate asset, because the 
taxpayer was a corporate employee with a covenant not to compete for three years after he no 
longer owned any stock; (2) the corporation earned the income, and correspondingly earned the 
goodwill; and (3) attributing the goodwill to the taxpayer-shareholder did not comport with the 
economic reality of his relationship with the corporation. After reviewing the principles of 
Norwalk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-279 and Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 
110 T.C. 189 (1998), the court held that because the taxpayer was the corporation's employee 
with a covenant not to compete with it, any goodwill generated during that time period was the 
corporation's goodwill. The court also rested its holding that the goodwill was a corporate asset 
on its conclusions the income associated with the practice was earned by the corporation and the 
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covenant not to compete, which extended for three years after the taxpayer no longer owned 
stock in the corporation rendered any personal goodwill "likely [of] little value." 
F. Corporate Divisions 
G. Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns 
1 . A controlled corporation is not a controlled corporation, except when 
it is controlled. REG-135005-07, Clarification of Controlled Group Qualification Rules, 74 F.R. 
49~29 (9/28/09). Section 1563(a) defines groups of controlled corporations based on ownership 
of voting control. and value of stock in parent-subsidiary and brother-sister controlled groups (or 
a combination). Section 1563(b) excludes certain controlled corporations from being treated as 
component members, including, among others, a corporation that was a member of the group for 
less than half of the days of a testing period, foreign corporations that do not have effectively 
connected income. Section 1561(a) limits the component members of a controlled group to one 
application of certain benefits and limitations, such as one bite at the taxable income brackets of 
§ 11. In addition, some provisions, such as § 41 which provides a credit for increased research 
expenditures, treat the members of a controlled group as a single corporation. Controlled group 
for these purposes is defined by reference to § 1563(a). Prop. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(ii) would 
provide that in determining whether two or more corporations are members of a controlled group 
under § 1563(a), an excluded member under § 1563(b)(2), while not a component member of a 
controlled group under § 1563(b)(1), nevertheless is a member of a controlled group under 
§ 1563(a). This proposed regulation is intended to clarify that for purposes of Code provisions 
other than § 1561(a) that reference the definition of a controlled group under § 1563(a) for 
purposes of limiting tax benefits, all corporations meeting the ownership requirements are taken 
into account. The IRS indicates its belief that the provision is supported by clear statutory 
language. 
• The preamble to the proposed regulation states that some 
taxpayers have taken the position that the limitation of § 41 and similar provisions is applicable only 
to component members of a controlled group. 
2. More controlled group guidance. T.D. 9476, Apportionment of Tax 
Items Among the Members of a Controlled Group of Corporations, 74 F.R. 68530(12/28/09). 
Reg. §§ 1.1561-1 through 1.1561-3 provide rules regarding the apportionment of tax benefit 
items among corporations that are (1) members of a consolidated group filing a life-nonlife 
income tax return (life insurance company included with a non-life insurance company) or 
(2) component members of a controlled group of corporations. 
3. More help from the IRS for consolidated groups: Are they "too big to 
fail"? T.D. 9458, Modification to Consolidated Return Regulation Permitting an Election To 
Treat a Liquidation of a Target, Followed by a Recontribution to a New Target, as a Cross-Chain 
Reorganization, 74 F.R. 45757 (9/4/09). Temp Reg. § 1.1502-13T(f)(5)(ii)(B) modifies the 
election under which a consolidated group can avoid immediately taking into account an 
intercompany item after the liquidation of a member corporation that previously had been sold 
within the group. Under the regulations, if § 332 otherwise would apply to a target's liquidation 
into its parent and the parent transfers substantially all of targets assets to a new member, and if a 
direct transfer of substantially all of the target's assets to the new member corporation would 
qualify as a § 368(a) reorganization, i.e., a cross-chain type (D) reorganization, then the 
liquidation and transfer of substantially all of the assets be disregarded and instead, the 
transaction will be treated as if target transferred substantially all of its assets to the new 
corporation exchange for the new corporation's stock and the assumption of T's liabilities in a 
§ 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization. The result is that target's deferred items are not triggered. The 
temporary regulations generally apply to transactions that occur on or after 10/25/07. The text of 
the temporary regulations also is text of the proposed regulations. REG-139068-08, 74 F.R. 
45789 (9/4/09). 
H. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues 
1 . Timing is everything to budget windows. Under the Corporate 
Estimated Tax Shift Act of 2009, as amended by the HIRE Act and the Health Care and 
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Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, for corporations with at least $1 billion in assets, in 
detennining the estimated tax otherwise due after 12/31109, the percentages of estimated tax 
liability of required by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 for the third 
quarters of2010 through 2013 do not apply. Prior to enactment of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, payments due in July, August, or September, 2014, were increased 
to 157.75 percent of the payment otherwise due, and the next required payment was to be 
reduced accordingly. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 increases the 
required payment of estimated tax otherwise due in July, August, or September, 2014, by 15.75 
percentage points. 
. 2. They were "engineers" under the IRC, even if not under ·state law. 
Kraatz & Craig Surveying, Inc. v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.8 (4/13/10). The Tax Court 
(Judge Dawson) upheld the validity of Temp. Reg. § 1.448-1T(e)(4)(i), under which 
"engineering" includes surveying and mapping, even though the services were not required by 
state law to be perfonned by licensed engineers and were not perfonned by licensed engineers. 
Whether a corporation is a qualified personal services corporation, as defined in § 448( d)(2), and 
be subject to a flat 35 percent tax rate under § 11 (b )(2), is detennined under all of the facts and 
circumstances and is not controlled by state licensing laws. 
3. Textron, Schmextron - the IRS is going to just require taxpayers to 
rat out their uncertain positions on the return itself via Schedule "COME AUDIT ME." 
This would even permit the IRS to send a statutory notice without having to perform an 
audit. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.RB. 408 (1126/10). The IRS is developing a new 
schedule to be filed with Fonn 1120, which would require corporations with more than $10 
million in assets and one or more uncertain tax positions to disclose those positions. The 
schedule would require both (a) a concise description of each uncertain position for which the 
taxpayer has recorded a reserve in its financial statement [defmed broadly to include some 
positions for which the taxpayer has not recorded a reserve because it expects to litigate the 
position or because the taxpayer has detennined that the IRS has a general administrative 
practice not to examine the position] and (b) the maximum amount of potential federal tax 
liability attributable to each uncertain position if it were disallowed in its entirety. 
• The taxpayer will not be required to disclose the taxpayer's 
risk assessment or tax reserve amounts, although in the Announcement the IRS states that under 
United States v.Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805 (1984), it can compel the production of that 
infonnation through a summons. To be sufficient, the description must contain: 
1. The Code sections potentially implicated by the position; 
2.A description of the taxable year or years to which the position relates; 
3. A statement that the J?ositlOn involves an item of mcome, gain, loss, 
4. 
5. 
6. 
deduction, or credit agamst tax; 
. A statement that the position involves a pennanent inclusion or exclusion 
of any item, the timing of that item, or both; 
A statement whether the position involves a determination of the value of 
any property or right; and 
A statement whether the position involves a computation of basis. 
• Comments and love letters should have been submitted by 
3/29/10, but see immediately below. 
a. Deadline for comments extended. Announcement 2010-17, 2010-
13 I.RB. 515 (5/5/10). That deadline was extended to 6/1110. 
h. Draft Schedule UTP is released. Announcement 2010-30,2010-
19 I.RB. 668 (4/19/10). This announcement released draft Schedule UTP to Fonn 1120, together 
with draft instructions. It requires that, beginning with returns filed for years beginning in 2010 
and thereafter, the following taxpayers with both uncertain tax positions and assets equal to or 
exceeding $10 million will be required to file Schedule UTP if they or a related party issued 
audited financial statements: (1) Corporations who are required to file a Fonn 1120, U.S. 
Corporation Income Tax Return; (2) Insurance companies who are required to file a Fonn 1120 
L, U.S. Life Insurance Company Income Tax Return or Fonn 1120 PC, U.S. Property and 
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( Casualty Insurance Company Income Tax Return; and (3) Foreign corporations who are required 
to file Form 1120 F, U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation. 
• For 2010 tax years, the IRS will not require a Schedule UTP 
from Form 1120 series filers other than those identified above (such as real estate investment trusts 
or regulated investment companies), pass-through entities, or tax-exempt organizations. The IRS 
stated that it will determine the timing of the requirement to file Schedule UTP for these entities 
after comments have been received and considered. 
• Query whether disclosures on Schedule UTP can serve as 
substitutes for disclosures made on Forms 8275 and 8275R? 
c. Proposed regulations authorizing Schedule UTP, requiring 
corporations to rat themselves out. REG-119046-10, Requirement of a Statement Disclosing 
Uncertain Tax Positions, 75 F.R. 54802 (9/9/10). The Treasury has published proposed 
amendments to Reg. § 1.6012-2 to require corporations to attach a Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax 
Position Statement(or any successor form) to their income tax returns in accordance with forms, 
instructions, or other appropriate guidance provided by the IRS. According to the preamble, 
"[t]he IRS intends to implement the authority provided in this regulation initially by issuing a 
schedule and explanatory publication that require those corporations that prepare audited 
financial statements to file a schedule identifying and describing the uncertain tax positions, as 
described in FIN 48 and other generally accepted accounting standards, that relate to the tax 
liability reported on the return." When adopted as a final regulation,· this rule will apply to 
returns filed for tax years beginning after December 15, 2009, and ending after the date of 
publication of these rules as final regulations. 
4. ARRA funds nonshareholder contributions? Rev. Proc. 2010-34,2010-
14 I.R.B. _ (9/23/10). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
. appropriated $2.5 billion to the Rural Utilities Service of the Department of Agriculture under 
the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP) and the National Telecommunications and Information 
( Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce under the Broadband Technology 
Opportunities Program (BTOP) to expand broadband capabilities. Grants under the various 
programs will be treated as nonshareholder contributions to capital under § 118( a) subject to the 
basis reduction requirements of § 362( c )(2). 
VII. P ARTNERSIDPS 
A. Formation and Taxable Years 
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis 
1 . If you lose it once, you can't claim it again. LeBlanc v. United States, 
104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7611 (Fed. Cl. 12/4/09). The taxpayers invested as limited partners in an 
agriculture limited partnership that produced farming expense deductions in its first year of 
operation. In a TEFRA audit proceeding, the partnership agreed to the disallowance of a portion 
of the deductions from transactions lacking economic substance. In a separate Tax Court 
proceeding, while the partnership proceeding was still pending, the taxpayers agreed to a 
settlement disallowing the same deductions on the partners' return. Several years later the 
taxpayers claimed a loss deduction from abandonment of the partnership interest in a refund suit. 
The taxpayers claimed that as a result of the settlements with the IRS they retained a substantial 
basis in their partnership interest which resulted in a loss on abandonment of the partnership 
interest. First, the court rejected the IRS assertion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because disallowance of the partners' losses was determined in the partnership proceeding. The 
court concluded that allowance of an abandonment loss deduction is an affected item subject to 
determination in a partner's refund action. The court stated that the partnership prong, allowance 
of an item, must be determined in the partnership proceeding; then the second prong, the impact 
of the affected item on the partners' individual tax liabilities, may be determined in a subsequent 
partner level proceeding. The court thus held that the sham transaction nature of the investment 
was determined in the partnership level proceeding, and that determination was not affected by 
the taxpayers' partner level settlement agreement, but that the court had jurisdiction to determine 
the partners'remaining bases for purposes of claiming their § 165 abandonment losses. The· 
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taxpayers asserted that their bases were reduced to zero, and no lower, by losses in the first year ( 
of the investment, but that additions to basis in subsequent years, not offset by the first year 
reductions to basis below zero, created a positive basis· in the year of abandonment. The court . 
held that calculation of basis under § 705 is cumulative and reflects a partner's entire period of 
ownership. Thus income and loss in the current year and prior years is summed in making the 
calculation. The statutory direction that basis cannot fall below zero does not mean that the 
history of profits and losses over the history of the partnership is' permanently set to zero. 
Further, the basis at the end of one year set at zero does not preclude a calculation of basis at any 
other time that includes all preceding distributed income and losses. The court also pointed out 
that the taxpayers' claim would allow them to recover as abandonment losses the loss deductions 
previously disallowed in the partnership proceeding. 
2 . State rehabilitation tax credits for sale, or not. Virginia Historic Tax 
Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-295 (12/21109). The Virginia Historic 
Rehabilitation Credit Program contains an allocation provision that allows a. developer 
partnership to allocate state rehabilitation tax credits to partners in proportion to their ownership 
interests in the partnership or as the partners mutually agree. The taxpayer partnership was a state 
tax credit partner in partnerships developing historic rehabilitation projects in Virginia. The 
taxpayer limited partnership, as a state tax credit partner, held a small percentage ownership 
interest in Virginia rehabilitation projects but was allocated most of the rehabilitation tax credits 
that the developer partnership could otherwise not use. The taxpayer partnership also purchased 
state tax credits under a one-time transfer provision. The taxpayer in turn received capital 
contributions from 282 investor limited partners (either directly or through a lower-tier LLC or 
LP). The pooled capital was invested in various developer rehabilitation partnerships. The 
Virginia State Rehabilitation credits were allocated to the investor partners. In general each 
investor was allocated $1 of state tax credit for each $0.74 invested. The investors were "bought 
out after the partnerships accomplished their purpose." 
• The court (Judge Kroupa) rejected the IRS's alternative (" 
assertions that the partnership derived income from the sale of state tax credits to the investors who . 
were not partners, or if the investors were to be recognized as partners in the tax credit partnerships, 
the transactions constituted disguised sales of the state tax credits under § 707(a)(2)(B). The court 
was impressed by several elements of the transactions in determining that the investors created a 
community of interest in profits and losses by joining together for a business purpose: the parties 
agreed to form a partnership, they acted as partners, the parties pooled resources in that the 
investors' contributed capital and the general partners contributed capital and services, and that the 
partners had a business purpose in terms of deriving a net economic benefit from state income tax 
savings (which was not a federal tax savings). The court further held that the substance of the 
transactions was the formation of a partnership rather than the sale and purchase of the state tax 
credits in part because the transaction was compelled by the form of investment specified by the 
Virginia program that encouraged the use of partnerships as a vehicle. for attracting capital into 
historic rehabilitation. Rather than treating the investors as purchasers of state tax credits, the court 
concluded that the investors' funds were pooled to facilitate investments in developer partnerships 
and that the investors remained as participants in the partnerships until the developer partnerships 
completed rehabilitation projects. 
• The court also found that the investors bore a risk that the 
developer partnerships would fail to generate rehabilitation credits. The court rejected the IRS's 
§ 707(a)(2)(B) argument for similar reasons. The court concluded that the substance of the 
transactions reflects valid contributions and allocations rather than sales based upon the court's 
findings that the investors made capital contributions in furtherance of the partnership's purpose to 
invest in developer partnerships engaged in historic rehabilitation and to receive state tax credits,the 
partnerships were able to participate because of the investors' pooled capital, the state tax credits 
were allocated to the investors consistent with the allocation provisions of the Virginia program, and 
that the investors were subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the partnerships operations. See Reg .. 
§ 1.707-3(b)(1). Finally, the court held that since the partnership did not have unreported income 
from the sale of state tax credits, the three year statute of limitation barred assessment and was not ( 
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subject to extension to six years under § 6229( c )(2) because of an omission of 25 percent of gross 
income. 
• One of the taxpayer's lawyers is a fonner student of 
Professor McMahon in the University of Florida College of Law Graduate Tax Program. [PAID 
ADVERTISEMENT. ] 
. 3 . Expanded anti-abuse rules look at the tax attributes of indirect 
owners to test allocations of built-in gain or loss. T.D. 9485, Contributed Property, 75 F.R. 
32659 (6/9/10). Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) provides that an allocation with respect to contributed 
built-in gain or loss property under § 704(c) (or a reverse allocation in the case of a book-up) is 
not reasonable if the contribution of property and the allocation is made with a view of shifting 
built-in gain or loss among partners in a manner that substantially reduces the present value of 
the partners' aggregate tax liability. The Treasury has finalized amendments to Reg. § 1.704-3 
that adopt without substantial change the proposed regulations in REG-I00798-06, Contributed 
Property, 73 F.R. 28765 (5/19/08). As amended, the regulations provide. that in testing for a 
reduction in aggregate tax liability, the tax consequence to both direct and indirect partners must 
be considered. Indirect partners include the owners of an entity that is a partner and is a 
partnership, S corporation, estate, trust, or controlled foreign corporation that is a ten percent 
partner. Indirect partners include the members of a consolidated group in which the partner is a 
member. Furthennore, as amended, Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(I) provides that the use of allocation 
methods with respect to built-in gain or loss property only apply to contributions to a partnership 
that "are otherwise respected." Even though an allocation may comply with the literal language 
of Reg. § 1.704-3(b), (c), or (d) (traditional method, curative allocations, or remedial 
allocations), "the Commissioner can recast the contribution as appropriate to avoid tax results 
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K." The regulations identify remedial allocations 
among related partners as one factor that may be considered. 
• Effective date. The amendments to the regulations apply to 
taxable years beginning after 6/9/10, but the preamble specifically notes that "[ n]o inference should 
be drawn from this effective date with respect to prior law." 
4. Family farm is a partnership. Holdner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2010-175 (8/4/10). When his son Randal expressed little interest in going to college, William 
Holder, an accountant, invested in developing a small family fann for his son to operate with an 
agreement to divide the profits with an undefined equity interest in the property. As the fanning 
operation expanding, father and son took title to property as tenants in common. On his returns 
William reported one-half of the income and claimed deductions for all operating expenses. The 
court held (Judge Marvel) held that the arrangement was a partnership, rejecting the taxpayer's 
arguments that they each operated as independent sole-proprietors. The court noted that both 
William and Randal contributed properties and labor to the venture which conducted business 
activities. The court also found that the taxpayers failed to rebut a presumption that the partners 
shared equal per capital interests in the partnership that applied to all items of income and 
expenditure and that differing capital contributions did not justify an allocation of all 
expenditures to William. The court sustained an accuracy related penalty under § 6662 finding 
that William failed to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of his reporting 
positions. 
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners 
1 . Forfeitable for decades and thus not guaranteed payments as annually 
accrued, but 100 percent a guaranteed payment when received. Wallis v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2009-243 (10/27/09). The taxpayer (a tax lawyer) retired as a equity partner in 
Holland & Knight, and among other amounts received $240,000 in twelve $20,000 payments 
over four taxable years. The $240,000 represented accumulated amounts that had been awarded 
to him as an equity partner over many years, but which were neither currently distributable as 
awarded nor recorded in the partner's capital account; rather, the amounts, which were 
detennined annually without regard to partnership income, were payable over a period of time 
after the partner reached age 68, but were forfeitable if the partner left the finn before that date. 
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The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the payments were a guaranteed payment under § 707(c) 
and § 736(a), taxable as ordinary income, and were not received as distributions under § 731. 
a. Affirmed. Tax lawyers have a high standard of "good faith" 
and "reasonable cause." Wallis v. Commissioner, __ Fed. Appx. _, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-
5755 (lIth Cir. 2010). The Tax Court was affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. There 
was sufficient evidence to support the Tax Court's conclusion that the payments' were § 707(c) 
guaranteed payments. The court also affirmed the imposition of a § 6662(a) negligence penalty, 
rejecting the taxpayer's "good faith" and "reasonable cause" argument, stating as follows: 
"Given that Donald Wallis has 35 years of experience as a tax lawyer, the Tax Court reasonably 
could conclude that Wallis should have been aware there were inconsistencies between (l) his 
not reporting the Schedule C payments at all to the IRS and (2) the income Form 1099 he 
received from H&K." . 
2 . A contribution in sales clothing, in a case of first impression a 
Bankruptcy Court identifies a contribution as a disguised sale, but all to no avail for the 
IRS. In Re: G-I Holdings, Inc., 105 AF.T.R.2d 2010-697 (D. N.J. 12/14/09). In a set of 
transactions conducted on the same date in 1990, GAF Chemicals and Alkaril Chemicals, Inc. 
transferred property valued at $480 million to Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. 
("RPSSLP") in exchange for a 49 percent limited partner interest. GAF transferred its limited 
partner interest to a trust, which in tum pledged the limited partnership interest to Credit Suisse 
as security for a nonrecourse loan of $460 million. The trust re-distributed the loan proceeds to 
GAF. RPSSLP was required to pay a priority return in an amount sufficient to pay interest on the 
Credit Suisse loan, with any surplus proceeds distributable to GAF. The loan was guaranteed by 
the French parent of the RPSSLP general partner. In a claim against GAF in a bankruptcy 
proceeding the IRS assessed a tax deficiency claiming that the transaction was a taxable 
disguised sale under § 704(a)(2)(B) rather than a contribution resulting in nonrecognition under § 
721. The court first held that the transaction created a valid partnership. The court held that 
§ 704(a)(2)(B) expressly authorized the court to collapse the contribution and loan transactions 
into a single transaction. Looking at the history of the negotiations, the court found that GAF had 
agreed to accept $30 million less cash and incur $12 million of transaction costs than a sale 
transaction in order to avoid $70 million of tax. Thus GAF's "true intent in restructuring the 
asset sale transaction was to sell its assets using a structure that would minimize taxation." The 
court described the following factors to support its conclusion: "As to the $450M transaction, the 
absence of a risk of loss, the absence of an expectation of profits that exceeded the increased 
transaction costs, the historical context in which the transaction occurred, and the evidence from 
the disguised sale analysis all support the conclusion that it was not a bona fide equity 
contribution to the partnership." Citing substance over form, the court indicated that the 
existence of a $480 million partnership capital account does not change the economic substance 
of the transaction. The court found that the interest payments to GAF based on its $480 million 
capital account had little real economic substance to GAF and merely represented loan payments 
to Credit Suisse. The court also concluded that the fact that GAF may have a bona fide equity 
interest in the partnership does not overcome the disguised sale language of § 704(a)(2)(B). After 
an extensive analysis of § 704(a)(2)(B) the court agreed with the IRS characterization that, 
following the principles of legislative history, the Credit Suisse loan constituted an indirect 
transfer of money from the partnership to the partner and the transfers constituted a sale of 
assets. With respect to whether the transaction is properly characterized as a sale under the 
statutory language, looking at the factors listed in the legislative history, the court staJed: 
As to the first factor, the $450M that GAF received from the 1990 Transactions 
was subject to no risk whatever. It walked away from the closing on February 12, 
1990 with $450M free and clear. Because this was a nonrecourse loan, GAF could 
never lose anything other than the collateral for the loan, its interest in RPSSLP. 
This factor weighs in favor of finding that GAF did not participate in the $450M 
transactions as a partner. As to the second factor, GAF's continuing partner status 
does not weigh in either direction. As to the third factor, the fact that the $450M 
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transaction occurred on the same day weighs in favor of finding that GAF did not 
participate in the $450M transaction as a partner. As to the fourth factor, this 
Court fmds that GAF's primary motivation for participating in the $450M 
transaction was to receive tax benefits. This too weighs in favor of finding that 
GAF did not participate in the $450M transaction as a partner. Thus, three of four 
factors weigh in favor of finding that GAF did not participate in the $450M 
transaction as a partner, and none weighs in favor of finding that GAF 
participated in this transaction as a partner. 
• Finally, the court indicated that its analysis is informed under 
Reg. § 1.707-5, enacted after the date of the transactions and therefore not applicable, and 
concluded that under the regulations the transaction would be treated as a sale. Ultimately the court 
found that GAF made a $30 million equity contribution and a $450 million sale to the partnership. 
At the end of the day, however, the court concluded that the omission from gross income 
represented by the disguised sale did not constitute more than 25 percent of GAF's gross income so . 
that the IRS was not entitled to invoke the six-year statute of limitations under § 6501 and that the 
government's claims were time barred. 
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers 
E. Inside Basis Adjustments 
F. Partnership Audit Rules 
1 . Partner's outside basis in a tax-shelter partnership is a partner item. 
Napoliello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-104 (5/18/09). The taxpayer invested in a Son-
of-Boss transaction involving digital foreign currency items. The IRS issued an FP AA to the 
taxpayer as a notice partner. In the uncontested partnership proceeding it was determined that the 
partnership was a sham that lacked economic substance, that transactions entered into by the 
partnership should be treated as transacted directly by the partners, and that purported losses 
claimed on disposition of distributed property with an enhanced basis should be disallowed. The 
IRS assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer based on the partnership items. The Tax Court 
previously had held in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008), that 
the determination of whether a partnership was a sham that will be disregarded for Federal tax 
purposes is a partnership item. In the instant case, the court (Judge Kroupa) agreed with the IRS 
that the partner's basis in distributed securities from the sham partnership is an affected item 
subject to determination in the partnership proceeding, and not subject to re-determination in the 
partner-level deficiency proceeding. Because the amount of any loss with respect to the partner's 
disposition of securities distributed from the partnership required a factual determination at the 
partner level, the court held that it had jurisdiction in the partner deficiency proceeding to 
proceed under normal deficiency procedures. The court thus proceeded to determine that the 
taxpayer claimed loss on the sale of the distributed securities was disallowed, that the taxpayer's 
basis in the securities was their direct cost rather than an exchange basis from the partnership 
interest, and that the taxpayer was not allowed to deduct transaction costs attributable to the 
investment. The Tax Court also held that the FP AA gave the taxpayer fair notice of the IRS 
claims. 
a. Part of the Tax Court's holding in Petaluma FX Partners retains its 
vitality, but not the part the Tax Court relied upon in Napoliello. Petaluma Fx Partners, LLC v. 
Commissioner, 591 F3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1112/10). The Tax Court in this Son-of-Boss tax shelter 
case determined that it had jurisdiction in a TEFRA partnership proceeding to determine that the 
partnership lacked economic substance and was a sham. Since the partnership was disregarded, 
the Tax Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to detemiine that the partners' outside basis in 
the partnership was zero. The Tax Court reasoned that a partner could not have a basis in a 
partnership interest that did not exist. (131 T.C. No.9 (2008).) The Court of Appeals agreed that 
the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the partnership proceeding to determine that the partnership 
was a sham. Temp. Reg. § 301.6223-1T(a) expressly provides that, "[a]ny final partnership 
administrative adjustment or judicial determination ... may include a determination that the entity 
is not a partnership for such taxable year." The Court of Appeals held that the regulation was 
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explicitly authorized by § 6233. A partnership item is defined in § 6231(a)(3) as an item required ( 
to be taken into account in determining the partnership's income under Subtitle A of the Code 
that is identified in regulations as an item more appropriately taken into account at the 
partnership level. The court indicated that, "Logically, it makes perfect sense to determine 
whether a partnership is a sham at the partnership level. A partnership cannot be a sham with 
respect to one partner, but valid with respect to another." However, the Appeals Court concluded 
that the partners' bases were affected items, not partnership items, and that the Tax Court did not 
have jurisdiction to determine the partners' bases in the partnership proceeding. The court 
rejected the IRS argument that the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the partnership proceeding to 
determine the partners' outside basis as an affected item whose elements are mainly determined 
from partnership items. The court held that resolution of the affected item requires a separate 
determination at the partner level even though the affected item could easily be determined in the 
partnership proceeding. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that accuracy related penalties under 
§ 6662(a) could not be determined without a determination of the partners' outside basis in a 
partner level proceeding and vacated and remanded the Tax Court's determination of penalty 
Issues. 
2 . Partnership audit rules extend the statute of limitations. Curr-Spec 
Partners L.P. v. Commissioner, 579 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 8/11/09). Section 6501(a) provides a 
three-year statute of limitations for assessing tax deficiencies. Section 6229(a) provides that the 
period for assessing a deficiency attributable to a partnership item does not expire until three 
years after the later of the date a partnership return or the due date for the partnership return. The 
IRS issued an FP AA disallowing claimed partnership losses four years after the partnership 
return was filed, and assessed deficiencies against the partners for years into which the losses 
were carried forward. The assessment to individual losses disallowing the loss carryforwards 
were within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the partners' returns. The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court holding that § 6229(a) does not establish an independent three-
year statute of limitations with respect to partnership items, but merely extends the limitations (' 
period of § 6501(a). Thus, assessment of a deficiency against partner's whose individual return 
remains open is not barred by any limitation period in § 6229(a). 
a. The Tax Court agrees. LVI Investors, LLC v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2009-254 (11/9/09). The court (Judge Nims) followed its holding in Curr-Spec 
Partners as affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. Section 6501(a) provides a three year assessment 
period after an individual's return is filed. Section 6229(a) provides that the period for assessing 
any tax attributable to a partnership item or an affected item expires three years after the latter of 
the due date of the partnership return or the date the partnership return was filed .. The court held 
that § 6229 does not override § 6501 and instead sets a minimum limitations period that may 
extend the § 6501(a) period. 
b. As does the Eastern District of Texas. Bemont Investments, LLC 
v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R2d 2010-1256 (B.D. Tex. 3/5/10). On taxpayer's motion for partial 
summary judgment on the statute of limitations, Magistrate Judge Bush held that Curr-Spec 
Partners required that the motion be denied. 
(1) In another motion decided on the same day, Magistrate 
Judge Bush decided that taxpayer's expert witness David Weisbach may testify as to whether the 
tax opinions received complied with applicable tax opinion standards and whether they complied 
with Circular 230, but not as to whether taxpayer's action were reasonable (which is a matter for 
the court). 
3 . Basis in a closed year is a partnership item that may be redetermined 
in an FPAA for an open year. Wilmington Partners L.P. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-
193 (8/26/09). The IRS issued an FPAA for the partnership'S 1993 year that was closed without 
adjustment. In an FPAA issued for 1999, the IRS determined that the partnership's basis in a 
reset note contributed in 1993 was zero. The court (Judge Kroupa) held that nothing in TEFRA 
prevents the court from considering events in a closed year to determine the proper adjustments 
for a docketed year. The court also held that the basis of the contributed note was a partnership 
item in the closed year of contribution, and remained a partnership item in each subsequent year. ( 
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The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the fact that § 6228(a)(5) expressly empowers 
the court to look back at non-docketed items as an offset to an administrative adjustment 
requested by a tax matters partner under § 6227, does not bar the court from looking at the facts 
of a non-docketed year in another matter. 
4 • Filing a refund claim before paying the $150 million, rather than 
paying first, filing second, left the taxpayer out the $150 million on procedural grounds. 
Ackerman v. Commissioner, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5830 (D. D.C. 8/18/09). Following a TEFRA 
partnership proceeding, the IRS notified the taxpayers of the resulting adjustments to their tax 
liability - over $150 million. Within the required sixty days of receiving the notices, the 
taxpayers filed administrative refund requests to which the IRS never responded. Subsequently 
they filed the refund suit. However, the taxpayers did not pay the deficiency until after the 
administrative refund request was filed. The government argued that § 6230( c) requires that the 
taxes be paid in full before the administrative refund request is filed, while the taxpayers argued 
that under § 6230(c) - unlike under § 7422, which governs refund claims generally - it is not 
necessary to pay the taxes in full before the administrative refund request is filed, but merely 
before the suit is filed. The court held that, as argued by the government, for the court to have 
jurisdiction, the taxes must be paid in full before the administrative refund request is filed. The 
court found the long line of cases imposing the "pay first" rule under § 7422 to be controlling. 
The court further held that even though accuracy related penalties resulting from the partnership 
adjustments were partner-level items, § 6230( c) - and not § 6511- nevertheless controlled the 
period for filing a refund claim. Thus, the taxpayer's refund claim was untimely because it was 
not filed within 60 days. The suit was dismissed. 
5. Be careful what you stipulate to. LKF X Investments, LLC v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-192 (8/25/09). The IRS issued a notice of final partnership 
administrative adjustment (FP AA) to the taxpayer partnership asserting that a LLC taxed as a 
partnership that was used to invest in market-linked deposit transactions (another form of 
abusive shelter using contingent offsetting payments to generate losses) should be disregarded 
for tax purposes and that the investors had zero basis in their partnership interest. In the 
partnership proceeding the parties contested the Tax Court's jurisdiction to consider disregard of 
the partnership and the partners' bases as partnership items and stipulated that if the court 
determined that it had jurisdiction the parties would not contest the determinations made in the 
FP AA other than whether the valuation misstatement penalty imposed under § 6662 applies to 
any underpayment resulting from the adjustments in the FP AA. The court· (Judge Marvel) 
granted summary judgment to the IRS holding that a determination whether a partnership is a 
sham, lacks economic substance, or otherwise should be· disregarded is a partnership item, 
following its prior decision in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008). 
The court also held that when a partnership is disregarded for Federal income tax purposes, the 
court has jurisdiction in the TEFRA proceeding to determine that the partners have zero outside 
basis. The court added that when the taxpayer stipulates that it would not contest an issue other 
than on jurisdictional grounds, the court will treat the issue as conceded. Finally, the court also 
held that where the partnership is disregarded and the partners' outside basis is zero the court had 
jurisdiction to determine as partnership items the applicability of accuracy related and valuation 
misstatement penalties under § 6662. The court rejected that taxpayer's assertion that the 
valuation misstatement penalty in inapplicable because it was attributable to disregard of the 
partnership rather than an erroneous valuation. 
6. In a Son-of-Boss litigation the Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine 
partner level deficiencies related to affected items. Hiding the loss through additional pass-
throughs justifies taxpayer-level determinations. Desmet v. Commissioner, 581 F.3d 297 (6th 
Cir. 9/17/09). The taxpayers formed a partnership in a Son-of-Boss transaction, then transferred 
their partnership interests to an S corporation. In the TEFRA partnership proceeding, which 
became final, the IRS determined that the partnership'S basis in distributed property was zero. 
Rather than directly assessing tax against the taxpayers as computational adjustments resulting 
from the FPPA under § 6230(a)(I), the IRS sent notices of deficiency related to affected items 
that require partner level determinations under § 6230(a)(2). The taxpayers asserted that the IRS 
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was required to assess the tax directly because no additional partner level determinations were 
necessary and that the statute of limitations had run on the assessment of individual deficiencies. 
Affirming the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the partnership proceeding determined 
only that the partnership was required to reduce its basis on account of its contingent obligation . 
to close the short sale leg of the Son-of-Boss transaction. The partnership proceeding did not 
address the taxpayers' claimed losses through their S corporation. The S corporation's loss was 
not addressed in the FPAA. The S corporation's loss arose from the sale of distributed stock, 
which could not be determined from the FP AA. Thus, the court held that the IRS was 
empowered to bring individual level proceedings to resolve issues regarding the losses passed-
through from the S corporation. The court also rejected the taxpayers' assertion that the 
procedure allows duplicative proceedings contrary to the purpose of the TEFRA partnership 
provisions. 
7. Go figure the deposit and come back. Russian Recovery Fund Ltd. v. 
United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 698 (Fed. Cl. 12114/09). Section 6226(a) requires that in order to 
petition for a readjustment of a partnership item in the Court of Federal Claims, the petitioning 
partner must provide a deposit of the amount by which the tax liability of the petitioning partner 
would be increased if the treatment of partnership items on the partner's return were consistent 
with the FPAA. Reg. § 301.6226(e)-I(a)(l) requires that if the petitioning partners is itself a 
partnership, the deposit must include the potential liability of each indirect partner. In an 
arrangement with losses flowing to partners through multiple partnerships, the court holds that 
the deposit must be calculated by any downstream partner to include losses flowing through the 
chain of partnerships, and not just losses passing through a single filing partnership. The filing 
partner's $50,000 actual deposit was increased to a required deposit of $8 million under this 
interpretation. Rather than dismiss the case, however, the court allowed the taxpayer to show that 
she made a good faith effort to calculate the required deposit. 
a. Krause v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1899 (W.O. Tex. 1/22/10). 
Partners who didn't contest an FPAA were not permitted to raise partnership level defenses to 
§ 6662(h) valuation misstatement penalties in a separate refund action. The taxpayer's claim that 
a valuation misstatement penalty is not allowable with respect to a disallowed partnership 
deduction is a substantive defense that must be raised in the partnership proceeding. The 
assertion does not constitute a computational error or partner-level defense permitted in a refund 
action under § 6230( c). 
9 . The applicable statute of limitations is a partnership item, even on the 
second try. Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 5/5/10). The taxpayers invested in 
tax shelters promoted by AMCOR in the mid-1980s. In a partnership audit procedure, following 
issuance of an FP AA, the Tax Court held rejected partnership assertions that the FP AA was 
barred by the statute of limitations. Agri-Cal Venture Associates v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 
2000-271. Some of the 43 partnerships entered into a settlement agreement with the IRS that 
allowed a percentage of ordinary deductions, but provided that the IRS may assert additional tax 
liability against individual partners plus interest. Subsequently the IRS assessed additional tax 
plus penalties against the taxpayers, which they paid in full. Seventy-seven of 129 AMCOR 
partnership tax refund cases filed in the Court of Federal Claims were identified as being 
factually similar raising claims that the statute of limitations had expired and that assessments of 
additional interest under § 6621(c) were improper because the transactions were not tax-
motivated transactions. Prati was selected as a representative case. The trial court dismissed the 
action accepting the IRS assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims that 
represented partnership items that should have been challenged in the partnership level 
proceeding. Ultimately 57 cases were appealed but stayed pending the court's decision in Keener 
v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 103 AFTR 2d 2009-364 (Fed. Cir. 1/8/09), which held that the 
statute of limitations is a partnership item as defined in § 6231(a), and that whether a partnership 
transaction is a sham is a partnership item for purposes of the additional interest provision. In 
Keener the court rejected a claim that the FP AA was untimely under § 6229 (three years after the 
date a partnership return is filed or the last day for filing the partnership return), but did not 
address a separate assertion that the claim was barred by the general three year limitation of § 
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( 6501 (three years from the date an individual's return is filed). Notwithstanding representations 
by the taxpayers before Keener was decided that the case would be determinative, the Federal 
Circuit considered the § 6501 argument, but reached the same result. The court concluded that 
the reasoning in Keener was directed to statutes of limitation in general and was not limited to 
§ 6229. The court also applied the reasoning of Keener to the taxpayers' § 6621 (c) interest claim 
. to hold that the characterization of partnership transactions is a partnership item. The court 
rejected the assertion that the taxpayers' settlement agreements converted the items into non-
partnership items. 
10. TMP's sole shareholder doesn't get to file a separate Tax Court 
petition. Devonian Program v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2010-153 (7/19/10). The taxpayer 
was the sole shareholder of Basin Gas Corp. which was designated as the tax matters partner in 
Devonian Program, a partnership. The Devonian subscription agreement indicated that Basin 
would receive a flat fee for its services and contribute $3,000 to Devonian for a 17 percent 
interest in Devonian's revenues. After the IRS issued an FPPA to Devonian, Basin filed a 
petition with the Tax Court as the tax matters partner. Subsequently, the taxpayer, the sole 
shareholder of Basin, filed a second petition claiming that Basin was only an agent and not a 
partner in Devonian. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the second petition, finding that Basin was a partner in the partnership and the 
designated tax matters partner. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that Basin held only a 
contingent interest in the partnership, finding that Basin could assign the interest and that Basin's 
interest in revenues was a partnership share rather than payment for services. The opinion does 
not indicate why Basin's sole shareholder independently sought to file a petition with the Tax 
Court. 
11. Son-of-Boss ...:.... the shelter that keeps on taking. Legal fees for creating 
a Son-of-Boss transaction are affected items. Domulewicz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2010-177 (8/5/10). The taxpayers entered into a BDO Seidman / Jenkens & Gilchrist Son-of-
Boss transaction by creating a subchapter S corporation that held an interest in a partnership. The 
S corporation was owned by a grantor trust. The S corporation paid $1,053,400 of legal fees 
related to the transaction. Under an FPAA issued to the partnership the IRS determined that the 
partnership was a sham whose existence was disregarded. After the FP AA became final, the IRS 
issued an affecte~ item notice of deficiency to the individual investors disallowing deduction of 
the legal fees passed-through from the S corporation. The court (Judge Laro) rejected the 
taxpayers' argument that the deficiency was barred by the statute of limitations because the fees, 
incurred by the S corporation, were not affected partnership items. Citing Thomas v. United 
States, 166 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 1999), the court held that the fees and the S corporation deduction 
were affected by the partnership item determination in· that the fees were nondeductible given the 
lack of a profit or business motive flowing from the partnership level determination. The fact that 
the fees were not incurred or deducted by the partnership did not remove the fees from being 
treated as affected items. The court pointed out further that the relationship between the 
partnership, the fees, the S corporation, and the taxpayers could not have been determined at the 
partnership level but had to be determined at a partner level proceeding. Therefore, the running 
of the statute of limitations was suspended under § 6229( d) until 60 days after the decision in the 
partnership proceeding became final. The fees were affected items because they were related to 
the transaction and were related to the partnership in that they were paid, at least in part, to form 
the partnership and to effect the transaction as it related to the partnership. The fees were the type 
of affected item assessable only through the deficiency procedures, because they required 
partner-level determinations to ascertain the portion (if not all) of the fees related to the 
partnership and to the transaction and which were thus nondeductible. 
. 12. The IRS gets a second bite at this TEFRA apple even if the in-house 
rules were not followed. NPR Investments, LLC v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87398 
(E.D. Tex. 8/10/10). NPR was a partnership foimed to execute a R.J. Ruble, Sidley Austin, Son 
of Boss abusive tax shelter deal. The three partners were partners in a plaintiffs contingency fee 
law firm, and two of them were the taxpayers in Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. 
United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 5/21109). When the partners withdrew from NPR, they 
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transferred the inflated basis foreign currency from NPR to their law firm partnership. On its tax . ( 
return, NPR indicated that it was not a partnership subject to TEFRA audit procedures, when in 
fact it was a TEFRA partnership. In the initial audit of NPR's returns, the IRS applied normal 
partnership audit procedures and issued a final no adjustment notice to the partnership. Rather 
than proposi11g adjustments to· the NPR return, the IRS determined that it would deny loss 
deductions through the issue of notices of deficiency directly to the NPR partners. In a higher 
level review, the IRS determined that NPR was a TEFRA partnership and that the deficiency 
action required issue of an FP AA to the NPR partners adjusting NPR partnership items. Section 
6223(f) provides that if the IRS mails a final partnership administrative adjustment, it may not 
mail another notice in the absence of a showing of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a 
material fact. The taxpayers argued that the second notice was invalid. The court (Judge Ward) 
found that the initial notice to NPR met the statutory criteria for an FPP A, even though it was 
sent through the normal audit process. The court indicated that there is nothing in statute or case 
law that affects the validity of an FPPA by whether the IRS followed proper internal procedur~s 
in issuing the notice. However, the court also found that the taxpayer's misrepresentation of the 
TEFRA audit status on NPR's partnership return by failing to check the box indicating it was 
subject to the TEFRA provisions was a "misrepresentation of a material fact" invoking the 
exception in § 6223(f) that allows a second notice. 
• The court also held that the taxpayers reasonably relied on 
their tax advisors and declined to impose penalties under §§ 6662(b) and 6664(c)(1). 
G. Miscellaneous 
1. Oops. No, no, I'm OK after all. Rev. Proc. 2010-32, 2010-36 LR.B. 320. 
(9/7/10). This procedure provides that if a foreign entity makes a check the box election to be a 
partnership, under the ·reasonable assumption that it has more than one owner, but then 
determines that it only had one owner, the original check the box election will be treated as an 
election to be a disregarded entity provided the requirements in the revenue procedure are 
satisfied. Similarly, it also provides that if a foreign entity makes a check the box election to be ( 
disregarded entity, under the reasonable assumption that it has only one owner, but then 
determines it only had more than one owner, the original check the box election will be treated. as 
an election to be a partnership provided the requirements in the revenue procedure are satisfied. 
VIn. TAX SHELTERS 
A. Tax Shelter Cases and Rulings - The Saga Starts a Long, Long Time Ago, 
But New Mysteries Continue to Unravel. 
1. Notice 2000-44. Baby BOSS is a fraud too! Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 
LR.B. 255 (8/11100). "Artificial" capital losses generated by Baby BOSS transactions will not be 
allowed. (Note that Notice 99-59, 1999-2 .B. 761, advised taxpayers that losses from "BOSS" 
product transactions are not properly deductible.) 
• Scheme # 1: The taxpayer purports to borrow at a premium 
interest rate. For example, a lender gives the taxpayer $3,000 and the parties treat the stated 
principal amount of the loan as only $2,000, with the remaining $1,000 that must be repaid 
representing interest. The taxpayer contributes the loan proceeds into a partnership, which assumes 
the liability, and uses the proceeds to purchase an investment asset worth $3,000. The 
taxpayer/partner takes the position under §§ 705(a)(2), 722, and 752(b) that his basis in his 
partnership interest is $1,000 (the $3,000 cash contribution minus the $2,000 assumed liability), 
even though the value of the partnership interest is zero. The taxpayer then sells the partnership 
interest for a nominal amount, claiming a $1,000 capital loss. (Everyone apparently ignores the 
$1,000 discrepancy between the cash proceeds of the loan and the $2,000 "principal amount," 
which ha,s to produce income to someone sometime.) This short sale variant is also the so-called 
BLIPS strategy. 
• Scheme #2: The taxpayer simultaneously purchases a call 
option and writes an offsetting call option, both of which are then contributed to a partnership. The 
taxpayer takes the position that the basis of the partnership interest equals the basis of the purchased 
call option, unreduced by the liability associated with the written call option, i.e., that the ( 
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( partnership did not assume a liability when it took responsibility for the written call option. The 
taxpayer then uses this artificially high basis to claim a capital loss on the sale of his partnership 
interest. (Compare Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, holding that a partnership's short sale of 
securities creates a liability.) This'offsetting option variant is also the so-called COBRA strategy. 
• Notice 2000-44 disallows the losses (under §§ 165(a) and (c)) 
produced by both of these Baby BOSS transactions as artificial, citing, in the case of individuals, 
Fox v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 1001 (1984), holding that §165(c)(2) requires a primary profit motive 
for a loss from a particular transaction is to be deductible. The notice also cites Reg. §1.701-2 (the 
partnership anti-abuse rules). The IRS also announced that it was reexamining the partnership basis 
rules. 
• Compound indicia of criminal tax fraud? The government 
believes that the Baby BOSS transactions were not being individually reported on schedule D, but 
instead have been buried in grantor trusts. For example, an individual taxpayer with an unrealized 
capital gain contributes both the appreciated assets and the Baby BOSS partnership interest into a 
. grantor trust, which sells both, and the individual reports only the net gain or loss from the grantor 
trust's transactions on his return, rather than breaking out gains and losses separately, as is required 
(by Reg. §1.671-2). Treasury Department officials suggest that criminal penalties might apply to 
this kind of reporting, which willfully conceals the facts. 
• Changes coming to tax shelter disclosure rules. The 
recently proposed corporate tax shelter disclosure rules will be changed by dropping the 
requirement that a shelter be marketed to a corporation to trigger the requirement that a promoter 
maintain a customer list. Under the amended regulations, a customer list would have- to be 
maintained for a shelter that is exclusively peddled to individuals, provided threshold amounts of 
fees and tax savings are met. 
2. Temp. Reg. § 1.7S2-6T. Fighting duplication and acceleration of losses 
through partnerships before June 24, 2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 
F.R. 37414 (6/24/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T provides rules, similar to the rules applicable to 
corporations in § 358(h), to prevent the duplication and acceleration of loss through the 
assumption by a partnership of a liability of a partner in a nonrecognition transaction. Under the 
temporary regulations, if a partnership assumes a liability, as defined in § 358(h)(3), of a partner 
(other than a liability to which § 752(a) and (b) apply) in a § 721 transaction, after application of 
§§ 752(a) and (b), the partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but not below the adjusted 
value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the term "liability" 
includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the 
obligation is otherwise taken into account for Federal tax purposes. Reduction of a partner's 
basis generally is not required if: (1) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is 
transferred to the partnership, or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is 
associated are contributed t; the partnership. However, the exception for contributions of 
substantially all of the assets does not apply to a transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 
C.B. 255 (or a substantially similar transaction). 
• The temporary regulations purport to be effective for 
transactions occurring after 10/18/99 and before 6/24/03. The cases which held them to be 
retroactively effective include: Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1882 
(N.D. Ill. 2007), ajf'd, 515F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); and Maguire Partners - Master Investments, 
LLC v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R2d 2009-763, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. ,-r50,215 (C.D. Calif. 2/4/09). The 
cases which held them not to be retroactively effective include: Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, 
LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 2006), ajf'd in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 5/21109); Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 
2008); Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (Fed. Cl. 2008); and 
Muifam Farms LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516 (Fed. Cl. 7/30/09). 
• And the Court of Federal Claims sticks by its guns. 
Murfam Farms. LLC v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010- , 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 598 
(Fed. Cl. 8/16/10). The court denied a motion by the government to vacate its earlier holding that 
I. Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T cannot be retroactively applied. The government argued that the holding 
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was moot following a stipulation by the parties that the transaction lacked economic substance. The 
court held that the possibility that its earlier ruling would weaken the governments litigating 
position in future cases did not warrant vacating the earlier decision. The court noted that debate 
among courts is helpful. 
3 . District Court holds for the taxpayer on the merits in an options 
transaction for which R.J. Ruble provided the tax opinion. Sala v. United States, 552 F. 
Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 4/22/08). The District Court (Judge Babcock) held that taxpayer was 
entitled to a $60 million ordinary loss on 24 long and short currency options entered into in 
November 2000 as part of a Deerhurst Program, in which the options were contributed to a 
partnership. The basis of that partnership interest was increased by the cost of the long options 
but was not reduced by the contingent liability on the short options under Helmer v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160 (l975). This was based upon Judge Babcock's finding of 
fact that the long and short options were separate instruments for tax purposes. The court found 
that the regulations issued in 2003, Reg. § 1.752-6, retroactive to October 1999, which contained 
an "exception to the exception" for transactions described in Notice 2000-44, exceeded 
Treasury's authority. Judge Babcock held that the regulations were not legislative because the 
"exception to the exception" was not comparable to the rules for corporations described in 
§ 358(h). Judge Babcock concluded that the corporate rules were only "to prevent acceleration or 
duplication of losses," which were not involved in the transactions described in Notice 2000-44. 
He refused to follow Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008). 
• Judge Babcock analyzed the complex transaction under the 
step transaction doctrine and found the doctrine inapplicable. 
• He found the losses deductible under § 165(c)(2) because 
they were incurred in a transaction entered into for profit, which was to be determined at the time 
taxpayer entered into the transaction, and not in hindsight. In this, Judge Babcock credited Sala's 
testimony that "he expected his investment in Deerhurst to be profitable above and beyond the 
expected tax loss . . .. " 
• He found the taxpayer was "an extremely cautious investor 
who invested a great deal of time and energy carefully researching and choosing his investments" 
and that he had a business purpose other than tax avoidance for structuring his investment as he did. 
• Judge Babcock further held that Sala's amended return filed 
on 11118/03 was a "qualified amended return" because KPMG had not been contacted regarding 
Deerhurst prior to that date, although it had been previously contacted regarding transactions similar 
to Deerhurst. 
a . Government motion on 6/10/08 for new trial based upon affidavit 
given in connection with decision not to prosecute investment manager. An9rew J. Krieger, a 
key witness for the taxpayer, stated in an affidavit dated 5/22/08 that a portion of the testimony 
he gave at deposition was false, in that there was no "test period" for an "investment program" 
but merely an effort to obtain tax savings. 2008 TNT 114-15. The motion was opposed by the 
taxpayer because Krieger gave his affidavit only after the government granted him immunity 
from prosecution by executing a non-prosecution cooperation agreement in connection with a 
criminal investigation unrelated to this case, i.e., the Coplan criminal case pending in the 
SouthemDistrict of New York. 2008 TNT 130-62, 7/1108. 
b. Government motion for new trial denied. 251 F.R.D. 614, 102 
A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5292 (7/18/08). Judge Babcock denied the motion, holding that the evidence 
submitted by the government was not new. He stated, "Rather than implying diligence, the 
timing of this 'new' evidence instead implies a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government 
to further delay and derail this case for tactical gain." 
c. Tenth Circuit reverses Judge Babcock for his Sala'd days. Sala 
v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5406 (lOth Cir. 7/23/10). The Tenth Circuit (Judge 
Murphy) reverses Judge Babcock's ruling in favor of Sala on all issues by severing the year-
2000 tax loss from the post-2000 Deerhurst Program and finding that the 2000 transaction lacked 
economic substance because "the economic substance doctrine requires 'disregarding, for tax 
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purposes, transactions that comply with the literal terms of the tax code but lack economic 
reality. '" 
• Judge Murphy observed: 
Indeed, rather than suffering any actual financial loss through Deerhurst GP, Sala 
actually profited from the transaction. Sala does not contest that the loss is 
fictional, but rather protests that the rule from Helmer should control. This 
argument does not, however, address the claimed loss's absence of economic 
reality. The absence of economic reality is the hallmark of a transaction . lacking 
economic substance .... 
Additionally, while the district court found the long and short options had a 
potential to earn profits of $550,000 over the course of one year, the expected tax 
benefit was nearly $24 million. That expected tax benefit dwarfs any potential 
gain from his participation in Deerhurst GP such that "the economic realities of 
[the] transaction are insignificant in relation to the tax benefits of the transaction." 
... The existence of some potential profit is "insufficient to impute substance into 
an otherwise sham transaction" where a "common-sense examination of the 
evidence as a whole" indicates the transaction lacked economic substance. 
4. Maguire Partners. Maguire Partners - Master Investments, LLC v. United 
States, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-763 (C.D. Calif. 2/4/09). Two individuals, through various entities, 
in late 2001 entered into call options spreads, i.e., they sold short call options to AIG via an 
Arthur Andersen tax strategy and purchased offsetting long call options and promissory notes 
from the same company; the options were European options, with an Asian-style feature, in that 
they were to be exercised on a particular date based upon the average value of a REIT basket 
over a 90-day period. The partnerships received the long options and notes and assumed the short 
options. In finding for the government, the court (Judge Walter) held that the evidence 
demonstrated that the transactions did not have economic substance because the individuals 
received no economic benefit, other than an increase in basis, from the transactions. The court 
also held that the evidence demonstrated that the individuals were motivated by the increased 
basis and not by any purported hedging benefit. The court held that, under both the step 
transaction doctrine and the substance-over-form doctrine, the individuals' actual cost basis was 
the original amount of their investment - not the increased basis reported by the partnerships, 
because they had no downside exposure, and only an extremely remote possibility of receiving a 
return. Judge Thomas further held that the obligation created by the short option is a liability for 
purposes of § 752, or alternatively, it had to be taken into account under Reg. § 1.752-6 which 
applies retroactively. He further found that the individuals had been placed on notice by Notice 
2000-44, issued in August 2000. 
• The court also held that the partnerships made a gross . 
valuation misstatement under § 6662, citing in support the fact that one of the individual's 
partnerships reported an increase in its capital account equal to 67 times the actual economic outlay 
that the individual paid for the transaction. 
. a. The court amended its earlier opinion to hold that the partnerships 
were not liable fot the gross valuation misstatement penalties, but were liable for negligence 
penalties instea4. Maguire Partners - Master Investments, LLC v. United States, ·104 A.F.T.R.2d 
2009-7839 (C.D. Calif. 12/11109).' The court focused its discussion of penalties on the 
"negligence or disregard of rules or regulations" under 6662(a) and (b)(1) and did not mention 
the valuation misstatement issue. 
S . Murfam Farms. Retroactive application of the partnership contingent 
liability regulation rejected again. Murfam Farms L.L.C. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516 
(Fed. Cl. 7/30109). The court (Judge Damich) granted the taxpayers' motion for partial summary 
judgment in a COBRA tax shelter case (COBRA is a Son-of-Boss digital options shelter under 
another name) declaring that Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T may not be applied retroactively. The court 
held that retroactive application of the temporary regulation was barred by the prohibition of 
§ 7805(b)(1) on retroactive application of regulations because it was not issued pursuant to a 
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offset by a large depreciation expense, with a corresponding allocation of a large amount of taxable 
income, but no corresponding allocation of depreciation deductions. This resulted in an enormous 
tax savings, but the simple allocation of a large percentage of income violates no rule. The 
government does not - and cannot - dispute that partners may allocate their partnership's income as 
they choose. Neither does the government dispute that the taxable income allocated to the Dutch 
Banks could not be offset by the allocation of non-existent depreciation deductions to the banks. 
And ... the bare allocation of a large interest in income does not violate the overall tax effect rule." 
• Judge Underhill concluded: 
The government is understandably concerned that the Castle Harbour transaction 
deprived the public fisc of some $ 62 million in tax revenue. Moreover, it appears 
likely that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction -
though certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax burden. 
Nevertheless, the Castle Harbour transaction was an economically real 
transaction, undertaken, at least in part, for a non-tax business purpose; the 
transaction resulted in the creation of a true partnership with all participants 
holding valid partnership. interests; and the income was allocated among the 
partners in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations. 
In short, the transaction, though it sheltered a great deal of income from taxes, 
was legally permissible. Under such circumstances, the I.R.S. should address its 
concerns to those who write the tax laws. 
transaction? 
• Query whether § 704(b) was properly applied. to this 
• This appears to be a lease-stripping transaction in which the 
income from the lease was assigned to foreign entities while the benefits of ownership were left 
with a domestic entity. 
b. Castle Harbour IL Second Circuit reverses. 459 F.3d 220 (2d 
Cir. 8/3/06). The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Leval, held that the Dutch banks were 
not partners because their risks and rewards were closer to those of creditors than partners. He 
used the facts-and-circumstances test of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), to 
determine whether the banks' interest was more in the nature of debt or equity, and found that 
their interest was overwhelmingly in the nature of a secured lender's interest, "which would 
neither be harmed by poor performance of the partnership nor significantly enhanced by 
extraordinary profits." 
• In ACM (Colgate), Judge Laro wrote a 100+ page analysis to 
find that there was no economic substance to the arrangement. The next contingent payment 
installment sale case in the Tax Court was ASA Investerings (Allied Signal), in which Judge Foley 
wrote a much shorter opinion fmding that the Dutch bank was not a partner; the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed on Judge Foley's holding that the Dutch bank was not a partner. The IRS began to pick up 
this lack-of-partnership argument and began to use it on examinations. Later, the Tax Court (Judge 
Nims) used the economic substance argument in Saba (Brunswick), which the DC Circuit remanded 
based on ASA Investerings to give taxpayer the opportunity to argue that there was· a valid 
partnership, which it could not do, as Judge Nims found on remand. Even later, the D.C. Circuit 
reversed the District Court's Boca (Wyeth, or American Home Products) case based upon this lack-
of-partnership argument - even though Cravath planned Boca carefully so that if the Dutch bank 
was knocked out, there would still be a partnership - based upon its ASA Investerings and Saba 
findings on appeal that there was no partnership. Now the Second Circuit has adopted the lack-of-
partnership argument. 
c. Castle Harbour III: On remand in Castle Harbour, the District 
Court found a valid partnership to have existed under § 704( e) because the heading does not alter 
the clear language of a statute. A valid family partnership is found in the absence of a family .. 
Additionally, in his contingent penalty findings, Judge Underhill stated that his 2004 taxpayer-
favorable decision ipso facto means that the taxpayer's reporting position was based upon 
substantial authority. 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6746 (D. Conn. 10/7/09), as amended, 2009 U.S. 
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Dist. LEXIS 98884 (D. Conn. 10123/09). In a carefully-written2 opinion, Judge Underhill held ( 
that, while the Second Circuit opinion decided that the partnership did not meet the Culbertson 
totality-of-the-circumstances test ("whether ... the parties in good faith and acting with a 
business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise"), it did not 
address the § 704( e )(1) issue. He held that the Dutch banks satisfied the requirements of that 
paragraph, which reads: 
(e) Family partnerships. 
(1) Recognition of interest created by purchase or gift. - A person shall be 
recognized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in 
a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or 
not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person. 
• In so holding, he relied upon well-settled law that the title of 
a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text, and that the title is of use only when it sheds 
light on some ambiguous word or phrase. See also, LR.C. § 7806(b). 
• Some of the authors observe that it is worth noting that 
although Evans v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g 54 T.C. 40 (1970), which 
Judge Underhill relied upon extensively to reach his conclusion, held that the application of 
§ 704( e)( 1) was not limited to the context of family partnerships, Evans involved the question who, 
between two different persons - the original partner or an assignee of the original partner's 
economic interest - was the partner who should be taxed on a distributive share of the partnership's 
income. Although in the family context § 704( e) frequently has been applied to determine whether a 
partnership exists in the first place, Judge Underhill's decision in Castle Harbour III is the very first 
case to discover that § 704(e)(I) applies to determine whether an arrangement between two (or 
more) otherwise unrelated business entities or unrelated individuals constituted a partnership. 
• It has sometimes been adduced that the fact that a court of 
applicable jurisdiction subsequently upholds the tax treatment of a transaction should be a strong (." ' 
argument for the proposition that such tax treatment was based upon substantial authority. With , 
respect to the applicability of penalties should he be reversed on appeal, Judge Underhill stated: 
To a large extent, my holding in Castle Harbour I in favor of the taxpayer 
demonstrates the substantial authority for the partnership's tax treatment of the 
Dutch Banks, as does my discussion above of the Dutch Banks' interest in Castle 
Harbour under section 704(e)(1). In addition, the government's arguments against 
the substantial authority defense are unavailing. (emphasis supplied) 
• Judge Underhill also sought to place the application of the 
penalty provisions in a temporal context when he stated: 
The government argues that Culbertson and Second Circuit cases like Slifka and 
Dyer that interpreted Culbertson cannot provide substantial authority for the 
partnership'S tax position because the Second Circuit held in Castle Harbour II 
that the Dutch Banks were not partners under Culbertson. The government, 
however, has not pointed to any Second Circuit case or other authority, prior to 
1997 and 1998 when the Castle Harbour partners took the tax positions at issue, 
where the parties' good faith intention or valid business purpose in forming a 
partnership was not sufficient to support a conclusion of partnership status for tax 
purposes. 
• In the context of the previous two bullet points, it is worth 
noting that Judge Underhill's observations in the immediately preceding 'bullet point appear to be 
consistent with Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(C), which provides that whether a position is supported by 
substantial authority must be determined with reference to authorities in existence at the time. But, 
Judge Underhill's observations in the second preceding bullet point appear to be inconsistent with 
2 One of us thinks the opinion is "carefully-written." Dan and Marty, the only two of us who teach and 
regularly write about partnership taxation, do not so think. Ira, who has never taught a course in ( 
partnership taxation, appreciates the innovative logic underlying the opinion. \ 
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( both Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii), and observations in the immediately preceding bullet point. 
However, we are not all in agreement with what Judge Underhill intended the observations in the 
second preceding bullet point to mean. . 
• Stay tuned for further proceedings on appeal to the Second 
Circuit, where the same panel that heard Castle Harbour II will hear Castle Harbour IV. 
7 . Consolidated Edison. Taxpayer victory in the Court of Federal Claims 
in a lease-in, lease-out (LILO) transaction with a Dutch utility. On appeal, the taxpayer is 
likely to hit a Dutch wall, i.e., a [Timothy] Dyk. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. 
United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (10/21109). The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Hom), in a long 
and careful opinion held that, under the particular facts of this case, the LILO transaction 
taxpayer entered into with a Dutch utility had economic substance, i.e., that no decision as to 
whether particular options would be exercised was "pre-ordained" and that taxpayer "bore the 
burdens and benefits of ownership." In finding that taxpayer had shown that the transaction was 
a true lease and should be respected, she distinguished factually other LILO cases decided for the 
government, such as BB & T Corporation v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008), and 
AWG Leasing Trustv. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
• A large portion of the opinion consists of Judge Hom's 
analysis of the expert evidence, with pointed criticism of one expert who "failed to conduct in-depth 
studies of the ... [t]ransaction and gave almost automatic and generalized conclusions on the flaws 
ofLILO and SILO transactions for tax purposes." 
.' Alleged "spoliation of evidence" in 2000 by reason of a 
switch in e-mail systems without preserving all of the then-existing e-mails, and the desire to protect 
1997 memoranda as work product, come into conflict with bad result for the credibility of an in-_ 
house lawyer. ("He was considered by the court an unreliable witness, perhaps willing to write or 
say whatever he thOUght would assist his then current assignment.") The court found that litigation 
was not reasonably anticipated until 2002 at the earliest because negotiations in connection with the 
IRS audit were ongoing until at least that year. The 1997 memoranda were ordered disclosed. 
8 . Palm Canyon X Another Son-of-Boss-type shelter bites the dust in the 
Tax Court and not even the Thighmaster can trim the tax bill. Palm Canyon X Investments, 
LLC, et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-288 (12115/09). In a lengthy opinion the court 
(Judge Marvel) held that a Son-of-Boss investment in offsetting digital option contracts was to 
be disregarded under the economic substance doctrine. Taxpayers Alan and Suzanne Hamel ran a 
retail business that included the extremely successful "Thighmaster," which featured Suzanne 
Hamel, a/kIa the actress Suzanne Somers, in its advertising. They incorporated Alan Hamel 
Investments (AHI), which in tum was the sole member of Palm Canyon, an LLC. Palm Canyon 
entered into a long digital option contact for a premium of $5 million an offsetting short option 
for which the counterparty paid a premium of $4.945 million, resulting in a net premium outlay 
of $55,000. An investment company formed by one of the promoters acquired a membership 
interest in the LLC, thereby allowing the LLC to be treated as a partnership. AHI claimed a basis 
in the LLC in the amount of the premium paid for the long position without reduction for the 
contingent liability represented by the short position assumed by the partnership. On the 
subsequent liquidation of the partnership, AHI claimed a high basis in a Canadian dollars 
position that was sold for a loss. The contracts were entered into through John Ivsan, a tax 
attorney with Cantl~y & Sedacca, LLP, who directed them to the Dallas branch of Deutsche 
Bank to implement the strategy, which created a $5 million ordinary loss. The court avoided the 
technical issues, and assumed that the transaction satisfied the literal language of § 752 and that 
under Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160, AHI's partnership basis was not reduced 
by the contingent short option liability. The court also avoided the issue of retroacti,ve 
application of Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6, which would have required AHI to reduce its basis by the 
LLC's potential payment on the short option. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the 
transaction failed to satisfy the subjective prong of the economic substance test because the 
Hamels entered into the transaction for the sole purpose of avoiding federal income tax, and 
failed the objective prong because the taxpayers' failed to demonstrate that the transactions had 
any reasonable prospect of earning a profit. The court noted that because of the marketing 
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agent's ability to determine the spot market exchange rate on the option date, the marketing 
agent could assure that the option contracts would not hit the "sweet spot" that would make the 
transaction profitable. The court imposed accuracy related penalties concluding that the 
transaction qualified as a tax shelter and that the Hamels could not reasonably rely on the tax 
opinion of Pryor, Cashman, Sherman & Flynn, LLP, which was part of the promoter team and 
therefore had a conflict of interest in issuing the opinion. 
9 . Wells Fargo. "The SILO transactions here are offensive to the Court 
on many levels." Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (1/8/10). Wells Fargo 
engaged' in 26 SILO transactions, five of which were tried in this refund case in the Court of 
Federal Claims. Seventeen of the SILOs involved domestic transit agencies and nine involving 
qualified technological equipment. The trial dealt with four SILOs involving public transit 
agencies, and one involving cellular telecommunications equipment. The parties agreed that the 
court's ruling with respect to the five transactions would guide the' resolution of the remainder. 
The court's fact [mdings are synopsized in the following passage from the opinion by Judge 
Wheeler: 
In each transaction, the parties employed equity and debt "defeasance accounts," 
which are types of escrow accounts intended to minimize the risks of non-
payment. During the lease-back period, a return is generated from the equity 
defeasance account investments. The value of the equity defeasance account is 
expected to grow so that the tax-exempt entity can exercise the buy-out option at 
the end of the lease-back period without using any of its own funds. However, the 
equity defeasance account return is more than offset by the other costs of the 
transaction, including Wells Fargo's cost of funds to engage in the transaction. 
The end result is that the trial transactions produce an overall loss without the tax 
benefits, and no rational person would engage in these transactions absent the tax 
benefits. This conclusion is borne out by Wells Fargo's cessation of SILO 
transactions after the IRS began disallowing SILO tax deductions. Moreover, the 
profitable portion of the transactions could be realized simply by investing in the 
same portfolio as the equity defeasance account. The only reason to create the 
elaborate array of agreements comprising a SILO transaction is for Wells Fargo to 
obtain the tax benefits at minimal risk, and with complete assurance of the desired 
long-term outcome. ' 
• The essence the court's ultimate holding is captured in the 
following passages from the opinion: 
The Court finds that Wells Fargo is not entitled to the claimed tax deductions on 
the five trial transactions. The SILO transactions did not grant to Wells Fargo the 
burdens and benefits of property ownership. The transactions lack economic 
substance, and were intended only to reduce Wells Fargo's federal taxes by 
millions of dollars. Although well disguised in a sea of paper and complexity, the 
SILO transactions essentially amount to Wells Fargo's purchase of tax benefits 
for a fee from a tax-exempt entity that cannot use the deductions. The transactions 
are designed to minimize risk and assure a desired outcome to Wells Fargo, 
regardless of how the value of the property may fluctuate during the term of the 
transactions. Indeed, nothing of any substance changes in the tax-exempt entity's 
operation and ownership of the assets. The only money that changes hands is 
Wells Fargo's up-front fee to the tax-exempt entity, and Wells Fargo's payments 
to those who have participated in or created the intricate agreements. The equity 
and debt "loop" transactions simply are offsetting accounting entries not 
involving actual payments, or pools of money eventually returned to the original 
holder. If the Court were to approve of these SILO schemes, the big losers would 
be the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), deprived of millions in taxes rightfully 
due from a financial giant, and the taxpaying public, forced to bear the burden of 
the taxes avoided by Wells Fargo. 
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( ... The heart of these transactions is that Wells Fargo paid a fee to tax-exempt 
entities to acquire valuable tax deductions that the tax-exempt entities could not 
use. Wells Fargo also invested an amount with an equity undertaker that it could 
have done directly, without involving any tax-exempt entities or their equipment. 
Aside from these two elements, the circular flow of funds adds nothing to the 
transaction, except to eliminate any risk to Wells Fargo and to produce more 
claimed tax deductions. The involvement of lenders like AIG, appraisers like 
Ernst & Young, and law firms like King & Spalding is "window dressing" serving 
only to generate fees and lengthy documents to give the SILOs an appearance of 
validity. The Indiana district court hit the mark when it described the SILO as a 
"blatantly abusive tax shelter" that is "rotten to the core." Hoosier Energy Rural 
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F.Supp.2d 919, 921, 928 
(S.D. Ind. 2008), affd 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009). 
• After first holding that Wells Fargo was not entitled to 
depreciation deductions because it never obtained the benefits and burdens of ownership, and was 
not entitled to interest deductions, because the "loop nonrecourse debt was not genuine indebtedness 
- "the lenders did not relinquish the use of the money except for the brief one-day loop ... [and 
neither] Wells Fargo nor the tax-exempt entity ever had the use of the funds" - the court held 
alternatively that the transactions lacked economic substance under the standards of Coltec 
Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (F3d. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007). The 
. transactions lacked objective economic substance because the source of the non-tax economic 
benefit to Wells Fargo, when the SILOs terminated was merely the return of its investment, plus the 
interest earned . 
... Wells Fargo could have realized this same return simply by investing in the 
portfolio of the equity defeasance arrangement, without involving the [counter-
parties] ... in any way .... 
... Though the mountains of paper defy comprehension without careful study, the 
bottom line is that the SILOs provide no reasonable possibility of profit at all, 
absent a claim for the tax deductions. 
Wells Fargo's cost of funds alone turns the SILOs into a losing proposition. Wells 
Fargo's witness ... agreed that the cash-on-cash, non-tax return calculated is less 
than Wells Fargo's cost of funds for its leasing business .... 
... [W]hen all transactional and funding costs are considered, the non-tax return is 
negative. Thus, if not for the tax deductions, no rational business entity would 
seriously contemplate a SILO transaction. 
• The transactions failed the subjective branch of the economic 
substance test because they had no non-tax business purpose . 
... Without the claimed tax benefits, and without the company's tax capacity to 
use the claimed tax benefits, Wells Fargo would not have entered into the SILO 
transactions .... The motivating reason for the Wells Fargo SILOs was the desire 
to reduce the company's taxes as much as possible. There were no non-tax 
reasons that would justify Wells Fargo's entering into these transactions. 
The lack of any arms' length negotiations of many substantive terms is a further 
indication of a questionable transaction. The key terms of the SILOs were 
determined by tax considerations, and Wells Fargo'S constraints to eliminate risk. 
The transaction terms were more the product of a software model, than any 
negotiations or commercial realities. 
• The court distinguished Consolidated Edison Co. of New 
York v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6966 (2009), as a "distinctly unique" 
case, and found the transactions in Wells Fargo to be like those in AWG Leasing Trust v. United 
States, 592.F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ohio 2008), and BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 
2008), aff'g 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-376 (M.D. N.C. 2007), in which deductions from LILO 
transactions were disallowed. 
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10. Confining the Frank Lyon Co. Result to its facts as understood by the ( 
Supreme Court. "The Court [in Frank Lyon CO.] also emphasized, in contrast to this case 
the transaction did not create any tax deductions, because Lyon and Worthen paid taxes at 
the same rate." Altria Group, Inc. v. United States, 694 F.3d 259 (S.D. N.Y. 3/16/10). In a 
refund suit involving several SILO and LILO tax shelters with respect to infrastructure originally 
owned by tax indifferent parties, a jury rendered a verdict for the government, fmding that the 
transactions lacked economic substance. On the taxpayer's motion for judgment as a matter of 
law and, alternatively, for a new trial, Judge Holwell ruled in favor of the government. He 
generically described the four transactions as follows: 
In each transaction, Altria immediately leased the asset back to its original owner 
using agreements with a number of unusual features, including complete 
defeasance (prepayment, in essence) of the lessee's rent and an owner's option to 
repurchase the asset. Altria then claimed depreciation, amortization, interest 
expense, and transaction expense deductions on its 1996 and 1997 corporate tax 
return based on its newly acquired assets, even though (i) its purchase money 
immediately was invested in securities that the nominal lessees could not access 
without providing substitute collateral, and (ii) the lessees could reacquire the 
assets without incurring any out-of-pocket costs. 
• In the course of extensive discussion of the import of Frank 
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), Judge Holwell deftly confmed that case to its facts 
as understood by the Supreme Court, stating, "The Court also emphasized, in contrast to this case 
the transaction did not create any tax deductions, because Lyon and Worthen paid taxes at the same 
rate." Referring again to the Supreme Court's Frank Lyon decision, he observed: "The Supreme 
Court, however, has expressly indicated that a transaction's effect on the U.S. Treasury must inform 
a federal court's analysis of whether a transactional form chosen selected by a taxpayer should be 
respected for federal tax purposes." Judge Holwell went on to discuss of the application of a flexible 
economic substance doctrine test under Second Circuit precedent, but he described it all as "dicta" (" 
in light of the jury's verdict. He described Second Circuit law as requiring "an analysis under which 
the fact fmder must consider both aspects of the economic substance inquiry, and may (but need not) 
fmd against the taxpayer if a transaction lacks either a legitimate business purpose or an economic 
effect." On this basis, the court rejected Altria's argument that because the facts established that it 
that it expected to receive a non-taxbased return of 2.5% to 3.8% from the transactions it was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law "[T]he jury's fmding that Altria lacked a legitimate business 
purpose for entering the transactions, even if at the limits of what present doctrine allows, was 
sufficient to support its economic substance verdict." 
• Note that under new § 7701(0), if a court applies the 
economic substance doctrine to transactions entered into after 3/30/1 0, it must apply a conjunctive 
test under which the claimed tax benefits must be disallowed unless (1) the transaction changes the 
taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way apart from Federal income tax effects and (2) the 
taxpayer has a substantial business purpose, apart from Federal income tax effects, for entering into 
such transaction. 
11. Partnership anti-abuse rules are applied to eliminate losses in a 
transaction that lacked economic substance. Did this court initiate the use of Reg. § 1.701-
2? NY Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-830 (S.D. Miss. 4/30/10). The 
District Court upheld the IRS recharacterization of a tax shelter strategy involving KPMG, called 
the Family Office Customized Strategy (FOCus) in eleven separate actions challenging final 
partnership administrative adjustments (FPAAs). The court agreed with the IRS that the 
transactions were subject to recharacterization under the anti abuse rules of Reg. § 1.701-2. The 
tax matters partner in all of the proceedings was James Kelly Williams who had substantial gains 
in tax years 2001 and 2002. The ·transaction developed by KPMG utilized a multiple tier 
structure, the creation of a fund of funds LLC, an alternative investment fund LLC and a third 
tier LLC that invested in collared long and short currency futures with Credit Suisse First 
Boston. Gains on long positions were invested in CDs with Credit Suisse, suspended losses on 
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( short positions remained in the investment funds. The tax shelter investor then purchased the 
funds to acquire the suspended losses with a capital contribution, in the form of debt guarantees 
with Credit Suisse, to establish basis. The transaction was blessed with opinions from the Arnold 
Porter firm. The court recognized these transactions as artificial high basis transactions described 
in Notice 2000-44,2000-36 I.R.B. 255 (BOSS and Son of Boss type transactions). While noting 
that the BOSS type transactions had been challenged by the IRS, the court also indicated that 
KPMG hoped that the FOCus strategy was structured in a way that would avoid IRS scrutiny and 
did not register the deal as an abusive tax shelter. The court found that "the central point in 2001 
of following the strategy being promoted by KPMG was to ameliorate Williams' tax situation, 
regardless of Williams' investment activity," After a lengthy analysis of economic substance 
cases, the court stated that "the FOCus steps were a series of transactions lacking economic 
substance and comprising an abusive tax shelter designed to permit an investor such as James 
Kelley Williams to purchase losses embedded in a tiered partnership structure and to reduce 
substantially, if not entirely, his federal tax liability for the 2001 tax year in a manner 
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K." The court also refused to conflate the FOCus 
generated losses with subsequent successful investments with the hedge fund, the NCR 
Bricolage companies, that managed the investments. Thus, the court held that the IRS 
appropriately recast the transaction under Reg. § 1.701-2 to deny the losses. With regard to the 
IRS assertion of penalties, the court held that James Kelly Williams was required to raise any 
reasonable cause and good faith defenses in a separate partner level refund action. The court 
sustained imposition of 20 percent understatement of income and 20 percent negligence penalties 
(which are not stacked) on the partnerships and rejected the partnerships' assertions that the 
FOCus positions were supported by substantial authority and that the partnerships could have 
reasonably relied on the advice of professionals. 
a. Different District Court, same result. Fidelity International 
Currency Advisor A Fund LLC v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2403, 2010-1 U.S.T.C. 
~50,418 (D. Mass. 5/17/10). Richard Egan (a former ambassador to Ireland) was one of the 
founders of EMC Corporation, a large publically traded entity that developed computer storage 
devices. In order to avoid tax on $200 million capital gain resulting from sales of EMC stock, 
Egan entered into paired options arrangements through partnership investments devised by 
KPMG, with opinions from Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, with Fidelity International Currency 
Advisors and Fidelity High Tech Advisor A Fund as general partners (Son-of Boss type 
transactions), and a separate transaction designed to offset ordinary gains described as a financial 
derivatives strategy designed to generate U.S. losses offset with offshore gains attributed to a 
non-US taxpayer. In an opinion in excess of 350 pages, finding that the transactions were shams 
lacking economic substance the court (Judge Saylor) described the transactions as "entirely 
irrational; they were unnecessarily and extravagantly expensive, and did not hedge the purported· 
risks effectively (or at all) .... the transactions were designed and intended to lose money, and in 
fact did so." With respect to the taxpayer's argument that § 752 allowed a basis increase for the 
long option positions while not treating the short positions as liabilities, the court stated that, "If 
the tax system depended entirely on form over substance, the argument might well pass muster. 
[par.] But tax liabilities are not so easy to dodge. It would be absurd to consider offsetting 
options - purchased and sold at the same time, and with the same counterparties - as separate 
items, and to act as if the one item existed and the other did not. That is particularly true where 
(as here) the individual option positions were gigantic, and might bankrupt the taxpayer or the 
options dealer if no offset were in place." Rejecting the taxpayers' claim of reasonable reliance 
on tax opinions, the court described the opinions as "fraudulent" and indicated that "[t]he Egans 
knew that the opinion letters were simply part of the tax shelter scheme, and did not for a 
moment believe that they were receiving independent legal advice after a full disclosure of all 
underlying facts." The court ultimately held, among other things, that neither transaction had 
business purpose and both lacked economic substance, that the intermediate steps of the 
transactions should be disregarded under the step transaction doctrines and that the transaction 
should be treated as a single integrated transaction, and that the partnerships would be 
disregarded under the anti-abuse regulation § 1.701-2. Although the court found that there were 
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no grounds to assert reasonable reliance defenses to penalties, the court indicated that it lacked 
jurisdiction to determine whether specific penalties, determined in individual partners' 
proceedings, should be assessed against members or partners. . 
12 . The Court of Federal Claims denied retroactive application of the 
regulations, but slammed the door on the digital options strategy on economic substance 
grounds and upholds penalties. Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 
636 (Fed. Cl. 7/31/08). The Welles family recognized substantial capital gain on disposition of 
50 percent of the family residential entry door business for $455 million. Prior to sale the family 
transferred their stock holdings in the family corporation, Therma-Tru, to a family investment 
partnership, Stobie Creek. The partnership, through single rnember LLCs, participated in the 
Jenkens & Gilchrist digital options strategy, to no avail according to the Court of Federal Claims. 
In an extraordinarily detailed and lengthy opinion, the court held: 
• Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160, establishes 
that the contingent nature of the short sold position in foreign currency prevents a reduction in basis 
for a reduction in partnership liabilities on distribution of property from the partnership. Thus the 
potential liability on the open currency option did not reduce the taxpayers' basis in distributed 
Therma-Tru stock, whose basis was increased by the purchase price of the short options. 
• Retroactive application of Reg. § 1.752-6 is not justified by 
§ 309 of the Community. Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309, 114 Stat. 
2763A-587, -638. That provision was aimed at corporate transactions and is focused on the use of 
contingent liabilities to accelerate or duplicate losses. The court opined that, "The transfers of the 
contingent liabilities in the cases at bar resulted in increasing each partner's outside basis, but did 
not cause any acceleration or duplication of losses." 
• Judge Miller held that the long and short digital options were 
two options, not one as contended by the government. 
• Judge Miller dismissed Notice 2000-44, which was issued in 
August 2000, after the transactions occurred but before they were reported by taxpayers in 2001, as 
follows: 
[The government's] argument misunderstands the import of IRS notices. As a 
general proposition, IRS notices are press releases stating the IRS's position on a 
particular issue and informing the public of its intentions; such notices do not 
constitute legal authority. . ... Whether [taxpayers] had "notice" that their 
transactions would be subject to scrutiny has no bearing on whether a Treasury 
regulation, seeking retroactively to effect a change in the law, can serve to 
disallow [taxpayers'] reporting position. 
• Nonetheless, under Coltee Industries, Ine. v. United States, 
454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the partnership transaction in options lacked economic substance. 
The court indicated that in· Coltee, "The Federal Circuit thus adopted a disjunctive test for 
determining whether a transaction should be disregarded as an economic sham: the doctrine should 
apply and a transaction should be disregarded either if the transaction lacks objective economic 
substance or if it is subjectively shaped solely by tax avoidance motivations." After an exhaustive 
analysis of conflicting expert. opinions, the court found that, "the weight of the evidence 
overwhelms plaintiffs' claim that the transactions were investments motivated by a business 
purpose to return a profit." The court also interpreted Coltee as holding that, "if a transaction was 
shaped solely by a tax-avoidance purpose, the fact that the transaction may have some objective 
economic reality cannot save it from being disregarded as an economic sham." As to the taxpayers' 
subjective purpose, the court found that, "Plaintiffs' limited evidence of non-tax avoidance 
subjective motivation does not imbue the transactions with economic substance." 
• The court also applied the step transaction doctrine to deny 
the claimed tax benefits. The court stated, "Trial established that, under either the interdependence 
test or the end result test, the step transaction doctrine applies to plaintiffs' transactions. 
Accordingly, the tax consequences must tum on the substance of the transaction and not on the form 
by which plaintiffs engaged in it. In disregarding the predetermined steps of the J&G strategy, 
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( Stobie Creek is unable to claim a basis increase in the Therma-Tru stock, and the capital gains must 
be taxed according to the reality of the transaction." 
• The court upheld accuracy and negligence penalties and 
rejected the taxpayers' claims that they reasonably relied on the advice of counsel. The court 
concluded that because of the built-in conflict of interest of the lawyers promoting the transaction 
that was known to the taxpayers, reliance on the legal opinions was not reasonable. 
a. Affirmed, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2848 (Fed. Cir. 6/11/10). The 
Federal Circuit (Judge Prost) affirmed the Court of Federal Claims on both the merits and on the 
penalty issue. The court found that the offsetting options, while separate transactions for tax 
purposes (under "a literal application of the tax code at that time"), were to be "properly treated 
as a single, unified transaction" for economic substance ("economic reality") purposes. This led 
to the conclusion that "they similarly should not be separate for the purpose of calculating the 
taxpayers' basis in Stobie Cr~ek," and the taxpayers' claimed basis of $204,575,000 was 
disregarded "as lacking economic reality." 
• The key paragraphs of the opinion relating to penalties are: 
Similarly, the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Jeffrey Welles 
knew or should have known that SLK was an agent of J & G, and thus could not 
reasonably rely on SLK's advice. SLK's agency relation-ship was apparent from 
the beginning. Waterman referred the Welleses to J & G, presented the strategy at 
the Vero Beach meeting, and recommended the strategy. As was true for J & G, 
SLK's fee agreement made clear that SLK had a financial stake in the outcome, 
again tying compensation to the sheltered gain. SLK also helped implement the 
strategy by drafting and backdating documents for the different corporate entities. 
In-deed, SLK openly acknowledged its role in a letter to the Welleses. The letter 
stated that the lower taxable gain that would be reported on Stobie Creek's return 
was "produced by the tax strategy that was developed by [J & G] and implemented 
with our [SLK's] help earlier this year." The trial court found that Jeffrey Welles 
received this letter. Based on that and other evidence presented at trial; it was 
reasonable for the trial court to infer that Jeffrey Welles (and thus Stobie Creek) knew 
or should have known about the conflicts of interest for J & G and SLK. It was not 
objectively reasonable for Jeffrey Welles to ignore evidence of these conflicts and 
continue to rely on the advice, regardless of the Welleses' longstanding relationship 
with SLK or the reputations of both firms. 
Even if Jeffrey Welles had not known about the conflicts of interest, his reliance 
on the advice ofSLK and J & G was still unreasonable. Based on Jeffrey Welles's 
education and experience, as well as the reason the. Welleses pursued the J & G 
strategy, the trial court found that Jeffrey Welles should have known that the J & 
G strategy was "too good to be true." Cj Neonatology, 299 F.3d at 234. This 
determination is not clearly erroneous. Jeffrey Welles was a highly educated 
professional with extensive experience in finance, having worked as an 
investment banker and as the manager of his family'S complex finances. Stobie 
Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 715. In that managerial role, he had helped implement a 
number of sophisticated tax-planning strategies, giving hini sufficient knowledge 
and experience to know when a tax-planning strategy was likely "too good to be 
true.;' Jeffrey Welles knew that the J & G strategy was marketed as a "Basis 
Enhancing Derivatives Structure" and that the purpose of the strategy was to 
boost the basis in capital assets, "generating a reduced gain for tax purposes." 
Moreover, Jeffrey Welles sought out and selected the ~ & G strategy because of a 
desire to avoid taxes that would otherwise be owed on the Therma-Tru deal, not 
because he wanted to structure the deal itself to minimize taxes. 
13. Even this Tax Court Judge's gullibility has limits. A "should" opinion 
by PWC that the transaction was not a disguised sale isn't worth the paper it was printed 
on, which resulted in a penalty of $36,691,796. Reliance on an opinion issued by an advisor 
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who was actively involved in developing and structuring a transaction was unreasonable ( 
because the advisor faced an inherent conflict of interest. Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 
T.C. No.9 (8/5/10). In 1999, a member ofthe taxpayer's consolidated group that manufactured 
tissues, WISCO, contributed substantially all of its assets to an LLC in exchange for a 5-percent 
interest in the LLC, which assumed most of WISCO's liabilities and which simultaneously 
distributed $755 million of cash to WISCO. The remaining 95 percent interest in the LLC was 
owned by Georgia Pacific. The $755 million was obtained through a bank loan to the LLC 
guaranteed by Georgia Pacific, for which WISCO provided a circumscribed indemnity regarding 
the principal, but not the interest (which required Georgia Pacific first to look to the LLC's assets 
and which also provided WISCO an increased interest in the LLC if it paid the indemnity). 
WISCO used the cash to pay a $151 million dividend to Canal and repay intercompany loans. 
WISCO's only assets thereafter were a $151 note from Canal and a $6 million corporate jet. 
Subsequently, the LLC borrowed funds from a subsidiary of Georgia Pacific to retire the bank 
loan. The taxpayer received a "should" opinion from PWC that the 1999 transaction would not 
be treated as an asset sale and gain would be deferred, for which it paid flat fee of $800,000. The 
fee was due only if the opinion was a "should" opinion, and only upon the closing of the joint 
venture transaction. In 2001, WISCO sold its LLC interest to Georgia Pacific for $1 million, and 
Georgia Pacific then sold the entire interest in the LLC to an unrelated party. The taxpayer 
treated the 1999 transacti0n as a contribution to the LLC and the receipt of a "debt-financed 
transfer of consideration," for which Reg. § 1.707-5(b) provides an exception to the disguised 
sale rules to the extent the distribution does not exceed the distributee partner's share of the 
partnership liabilities under § 752. (However, for financial accounting purposes taxpayer 
reported the transaction as a sale.) The IRS asserted that the 1999 transaction was a disguised 
sale under § 707(a)(2)(B), because WISCO did not have any allocable share of the liability. The 
taxpayer argued that WISCO's indemnity of Georgia Pacific's guaranty imposed the economic 
risk of loss for the LLC debt on WISCO, and thus WISCO's share of the debt equaled the 
distribution. The IRS asserted that WISCO's indemnity agreement should be disregarded under (' 
the anti-abuse rule for allocation of partnership debt: Reg. § 1.752-20)(1) and (3) provides that a 
partner's obligation to make a payment may be disregarded if (1) the facts and circumstances 
indicate that a principal purpose of the arrangement between the parties is to eliminate the 
partner's risk of loss or to create a facade of the partner's bearing the economiC risk of loss with 
respect to the obligation, or (2) the facts and circumstances of the transaction evidence a plan to 
circumvent or avoid the obligation. The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) agreed with the IRS that the 
transactions had to be viewed together and they constituted a disguised sale under § 707(a)(2)(B) 
rather than a tax-free contribution to a partnership under § 721. Taking into account all of the 
facts, including the facts that (1) Georgia Pacific did not require the indemnity, but it was 
included because the taxpayer's tax advisor concluded that it was necessary in order to avoid the 
disguised sale rules, (2) the indemnity's provisions minimized the likelihood that it would ever 
be invoked, and (3) the taxpayer's representations to Moody's and Standard & Poor's that the 
only risk associated with the transaction was the tax risk, Judge Kroupa found that the indemnity 
agreement was crafted to limit any potential liability to WISCO's assets, which were insufficient 
to cover more than a small fraction of the indemnity.'Accordingly, the indemnity agreement was 
disregarded, and the distribution of cash to WISCO was not protected by the debt-financed 
transfer exception to the disguised sale rules. The 1999 transaction was a sale of WISCO's 
assets. The court said, "Chesapeake [taxpayer's predecessor] used the indemnity to create the 
appearance that WISCO bore the economic risk of loss for the LLC debt when in substance the 
risk was borne by GP." Among the circumstances considered by the court was that Chesapeake 
represented that its only risk on the transaction was the tax risk. 
• Judge Kroupa also upheld the imposition a substantial 
understatement penalty under § 6662(a) in the amount of $36,691,796. Even though the taxpayer 
received a "should" opinion from PWC that the 1999 transaction would not be treated as an asset 
sale and gain would be deferred, the "reasonable cause exception of § 6664( c)(1) did not apply, 
because (1) "the opinion was riddled with questionable conclusions and unreasonable assumptions," 
and (2) PWC was actively involved in planning the transaction and its opinion was tainted by a ( 
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( conflict of interest, which caused it have "crossed over the line from trusted adviser for prior 
accounting purposes to advocate for a position with no authority that was based on an opinion with 
a high price tag-$800,000." She described the opinion as "littered with typographical errors, 
disorganized and incomplete." Judge Kroupa concluded that PWC's opinion was based on the size 
of its fee, rather than on legal reasoning, stating as follows: 
We are also nonplused by Mr. Miller's failure to give an understandable response 
when asked at trial how PWC could issue a "should" opinion if no authority on 
point existed. He demurred that it was what Chesapeake requested. The only 
explanation that makes sense to the Court is that no lesser level of comfort would 
have commanded the $800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for the opinion. 
• Judge Kroupa found that the taxpayer "essentially bought an 
insurance policy as to the taxability of the transaction," and continued to conclude as follows: 
PWC's opinion looks more like a quid pro quo arrangement than a true tax 
advisory opinion. If we were to bless the closeness of the relationship, we would 
be providing carte blanche to promoters to provide a tax opinion as part and 
parcel of a promotion. Independence of advisers is sacrosanct to good faith 
reliance. We fmd that PWC lacked the independence necessary for Chesapeake to 
establish good faith reliance. We further find that Chesapeake did not act with 
reasonable cause or in good faith in relying on PWC's opinion. 
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions." 
1 . Now let me get this straight. I followed the Code and Regs 
meticulously, claimed my loss deduction, but it was disallowed because I really had no 
possibility of actually making money on the deal and all I was looking for was a nice tax 
loss, and even though I've got this letter from my lawyer saying the deduction is 100% 
legal, I'm still looking at a 40 percent penalty on the deficiency. But my neighbor who 
deducted the cost of his kid's college education as a business expense, which every 
kindergartner knows you can't do, doesn't have to pay any penalty because he's dumb and 
his dumb, but probably honest, CPA said it was OK. Say What!? Well, we don't have to 
"know it when we see it" because Congress has defined it for us. The 2010 Health Care 
Reconciliation Act added new Code § 7701 (0), codifying the economic substance doctrine, 
which has been applied by the courts for several decades as a judicial interpretive doctrine to 
disallow tax benefits otherwise available under a literal reading of the Code and regulations. 
• Background - Codification of the economic substance 
doctrine has been on the legislative agenda many times since early in the first decade of this century, 
or for the past ten years (for those of us still hung up on Y2K). The move for codification was 
motivated in part by the insistence of not a few tax practitioners that the economic substance 
doctrine simply was not actually a legitimate element of the tax doctrine, notwithstanding its 
application by the courts in many cases over several decades. This argument was based on the 
assertion that the Supreme Court had never actually applied the economic substance doctrine to 
deny a taxpayer any tax benefits, ignoring the Supreme Court's decision in Knetsch v. United States, 
364 U.S. 361 (1960), and instead focusing on the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Cottage 
Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), and Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 
U.S. 561 (1978), in which a transaction that on the facts showed the total lack of "economic 
substance" was upheld. Congressional concern was intensified by the decision of the Court of 
Federal Claims in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004), vacated and 
remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007), which questioned 
the continuing viability of the doctrine, stating that "the use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to 
trump 'mere compliance with the Code' would violate the separation of powers." See STAFF OF TIlE 
JOINT COMMITIEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF TIlE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF TIlE 
"RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WIlli TIlE "PATIENT PROTECTION 
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 144 (JCX-18-10 3/21110); However, in that case the trial court found 
that the particular transaction at issue in the case did not lack economic substance, and thus the trial 
court did not actually rule on its validity, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
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vacated the Court of Federal Claims decision and, reiterating the validity of the economic substance ( 
doctrine and, in the opinion of some, expanding it greatly, held that transaction in question lacked 
economic substance. Although the economic substance doctrine has been articulated in a number of 
different manners by different courts over the years, its purpose is aptly described by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Coltec Industries v. United States, supra. 
The economic substance doctrine· represents a judicial effort to enforce the 
statutory purpose of the tax code. From its inception, the economic substance 
doctrine has been used to prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative 
purpose of the tax code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack 
economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit. In this regard, the economic 
substance doctrine is not unlike other canons of construction that are employed in 
circumstances where the literal terms of a statute can undermine the ultimate 
purpose of the statute. 
• . The modem articulation of the doctrine traces its roots back 
to Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), where the Court upheld the taxpayer's 
treatment of an early version of a SILO, stating as follows: 
[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic 
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is 
imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax 
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should 
honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties. 
• This passage - which sets forth a statement as to what was 
sufficient for economic substance, but which was subsequently interpreted to be a statement as to 
what was necessary for economic substance3 - has led courts to two different formulations of the 
economic substance doctrine. One, the so-called "conjunctive test" requires that a transaction have 
both (1) economic substance and (2) a non-tax business purpose in order to be respected for tax 
purposes. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. ( 
2009); Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993); James v. Commissioner, 899 
F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1990); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.9 (2009); 
Coltec, supra. Under the other formulation, the so called "disjunctive test," represented principally 
by IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th Cir. 2001), and Rice's Toyota World, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), a transaction would be respected for tax purposes if it 
had either (1) economic substance and (2) a non-tax business purpose. Yet a third articulation 
appeared inACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 
1017 (1999), where the court concluded that, that "these distinct aspects of the economic sham 
inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step analysis,' but rather represent related 
factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart 
from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes." The courts also have differed with 
respect to the nature of the non-tax economic benefit a taxpayer is required to establish to 
demonstrate that a transaction has economic substance. Some courts required a potential economic 
profit. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 
F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). Other courts have applied the 
economic substance doctrine to disallow tax benefits where - even though the taxpayer was exposed 
to risk and the transaction had a profit potential - compared to the tax benefits, the economic risks 
and profit potential were insignificant. Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990); Goldstein, 
supra. Yet other courts have asked whether a stated business benefit - for example, cost reduction, 
as opposed to profit-seeking - of a particular transaction was actually obtained through the 
transaction in question. See Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007). Finally, notwithstanding that several courts have rejected the 
3 Ira believes that the interpretation contains an error in logic which takes a statement from the Frank 
Lyon case as to what is "sufficient" for economic substance and construes it as a statement as to what is 
"necessary" for economic substance. Marty and Dan do not so believe, or think that the alleged error is 
irrelevant. ( 
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( bootstrap argument that an improved fmancial accounting result - derived from tax benefits 
increasing· after-tax profitability - served the valid business purpose requirement, see, e.g., 
American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, a.!f'd, 326 F.3d.737 (6th Cir. 
2003); Wells Fargo & Company v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010), taxpayers continued to 
press such claims. 
• The Codified Economic Substance Doctrine - The 
codification of the economic substance doctrine in new § 7701 (0) clarifies and standardizes some 
applications of the economic substance doctrine when it is applied, but does not establish any rules 
for determining when the doctrine should be applied. According to the legislative history, "the 
provision [I.R.C. § 7701(0){5)(C)] does not change present law standards in determining when to 
utilize an economic substance analysis." See STAFF OF TIlE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF TIlE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF TIlE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," 
AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH TIlE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 
152 (JCX-18-10 3/21110). Thus, "the fact that a transaction meets the requirements for specific 
treatment under any provision of the Code is not determinative of whether a transaction or series of 
transactions of which it is a part has economic substance." Id., at 153. Codification of the economic 
substance doctrine was not intended to alter or supplant any other judicial interpretive doctrines, 
such as the business purpose, substance over form, and step transaction doctrines, any similar rule in 
the Code, regulations, or guidance thereunder; § 7701(0) is intended merely (merely?) to 
supplement all the other rules. Id., at 155. 
• Conjunctive analysis of objective and subjective prongs -
One of the most important aspects of new § 7701(0) is that it requires a conjunctive analysis under 
which a transaction has economic substance only if (1) the transaction changes the taxpayer's 
economic position in a meaningful way apart from Federal income tax effects and (2) the taxpayer 
has a substantial business purpose, apart from Federal income tax effects, for entering into such 
transaction. (The second prong of most versions of the codified economic substance doctrine 
introduced in earlier Congresses added "and the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing 
such purpose." See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 110th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2003). It is not clear what difference in application was intended by adoption of the different final 
statutory language.) This conjunctive test resolves the split between the Circuits (and between the 
Tax Court and certain Circuits) by rejecting the view of those courts that find the economic 
substance doctrine to have been satisfied if there is either (1) a change in taxpayer's economic 
position or (2) a nontax business purpose, see, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 
89 (4th Cir. 1985); IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350,353 (8th Cir.2001). Section 
7701(0)(5)(D) allows the economic substance doctrine to be applied to a single transaction or to a 
series of transactions. The Staff of the Joint Committee Report indicates that the provision "does not 
alter the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when 
applying the doctrine," and gives as an example the courts' ability ''to bifurcate a transaction in 
which independent activities with non-tax objectives are combined with an unrelated item having 
only tax-avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated benefits." 
• Claim of Profit Potential - Section 7701(0)(2) does not 
require that the taxpayer establish profit potential in order to prove that a transaction results in a 
meaningful change in the taxpayer's economic position or that the taxpayer has a substantial non-
Federal-income-tax purpose. Nor does it specify a threshold required return ifthe taxpayer relies on 
the profit potential to try to establish economic substance. (In this respect the enacted version differs 
from earlier proposals that would have required the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction to exceed a risk-free rate of return. See, e.g., H.R. 2345, l10th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); 
H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).) But if the taxpayer does rely on a profit potential claim, then 
the profit potential requires a present value analysis: 
The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into account in determining 
whether the requirements of [the § 7701(0) test for economic substance] are met 
with respect to the transaction only if the present value of the reasonably expected 
pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of 
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the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were 
respected. 
• Thus the analysis of profit potential by the Court of Federal 
Claims in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009), which· 
appears not to have thoroughly taken into account present value analysis, would not stand muster 
under the new provision. In all events, transaction costs must be taken into account in detennining 
pre-tax profits, and the statute authorizes regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as 
expenses in detennining pre-tax profit in appropriate cases. Any State or local income tax effect that 
is related to a Federal income tax effect is treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect. 
Thus, state tax savings that piggy-back on Federal income tax savings cannot provide either a profit 
potential or a business purpose. Similarly, a fmancial accounting benefit cannot satisfy the business 
purpose requirement if the financial accounting benefit originates in a reduction of Federal income 
tax. 
• Don't worry; be happy! /?] - Section 7701(0)(5)(B) 
specifically provides that the statutory modifications and clarifications apply to an individual only 
with respect to "transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity 
engaged in for the production of income." (We wonder what else anybody would have thought they 
might apply to? The home mortgage interest deduction? Charitable contributions of appreciated 
property? How about a Son of Boss transaction where there is no possibility for profit?) More 
importantly, according to STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED, IN 
COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 152-153 (JCX-18-
10 3/21110), "[t]he provision is not intended to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business 
transactions that, under longstanding judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely 
because the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on 
comparative tax advantages." The list of transactions and decisions intended to be immunized for 
the application of the economic substance doctrine includes: 
(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or equity; (2) a 
U.S. person's choice between utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic 
corporation to make a foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a transaction or 
series of transactions that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization 
under subchapter C; and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a 
transaction, provided that the ann's length standard of section 482 and other 
applicable concepts are satisfied. 
• Leasing transactions will continue to be scrutinized based on 
all of the facts and circumstances. 
• Jettisoned along the way - Many earlier versions of the 
codification of economic substance doctrine, some of which were adopted by the House, also 
provided special rules for applying what was essentially a per se lack of economic substance in 
transactions with tax indifferent parties that involved fmancing, and artificial income and basis 
shifting. See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 11 Oth Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). 
These rules did not make it into the enacted version. Special statutory rules for detennining the 
profitability of leasing transactions also did not fmd their way into the final statutory enactment. 
• Penalties, oh what penaltiesl - New §§ 6662(b)(6), in 
conjunction with new § 6664(c)(2), imposes a strict liability 20 percent penalty for an 
underpayment attributable to any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction 
lacking economic substance, within the meaning of new § 7701(0), "or failing to meet the 
requirements of any similar rule of law." (Does that extend to substance versus fonn in a SILO? 
How about business purpose in a purported tax-free reorganization?) The penalty is increased to 40 
percent if the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the relevant facts on the original return or an 
amended return filed before the taxpayer has been contacted for audit - an amended return filed 
after the initial contact cannot cure original sin. I.R.C. § 6664(i). Because the § 6664(c) "reasonable 
cause" exception is unavailable, outside (or in-house) analysis and opinions of counselor other tax 
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( advisors will not insulate a taxpayer from the penalty if a transaction is found to lack economic 
substance. Likewise, new § 6664( d)(2) precludes a reasonable cause defense to imposition of the 
§ 6662A reportable transaction understatement penalty for a transaction that lacks economic 
substance. (Section 6662A( e )(2) has been amended to provide that the § 6662A penalty with respect 
to a reportable transaction understatement does not apply to a transaction that lacks economic 
substance if a 40 percent penalty is imposed under § 6662(i)). A similar no-fault penalty regime 
applies to excessive erroneous refund claims that are denied on the ground that the transaction on 
which the refund claim was based lacked economic substance. I.R.C. § 6676( c). However, under the 
"every dark cloud has a silver lining" maxim, the §§ 6662(b)(6) and 6664(c)(2) penalty regime does 
not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which the § 6663 fraud penalty is imposed. 
• Effective date - Section 7701 (0) and the revised penalty 
rules applies to transactions entered into after the date of enactment and to underpayments, 
understatements, and refunds and credits attributable to transactions entered into after 3/30/10. 
a. Better than a sharp stick in the eye, but not much better. The 
IRS is catching conjunctivitis, weighing in on the conjunctive test. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 
I.R.B. _ (9/13/2010). The IRS indicates ,that it will rely on relevant case law in applying the 
two-pronged conjunctive test for economic substance. Thus, both in determining whether a 
transactions meets both of the requirements of the conjunctive test, the IRS will apply cases 
under the common law economic substance doctrine to determine whether tax benefits are 
allowable because a transaction satisfies the economic substance prong of the economic 
substance doctrine and to determine whether a transaction has a sufficient nontax purpose to 
satisfy the requirement that the tax benefits of a transaction are not allowable because the 
taxpayer lacks a business purpose. The IRS adds that it will challenge taxpayers who seek to rely 
on case law that a transaction will be treated as having economic substance merely because it 
satisfies either of the tests. The IRS also indicates that it anticipates that the law of economic 
substance will continue to evolve and that it "does not intend to issue general administrative 
guidance regarding the types of transactions to which the economic substance doctrine either 
applies or does not apply." . 
• The Notice also indicates that, except for reportable 
transactions, disclosure for purposes of the additional penalty of § 6621 (i) will be adequate if the' 
taxpayer adequately discloses on a timely filed original return, or a qualified amended return the 
relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of the transaction. A disclosure that would be deemed 
adequate under § 6662(d)(2)(B) will be treated as adequate for purposes of § 6662(i). 
C. Disclosure and Settlement 
D. Tax Shelter Penalties, Etc. 
1 . "Everyone's doing it" is not a legal principle. 3K Investment Partners 
v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.6 (9/3/09). In a partnership proceeding to determine whether the 
partnership reasonably relied on tax opinions in a Son-of-Boss tax shelter investment in order to 
avoid § 6662 accuracy related penalties, the partnership sought discovery of all of the Son-of-
Boss tax shelter opinions and a list of firms providing opinions in order to bolster its argument 
that reliance on opinions of Jenkens & Gilchrist was reasonable. In denying the discovery 
motion, the court (Judge Thornton) observed that, "Petitioner's argument appears to be a variant 
of the refrain, familiar to parents of teenagers, that 'Everyone's doing it.' For the same reason 
that this does not constitute reasonable cause for teenagers, it would not constitute reasonable 
cause for petitioner." The court held that the partnership must establish reasonableness based on 
the facts of its own case. The court also rejected the partnership's argument that the undisclosed 
opinions, which the court described as involving only a small subset of tax advisors, disclosed a 
general consensus of tax advisors supported good faith reliance. The court also ruled that the 
undisclosed tax opinions in the possession of the IRS represented confidential taxpayer 
information protected from disclosure under § 6103(a). . 
2. The Seventh Circuit jumps ship on penalties as partnership items. It 
affirmed a District Court holding that no accuracy-related penalties applied in a Son-of-
Boss case because taxpayers were entit~ed to rely on tax opinions. American Boat Company, 
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LLC v. United States, 583 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 10/1/09). David Jump transferred Mississippi river ( 
towboats to American Boat L.L.C. after an accident in which barges broke loose from a tow boat 
and nearly caused a disaster by floating into a casino moored in St. Louis. In a series of Son-of-
Boss transactions, American Boat used Treasury note short sales to increase the basis of its tow 
boats and claim higher depreciation deductions. In a District Court proceeding brought by the 
partnership the trial court held that the Son-of-Boss transactions were shams, but upheld the 
partnership's assertion of a reasonable cause defense under § 6664(c) to accuracy related 
penalties as a partnership item. The government appealed the penalty issue. 
• The court stated that the vast majority of courts have held that 
a partnership may assert a reasonable cause defense as a partnership item on its own behalf based on 
the conduct of its managing or general partner. The court also noted that a partner may not raise the 
partner's own reasonable cause defense in a partnership proceeding, but rejected the IRS argument 
that a reasonable cause defense is limited. The court concluded that a partnership may raise a 
reasonable cause defense on facts and circumstances common to all partners and which relies on 
neither an individual partner's tax return nor his unique conduct. The court further concluded that, 
while it was a close case, the Seventh Circuit was not able to conclude that the District Court 
committed clear error in finding that American Boat, through David Jump, reasonably relied on the 
tax opinion of Erwin Mayer and Jenkens & Gilchrist in reporting the Son-of-Boss transaction. 
, 3. Magistrate Judge Bush decided that valuation misstatement penalties 
are inapplicable in a Son of Boss tax shelter case in which the IRS determined that the 
transaction were shams that lacked economic substance. Bemont Investments LLC v. United 
States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1338 (B.D. Tex. 3/9/10). Magistrate Judge Bush based his decision 
on Weiner v. United States, 389 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 2004), which cited with approval a line of 
cases that held that valuation penalties are not applicable if the IRS's disallowance of tax 
benefits is not "attributable to" a valuation misstatement. 
4 • The IRS states that it will suspend the collection of penalties under 
§ 6707 A from small businesses that "inadvertently" invested in listed tax shelters. 2009 (,' 
TNT 128-15 (7/6/09). Letter from Commissioner Shulman, which reads in part, "Given your 
indication of a commitment to enact legislation to address this issue, and to provide the Congress" 
that opportunity, we will not undertake any collection enforcement action through September 30, 
2009, on cases where the annual tax benefit from the transaction is less than $100,000 for 
individuals or $200,000 for other taxpayers per year." , 
a . The IRS agrees to extend the moratorium through the end of 2009. 
Letter from Commissioner Shulman. 2009 TNT 184-23 (8/24/09. 
b. And again, to extend the moratorium through 41111 O. 2009 TNT 
245-1 (12/23/09). 
c. Yet another extension to 6/1/10.2010 TNT 42-2 (4/3/10). 
• With Congress focused "laser-like" on job creation, no 
legislation on this penalty issue had been enacted as of 8/5/10, although H.R. 5297, the Small 
Business Jobs and Credit Bill of2010 is pending in the Senate. 
d. Relief from tax shelter penalties under § 6707 A for small 
businesses. The § 6707 A penalty is limited to 75 percent of the decrease in tax shown for 
any reportable transaction. Under § 2041 of the Small Business Jobs Act of2010, the § 6707A 
penalty is limited to 75 percent of the decrease in tax shown for any listed or reportable 
transaction. Formerly, penalty imposed for failure to include informa,tion on a listed transaction 
by a taxpayer other than a natural person was $200,000 regardless of how small the claimed 
benefits from the transaction happened to be. The limitation applies to penalties assessed after 
12/31/06. ' 
5. If the tax advisor's fee is big enough, it's not a reliable opinion! 
Murfam Farms. Inc. v. United States, _ Fed. Cl. _,2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 598 (8/16/10). 
The taxpayers conceded that their Son-of-Boss tax shelters lacked economic substance, and the 
only issue was whether the 40 percent accuracy related penalty was properly assessable. The 
court held that the taxpayers had not established that acted with reasonable cause or in good 
faith, and that the penalty waOs properly assessed. Reliance on the advice of E& Y was not 
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reasonable: "Because E& Y had a financial interest in having the Murphys participate in 
COBRA, the firm had an inherent conflict of interest in advising on the legitimacy of that 
transaction." Furthermore, "[t]hat conflict of interest was exacerbated by the fee structure," 
under which E&Y's fee would be a percentage of the taxpayer's desired tax loss. "The Murphys 
knew that E& Y stood to earn millions by advising them to participate in COBRA, and they 
therefore knew or should have known that E& Y' s advice lacked the trustworthiness of an 
impartial opinion." Judge Damich also had a host of other reasons for finding that the taxpayers' 
reliance was not reasonable or in good faith. 
IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING 
A. Exempt Organizations 
1. The IRS gives small exempt organizations until 10/15/10 to comply 
with filing requirements. IR-2010-87 (7/26/10). The IRS has granted relief to small exempt 
organizations that failed to file required returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009 by extending to 
10/15/10 the deadline for complying with filing requirements in order to keep tax exempt status. 
The information release provides for late electronic filing of the Form 990-N, Electronic Notice 
(e-Postcard) and for a voluntary compliance program to file the Form 990-EZ. 
2. Tax Blues for Bluetooth. Bluetooth SIG, Inc. v. United States, 106 
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5163 (9th Cir. 7/8/10). The taxpayer sought tax exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(6) as a "business league." The corporation (1) develops, refines, and adapts the 
Bluetooth speCification, (2) engages in marketing, public relations, and other promotional 
activities designed to influence the acceptance, understanding, and use of Bluetooth enabled 
products, (3) enforces its trademark both by ensuring that its members conform to the "Bluetooth 
Brand Book" and by detecting unauthorized use of the Bluetooth trademark, and (4) operates a 
certification and listing program. The taxpayer had 4,148 members, all of which independent 
businesses. It had three membership classes: Adopters, Associates, and Promoters. Adopters pay 
no annual fee, but pay a listing fee of $10,000 per product. Associates pay an annual fee of either 
$7,500 or $35,000 depending on the size of the manufacturer. They pay a reduced listing fee of 
$5,000 per product and have the right to participate in the continuing development of the 
Bluetooth specification. They receive certain marketing and promotional opportunities that may 
not be available to Adopters. Promoters pay no annual fee but enjoy the same benefits as 
Associates, plus a seat on the board of directors. Each of the original five companies involved 
with the technology has Promoter status. The court affirmed the district court's summary 
judgment that the taxpayer did not qualify for tax exempt status, because it activities were 
activities ordinarily conducted for profit, which is not permitted under Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1. 
Further, the taxpayer's activities were not directed to the improvement of business conditions of 
one or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for 
individual persons. A benefit to nonmembers is a key characteristic of business leagues, but the 
taxpayer did not benefit nonmembers. Rather, the taxpayer engaged in particular services for 
particular member-manufacturers. 
3. The exclusivity of a gated parking lot for the neighborhood beach club 
has a tax price. Ocean Pines Association v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 13 (8/30/10). The 
taxpayer was a homeowners association that was tax-exempt under § 501(c)(4) as a not-for-profit 
organized to promote community welfare. In addition to enforcing zoning and providing roads 
and recreational facilities within Ocean Pines, funded by members' dues (but which were open to 
both members and nonmembers), it operated a beach club and parking lots eight miles from the 
area (Ocean Pines) in which its members lived. The primary beach club facilities (e.g., pool, 
locker room, etc.) and parking lots were accessible only to the association's members and their 
guests, but the snack bar, restaurant, and beach itself were open to the public. The taxpayer 
charged its members a separate fee for parking permits, and maintained a parking permit system 
and guards. It also leased the parking lots to third-party businesses at night and in the off season. 
The taxpayer did not report any of the income as subject to the unrelated business income tax 
(UBIT). The IRS issued a deficiency notice determining that the net income from the parking 
lots and beach club facilities was subject to UBIT, because their operation was not substantially 
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related to the promotion of community welfare. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) upheld the 
deficiency. The court concluded that the operation ofthe beach club and the parking lots did not 
promote community welfare because they were not accessible to nonmembers, i.e., the general 
public. Therefore, unless an exception applied, the income was subject to UBIT. Finally, the 
court held that the § 512(b)(3)(A)(i) exception for rents from real property did not apply, because 
Reg. § 1.512(b )-1 (c)( 5) provides that income from the operation of a parking lot is not rent from 
real property. 
B. Charitable Giving 
1 . The easement has to have some real effect to give rise to a charitable 
contribution deduction. Herman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-205 (9/14/09). Judge 
Gustafson held that a contribution to a charitable organization of an easement burdening 
developable air rights over a certified historic structure owned by another person did not qualify 
for a charitable contribution deduction under § 170(h). The easement did not preclude the 
taxpayer, the structure's owner, or any subsequent purchaser of the property from altering or 
demolishing the structure. Thus, the conservation easement did not preserve an "historically 
important land area" or a "certified historic structure" within the meaning of § 170(h)(4)(A){iv). 
2. A possibly faulty conservation easement deduction saved by local 
preservation laws. Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208 (9/15/09). Judge Wherry 
held that facade conservation easements validly supported a charitable contribution deduction, 
even though they allowed easement holder to consent to changes to the properties, because any 
rehabilitative work or new construction on the facades was required to comply with the 
requirements of all applicable Federal, State, and local government laws and regulations. Reg. 
§ 1.170A-14(d)(5) allows a donation to satisfy the conservation purposes test even if future 
development is allowed, as long as that future development is subject to local, State, and Federal 
laws and regulations. That the properties were already subject to local preservation laws did not 
prevent any charitable contribution deductions, because even though the easements were 
duplicative in some respects, the easements subjected taxpayer to a higher level of enforcement 
than that provided by local law. 
3 . A "gotcha" for the IRS! The Tax Court just says "no" to deductions 
for contributions of conservation easements on mortgaged properties. Kaufman v. 
Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.9 (4/26/10). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that as a matter of 
law no charitable contribution deduction is allowable for the conveyance of an otherwise 
qualifying conveyance of a facade conservation easement if the property is subject to a mortgage 
and the mortgagee has a prior claim to condemnation and insurance proceeds. Because the 
mortgage has priority over the easement, the easement is not protected in perpetuity - which is 
required by § 170(h)(5)(A). The deduction cannot be salvaged by proof that the taxpayer likely 
would satisfy the debt secured by the mortgage. 
4. A personal sperm bank can't qualify as a tax exempt organization. 
Was this foundation founder thinking he could get a tax deduction for producing sperm? 
Free Fertilitv Foundation v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.2 (7/7/10). A not-for-profit corporation 
established for the sole purpose of providing the founder's sperm free of charge to women 
seeking to become pregnant through artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization was held not 
to promote health for the benefit of the community, and thus did not operate for exempt purposes 
and did not qualify for an exemption under § 501(c)(3). The founder and his father were the only 
board members and decided in their sole discretion who would receive the founder's sperm. 
S. Both their house and their claimed charitable contribution deduction 
went up in smoke. District Court denies deduction for about-to-be-demolished house to 
local fire department on "qualified appraisal" and "contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment" grounds, but ducks the issue of whether taxpayers could claim a 
deduction for this type of donation. Hendrix v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5373 (S.D. 
Ohio 7/21110). When the taxpayers found it would cost $10,000 to demolish their house so they 
could build a new house on the land, in 2004 they entered into a transaction under which the 
local fire department could use their house for training and return the cleared land to the 
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( taxpayers. They claimed a charitable contribution deduction of $287,400 - based upon an 
appraisal of $S20,000 for the property. The District Court (Judge Frost) denied the deduction on 
failure to obtain a "qualified appraisal" as required by § 170(f)(11 )(A) and failure to obtain a 
"contemporaneous written acknowledgment" as required by § 170(f)(8). While Judge Frost. did 
not answer the question of whether "taxpayers may be able to Claim a deduction for the type of 
donation involved in this case" if a qualified appraisal and written acknowledgment had been 
obtained, he did include in his opinion that Deloitte & Touche had advised the taxpayers that 
"[ d]onation of property to a fire department is aggressive and not explicitly sanctioned by the 
Internal Revenue Code." 
6. Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 112 
(l0/30/08). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that, as a precondition to using the replacement 
cost approach to valuing real estate, the taxpayer must show that the property is unusual in nature 
and other methods of valuation, such as comparable sales or income capitalization, are not 
applicable. The income approach to valuation is favored only where comparable market sales are 
absent. On the facts, the value of the contribution of a conservation facade easement for an 
historic structure on the edge of the French Quarter in New Orleans was overstated. The 
accuracy-related penalty for gross overvaluation was proper because there was no good faith 
investigation into the value. 
a . Regardless of which valuation method is used, it still must 
relate to the property's "highest and best use." Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. 
Commissioner, 2010-2 U.S.T.C. ~SO,S64 (Sth Cir. 8/10/10). In an opinion by Judge Barksdale, 
the Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court's decision and remanded the case for a determination of 
the easement's value, although it rejected the taxpayer's arguments that the IRS's expert was 
unqualified and that his report was unreliable and should not have been admitted. But the Court 
of Appeals agreed with the taxpayers' argument that the Tax Court "miscomprehended the 
highest and best use" of the building subjected to the conservation easement, and thereby 
undervalued the easement. 
In sum, the tax court erred in declining to consider the Maison Blanche and Kress 
buildings' highest and best use in the light of both the reasonable and probable 
condominium regime and the reasonable and probable combination. of those 
buildings into a single functional unit, both of which foreclosed the realistic 
possibility, for valuation purposes, that the Kress and Maison Blanche buildings 
could come under separate ownership. This combination affected the buildings' 
fair market value. 
• As result the court did not reach the Tax Court's holding that 
the income and replacement-cost methods of valuation were inapplicable and directed the tax court 
to consider those methods, in addition to comparable sales method on remand. Because the holding 
on the valuation was vacated, the Tax Court's holding that the gross overvaluation penalty also was 
vacated. 
7 . "Praise the Lord, [but] pass the ammunition." Or, is it that the judge 
was hypertechnical? Lord v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-196 (9/8/10). Charitable 
contribution deduction for a conservation easement was denied because the appraisal in the 
amount of $242,000 submitted to comply with Reg. 1.170A-13( c )(2)(i)(A) was not a "qualified 
appraisal." The Tax Court (Jude Foley) held that this was because the appraisal itself did not 
include: (1) the easement contribution date); (2) the date the appraisal was performed; or (3) the 
appraised fair market value of the easement contribution on the contribution date. Judge Foley 
further held that the doctrine of substantial compliance was not applicable because significant 
information was omitted from the appraisal. 
• The background facts were that taxpayer granted a deed of 
. conservation easement to the Land Preservation Trust on 12/30/99; that the Paige Appraisal 
Company produced an appraisal report [stating the fair market value of the easement] with an 
effective date of 12/31/99; and that the report date was 114/00. 
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x. TAXPROCEDURE ( 
A. Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions 
1. Increased penalty for failure to file on time. For returns required to be 
filed after December 31, 2008, the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax ACt of 2008 
increases the minimum penalty failure to file a return on time to the lesser of$135 or 100 percent· 
of the tax required to be shown on the return. 
a. Increased penalties for failing to timely file partnership and S 
corporation returns. Section 16 of the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Act of 2009 
(WHABA) amends §§ 6698 and 6699 to increase the penalty for failing to file a partnership or S 
corporation tax return from $89 to $195. 
2. No free trade agreement for SSNs. T.D. 9437, Amendments to the 
Section 7216 Regulations - Disclosure or Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 73 F.R. 
76216 (12/16/08). This Treasury Decision amends Reg. § 301.7216-3(b)(4) to permit disclosure 
by a tax return preparer of a taxpayer's SSN to another tax return preparer located outside the 
United States only with the taxpayer's consent. The amended regulation applies to disclosures of 
tax return information occurring on or after 1/1/09. 
a. But there is some freedom for preparers to use taxpayer return 
information to increase their own profitability. T.D. 9478, Amendments to the Section 7216 
Regulations - Disclosure or Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 75 F.R. 48 (12/29/09). 
Temp. Reg, § 301.7216-2T(n) allows preparers to compile, maintain, and use a list containing 
solely the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, phone numbers, taxpayer entity classification, and 
income tax return form numbers of taxpayers whose tax returns the tax return preparer has 
prepared, if the list is used only to contact the taxpayers on the list either (1) to provide tax, 
general business, or economic information for educational purposes, or (2) for soliciting 
.additional tax return preparation services. Temp. Reg. § 301.7216-2T(p) allows return preparers 
to disclose return information without penalty for the purpose of a quality or peer review, but 
only to the extent necessary to accomplish the review. The information also may be used to (, 
perform a conflict of interest check. Identical proposed regulations were published 
simultaneously. REG-131028-09, Amendments to the Section 7216 Regulations - Disclosure or 
Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 75 F.R. 94 (12/29/09). 
(1) Rev. Rul. 2010-5, 2010-4 I.R.B. 312 (12/30/09). This 
revenue ruling provides further guidance and allows disclosure of return information to a return 
preparer's malpractice 'carrier to the extent necessary to obtain insurance or to defend against 
claims; to defend claims, the tax return itself may be disclosed and it may be disclosed to 
attorneys engaged to defend against the claim. 
(2) Rev. RuI.201O-4, 2010-4 I.R.B. 309 (12/30/09). This 
revenue ruling provides further guidance and details circumstances that justify use of lists to 
contact clients and allowing disclosure of information to a third-party provider who prepares the 
mailings. 
3. IRS gets addicted to announcing amnesty for offshore tax cheats. IRS 
News Release IR-2003-05, 2003 TNT 10-11 (1/14/03). An Offshore Voluntary Compliance 
Initiative provided that "eligible taxpayers," who used offshore payment cards or other offshore 
financial arrangements' to hide their income, may avoid civil fraud and information return 
penalties (but not failure to pay tax or accuracy-related penalties) if they come forward and pay 
up by 4/15/03 and provide full details on those who promoted or solicited the offshore scheme. 
Promoters and solicitors are not eligible. The information release contains the following 
example: 
For example, a taxpayer who understated his income to avoid $100,000 in taxes in 
1999 would wind up paying $149,319 to the government. This includes the tax 
liability plus $29,319 in interest and an additional accuracy-related penalty of 
$20,000. 
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( a. Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-1 C.B. 311 (1/14/03). This revenue 
procedure contained detailed procedures for the Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative, 
including as an exhibit the "specific matters closing agreement" to be executed.by the taxpayer. 
b. Liechtenstein! IR-2008-26 (2/26/08). The IRS announced that it 
was initiating enforcement action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers in connection with 
accounts in Liechtenstein. According to a story in the 2/19/08 Wall Street Journal, (a) Heinrich 
Kieber, a former employee of Liechtenstein's largest bank, LGT Group, has offered confidential 
client data to tax authorities on several continents over the past 18 months, and (b) the German 
government paid roughly €4.2 million ($6.4 million) to an unnamed individual for the same type 
of information. 
c. UBS settles with the Justice Department for $780 million. On 
2/18/09, the Swiss bank UBS agreed to pay $780 million under a deferred prosecution agreement 
over the bank's offshore services to U.S. taxpayers. It also agreed to hand over the names and 
account information of some of these taxpayers; however, there were indications that only 250 
client names out of 19,000 account holders were being disclosed. 2009 TNT 31-1. 
d. The 2009 version is much less of an amnesty than the 2003 
version. On 3126/09, the IRS announced several programs relating to penalties on voluntarily 
disclosed offshore accounts. They have a 3/23/09 effective date, and are good for six months. 
Several internal memoranda explain how the IRS intends to process voluntary disclosure claims 
made regarding offshore accounts. 2009 TNT 57-2. 
• These memoranda include one on examinations of offshore 
transactions, 2009 TNT 57-32; one on the routing ofvoluntary disclosure cases, 2009 TNT 57-33; 
and one authorizing a new penalty structure for voluntary disclosures, 2009 TNT 57-34. 
e. IR-2009-84 (9/21109). The filing deadline for the voluntary 
disclosure was extended to 10/15/09, and the IRS announced there would be no further 
extensions. 
f. The instructions for the new FBAR are FUBAR. IR-2009-58 
and Announcement 2009-51, 2009-25 I.R.B. 1105 (6/5/09). The IRS announced that for the 
Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBARs) due on 6/30/09, filers of Form TD F 
90-22.1 (Rev. 10-2008) need not comply with the new instruction relating to the definition of a 
United States Person, i.e.: 
United States Person. The term "United States person" means a citizen or 
resident of the United States, or a person in and doing business in the United 
States. See 31 C.F.R. 103.11(z) for a complete definition of 'person.' The United 
States includes the states, territories and possessions of the United States. See the 
definition of United States at 31 C.F.R. 103.11(nn) for a complete definition of 
United States. A foreign subsidiary of a United States person is not required to 
file this report, although its United States parent corporation may be required to 
do so. A branch of a foreign entity that is doing business in the United States is 
required to file this report even if not separately incorporated under U.S. law. 
• Instead, for this year, taxpayers and others can rely on the 
definition of a United States person included in the instruction to the prior fonn (7-2000): 
United States Person. The term "United States person" means: (1) a citizen or 
resident of the United States; (2) a domestic partnership; (3) a domestic 
corporation; or (4) a domestic estate or trust. 
q. Notice 2009-62, 2009-35 I.R.B. 260 (8/7/09). By this notice, the 
IRS extended the filing deadline unti16/30/10 to report foreign financial accounts on Form TD F 
90-22.1 for persons with signature authority over (but no financial interest in) a foreign financial 
account and persons with signature authority over, or financial interests in, a foreign commingled 
fund. 
h. Still clear as mud: New definitions and instructions. R1N 1506-
AB08, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act 
Regulations - Reports of Foreign Financial Accounts, 75 F.R. 8844 (2126/10). This proposed 
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rule would include a definition of "United States person" and definitions of "bank account," ( 
"securities account," and "other financial account," as well as of "foreign country." It also 
includes draft instructions to Form TD F 90-22.1 (FBAR). 
(1) Notice 2010-23, 2010-11 I.R.B. 441 (2/26/10). Provided 
administrative relief to certain person who may be required to file and FBAR for the 2009 and 
earlier calendar years by extending the filing deadline until 6/30/11 for persons with signature 
authority, but no financial interest in, a foreign financial account for which an FBAR would have 
otherwise been due on 6/30/10. It also provides relief with respect to mutual funds. 
(2) Announcement 2010-16,2010-11 I.R.B. 450 (2/26/10). The 
IRS suspended, for person who are not U.S. citizens, U.S. residents, or domestic entities, the 
requirement to file an FBAR for the 2009 and earlier calendar years. 
4. Tax Court jurisdiction to review an otherwise unreviewable assessable 
penalty can't piggyback on a related deficiency proceeding. Smith v. Commissioner, 133 
T.C. No. 18 (12/21/09). Section 6707A, added to the Code by the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004, imposes a penalty for a taxpayer's failure to include with his return required information 
with respect to a reportable transaction. The IRS assessed a § 6707 A penalty against the taxpayer 
and issued a deficiency notice to his wholly owned corporation with respect to the transaction to 
which the § 6707 A penalty applied. The taxpayer filed a timely petition with the Tax Court, but 
Judge Kroupa held that a penalty imposed under § 6707 A is not reviewable by the Tax Court, 
even in a deficiency proceeding. Although the IRS issued a deficiency notice, the notice did not 
determine the § 6707 A penalty. The § 6707 A penalty was properly independently assessed 
without the IRS issuing a deficiency notice, and the penalty was thus not within the Tax Court's 
deficiency jurisdiction. The taxpayer's only redress is though a refund proceeding. 
S. There's no prepayment judicial review for the failure to pay penalty. 
Burke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-282 (12/8/09). The § 6651(a)(3) addition to tax for 
failure to pay is not subject to deficiency procedures, but may be collected administratively if it 
not paid upon notice and demand. (' 
,6 • Meeting five out of six criteria for being a "responsible person" buys a ' 
100% penalty. Erwin v. United States, 591 F3d 313 (4th Cir. 1/13/10). The Fourth Circuit, in a 
majority opinion by Judge Motz, upheld the District Court's finding on summary judgment that 
the taxpayer was liable for the § 6672 failure to withhold and pay-over penalty. To determine 
whether a particular individual is a "responsible person" liable for the § 6672 failure to withhold 
and pay-over penalty, the Fourth Circuit will examine whether he: (1) served as an officer or 
direGtor of the company; (2) controlled the company's payroll; (3) determined which creditors to 
pay and when to pay them; (4) participated in the corporation's day-to-day management; (5) had 
the ability to hire and fire employees; and (6) possessed the power to write checks. Undisputed 
facts established that taxpayer met the first five criteria, even though he delegated some 
responsibilities to others. Considering "the totality of the circumstances", he was a responsible 
person even though he did not have check-writing authority. 
• Judge Hamilton dissented, concluding that a "reasonable 
fact-finder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Erwin and drawing all reasonable 
inferences from such evidence in his favor, could find that he was not a responsible person ... ", 
even though he did not believe that as a matter of law Erwin could not be a responsible person. 
Judge Hamilton thought that only the first factor cut in favor of the government, and he would have 
vacated and remanded for a trial, because it was a "close case." 
7 . The District Court needs to justify home imprisonment in lieu of time 
in the big house for criminal tax evasion. United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (14th Cir. 
1/13/1 0). The defendant pled guilty to tax evasion for 2004. Although he was charged with tax 
evasion only for 2004, the information alleged that he had evaded taxes for 16 years between 
1984 and 2002 and owned taxes on more than $600,000 - when interest and penalties were 
tacked on the amount exceeded $2 million. The District Court sentenced Engle to four years 
probation, conditioned on 18 months of home detention, with work release and international 
travel privileges. The district judge reasoned that it was more important that the back taxes be 
paid than that Engle be imprisoned and that if Engel were imprisoned he would be deprived of 
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( his livelihood and hence be unable to pay the taxes that he had evaded. The Fourth Circuit (Judge 
Traxler) vacated the sentence because the district court did not adequately explain its decision tQ 
vary significantly from the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' recommendations 
in imposing the len~ent sentence that did not include prison time. Judge Traxler noted, after 
requiring that further proceedings be in front of a different judge: 
The district judge in this case [Judge Mullin] also presided over the tax 
evasion trials and sentencings in [ other] cases that, though not formally 
consolidated with this case, were argued before this court seriatim with this 
appeal. In the sentencing hearing for [another criminal defendant], the district 
judge, who has taken senior status, stated that he no longer intended to handle 
. criminal matters. 
8. Yip[e]! United States v. Yip, 592 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1113/10). The Ninth 
Circuit held that under U .S.S.G. § 3C 1.1, "[0 ]bstruction during an IRS audit justifies enhancing a 
defendant's sentence for obstruction 'during the course of the investi,ation. '" 
9 . The defendant was a little bit too "Cheeky" for his own good; instead, 
he should have turned the other cheek(s). United States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 
1125110). The defendant's conviction for tax evasion was upheld. His claim of good faith belief 
that he was not required to pay taxes on proceeds from a pyramid marketed tax evasion scheme 
was belied by his receipt of prior notice from the IRS regarding his tax liability coupled with his 
advice to participants in the scheme to plan a "reliance defense" based "on the advice of income 
tax professionals and other credible sources that could be used to convince a jury that the 
participant sincerely believed he or she was not liable for federal or state income tax." Because 
he was advising others to employ calculated tactics to avoid paying income taxes ... a rational 
jury reasonably could have found that [he] ... willfully evaded paying income tax." , 
10. "Abatement" is all or nothing. "Reduction" is not a lesser included 
option. It couldn't have happened to a nicer union. Service Employees International Union v. 
United States, 598 F.3d 111 0 (9th Cir. 3/1711 0). SEIU filed its information return late and the 
IRS assessed a $50,000 penalty under § 6652(c)(l)(A). On appeal from an adverse CDP 
determination, the district court (which at the time had jurisdiction) concluded that there was no 
"reasonable cause" for the late filing, but nevertheless held that in its discretion the IRS should 
have reduced the penalty and entered judgment in favor of the IRS for only 25% of the $50,000 
penalty. The Court of Appeals reversed. The penalty under § 6652(c)(I)(A) is "'either fully 
enforceable or fully unenforceable,'" citing In re Sanford, 979 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992). 
Section 6652(c)(4), providing for abatement of the penalty if there was "reasonable cause" for 
the late filing, is mandatory, not discretionary. "If a nonprofit fails to file the informational return 
on time for reasonable cause, the IRS has no discretion whether to impose or reduce the penalty; 
it is flatly prohibited from imposing any penalty at all." Neither the IRS nor any reviewing court 
has discretion to reduce, rather than to abate for "reasonable cause," a § 6652( c )(1 )(A) penalty 
for late filing of an informational Teturn. 
11. The "TurboTax got it wrong for me just like Wikipedia says it did for 
Timothy Geithner" defense doesn't cut the mustard. Lam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2010-82 (4119/10). Based on a stipulation, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry) upheld a deficiency 
determined by the IRS based on the application of § 280A to disallow claimed rental real estate 
losses and recharacterization of claimed ordinary losses as capital losses. The court also upheld 
accuracy related penalties, finding that there was no substantial authority for the taxpayer's 
positions and that the reasonable cause exception did not apply. The taxpayers argued that they 
consistently filled out their tax returns using TurboTax and that they confused capital gains and 
losses with ordinary income and expenses. Even though Judge Wherry believed that the errors 
were made in good faith, he held that they did not behave in a manner consistent with that of a 
prudent person. They did not consult a tax professional or visit the IRS's web site for instructions· 
on filing the Schedule C. He did not accept their misuse of TurboTax, even if unintentional or 
4 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), held that Court held that a good-faith belief as to the law 
need not be objectively reasonable to be a defense to criminal tax fraud. 
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accidental, as a defense to the penalties, because they did not attempt to show a reasonable cause ( 
for their underpayment of taxes. Rather, they analogized their situation to that of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, Timothy Geithner. 
Citing a Wikipedia article, Ms. Lam essentially argues that, like Secretary 
Geithner, she used TurboTax, resulting in mistakes on her taxes. In short, it was 
not a flaw in the TurboTax software which caused petitioners' tax deficiencies. 
"Tax preparation software is only as good as the information one inputs into it." 
[citation omitted]. Because petitioners have not "shown that any of the conceded 
issues were anything but the result of [their] own negligence or disregard of 
regulations," they are liable for the section 6662(a) penalties. 
a. Another case on TurboTax. The case does not reflect whether the 
IRS was ashamed, but it was undeterred in seeking penalties for conduct unpenalized with 
respect to the Secretary of Treasury. Parker v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-78 
(6/21110). The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) held that taxpayer's compensation from the 
International Monetary Fund was subject to self-employment taxes. Accuracy-related penalties 
were imposed despite taxpayer's argument that he relied on his tax return preparation software. 
12. T.D. 9488, Interest and Penalty Suspension Provisions Under Section 
6404(g) of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 F.R. 33992 (6/16/10). Final Reg. § 1.6404-4(b)(5), 
replacing Temp. Reg. § 1.6404-4T(b)(5), provides guidance regarding the exception for any 
listed transaction as defined in § 6707 A( c) or any undisclosed reportable transaction from the 
general rule of suspension of any interest under § 6404(g)(I) if the IRS does not contact the 
taxpayer regarding adjustments within the requisite period of time, generally 36 months after the 
later of the due date or the return filing date. 
13. He might have played a DC cop in "Murder at 1600," but now he'll be 
a convict for real at an FCI thanks to 1111 Constitution Ave. United States v. Snipes, 106 
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5256 (11th Cir. 7/16/10). Snipes earned more than $27 million dollars in gross 
income from 1999 to 2004, but he did not file individual federal income tax returns for any of ( 
those years. Snipes was involved with co-defendant Eddie Ray Kahn's organization, American 
Rights Litigators (ARL), which purported to assist customers in resisting the IRS. ARL 
employees, including co-defendant Douglas Rosile, and ARL members, including Snipes, sent 
voluminous letters to the IRS, challenging the IRS's authority to collect taxes. The centerpiece of 
this resistance was the "861 argument" that the domestic earnings of individual Americans are 
not income subject to tax. Snipes personal arguments to the IRS over the curse of several years 
were described by the court, in part, as follows: 
Snipes's correspondence with the IRS advanced several arguments justifying his 
failure to file his personal tax returns, including that he was a "non-resident alien 
to the United States," that earned income must come from "sources wholly 
outside the United States," that "a taxpayer is defined by law as one who operates 
a distilled spirit Plant," and that the Internal Revenue Code's taxing authority "is 
limited to the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the United States, 
exclusive of the 50 States of the Union." Snipes also claimed that as a "fiduciary 
of God, who is a'nontaxpayer,'" he was a "foreign diplomat" who was not 
obliged to pay taxes. When Snipes consulted his long-time tax _attorneys about his 
resistance to paying federal income taxes, they advised him that his position was 
contrary to the law and that he was required to file tax returns. The firm 
terminated Snipes as a client when Snipes refused to file his tax returns. 
• Snipes also integrated the ALR tax "teachings" into the 
accounting methodology of his film production companies. After June 2000, his companies stopped 
deducting payroll and income taxes from employees' salary checks. Snipes began to proselytize this 
theory of tax resistance. Not surprisingly, The Eleventh Circuit upheld Wesley Snipes's conviction 
of willful failure to file tax returns and the imposition of a 36-month prison sentence. 
14. Cheatin' tax advisor blinded by his own brilliance. United States v. 
Jewell, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5483 (8th Cir. 7/30/10). The defendant was a tax attorney who 
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concocted a scheme to assist his clients in underreporting several million dollars of income and 
was convicted of aiding and abetting tax evasion. Among the many issues he raised on appeal. 
was that his clients ultimately had settled the tax deficiency with the IRS. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction. The court held that the fact that the taxpayer whose taxes were evaded 
eventually paid those taxes is not a defense to aiding and abetting tax evasion if the advisor had 
the intent to assist the taxpayer with evading taxes in the taxable year in question and at the time 
taxes were due for the year in question there was a deficiency. 
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA 
1 . District Court finds tax accrual workpapers protected by the "work 
product privilege" and denies the IRS petition for summons enforcement. United States v. 
Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.1. 8/28/07). Textron engaged in six SILO transactions in 
2001 before SILOs became listed transactions in 2005. Under IRS procedures, engaging in more 
than one listed transaction means that the IRS will request the entire tax accrual workpapers file. 
Textron produced all requested documents with respect to the SILO transactions but refused to 
tum over its entire workpaper file. Judge Torres held that the tax accrual workpapers were 
prepared "because of' anticipated litigation with the IRS. He refused to follow contrary authority 
from the Fifth Circuit in United States v. El Paso Company, 682 F.2d 530 (1982), which used the 
more stringent primary purpose test for determining whether documents were prepared "in 
anticipation of litigation." He also held that work product protection was not lost when the tax 
accrual workpapers were provided to Ernst & Young for its audit of the company because the 
AICPA Code § 301 on confidential client information made it very unlikely thatthe accounting 
firm would provide them to the lRS. . 
a. This split decision has been taken to the bane. United States v. 
Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.I. 8/28/07), affirmed in part, vacated in part and 
remanded, 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1121109) (2-1), taxpayer's petition for rehearing denied, 
(3/24/09), government's petition for en banc rehearing granted, (3/25/09). The majority opinion 
(Judge Torruella) affirmed the holding that Textron's tax accrual workpapers were protected by 
the work product doctrine on the ground that the First Circuit law is that "dual purpose" 
documents created because of the prospect of litigation are protected even though they were also 
prepared for a business purpose, i.e., E&Y's audit of Textron. It distinguished United States v. El 
Paso Company, 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), as being part of an existing split between the 
circuits in the definition of "the anticipation of litigation." 
• The majority remanded the case for the District Court to 
consider the questions of whether Textron waived work-product protection by showing its tax 
accrual work papers to E&Y and whether E&Y's workpapers were within the "control" of Textron. 
• Judge Boudin dissented on the ground that the proper test 
should be whether the tax accrual workpapers were prepared "in the ordinary course of business" or 
were otherwise independently required, and their preparation would not be chilled by lack of 
protection because they are required by "the financial statement obligations and accounting rules." 
He based his opinion on the need for such documents "[i]n the wake of Enron and other corporate 
scandals .... " He later stated, 
And, while it may seem one-sided to give the government Textron's blue print to 
weaknesses in Textron's tax returns, the return is massive - constituting more 
than 4000 pages; the government has an important interest in collecting taxes that 
are owed; and its inquiries into work papers were focused on a specific type of 
transaction that had been shown to be open to abuse. So context should be kept in 
mind before shedding too many tears for Textron. 
• The government's petition for rehearing en banc was granted. 
b . Reversed by a divided First Circuit in an en bane rehearing. 
The First follows the Fifth to El Paso. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 
8/13/09) (3-2), cert. denied (5/24/10). The majority (Judge Boudin) held that the work product 
privilege protects only work done for litigation purposes (the "prepared for" test or the "primary 
purpose" test), and abandoned the prior First Circuit "because of' test, encompassing work done 
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in preparing fmancial statements that also is prepared in contemplation of litigation. The majority ( 
followed United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), 
Judge Boudin concluded: 
Textron apparently thinks it is "unfair" for the government to have access 
to its spreadsheets, but tax collection is not a game. Underpaying taxes threatens 
the essential public interest in revenue collection. If a blueprint to Textron's 
possible improper deductions can be found in Textron's files, it is properly 
available to the government unless privileged. Virtually all discovery against a 
party aims at securing information that may assist an opponent hi uncovering the 
truth. Unprivileged IRS information is equally subject to discovery. 
The practical problems confronting the IRS in discovering under-reporting 
of corporate taxes, which is likely endemic, are serious. Textron's return is 
massive - constituting more than 4,000 pages - and the IRS requested the work 
papers only after finding a specific type of transaction that had been shown to be 
abused by taxpayers. It is because the collection of revenues is essential to 
government that administrative discovery, along with many other comparatively 
unusual tools, are furnished to the IRS. 
As Bentham explained, all privileges limit access to the truth in aid of 
other objectives, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961), but 
virtually all privileges are restricted - either (as here) by definition or (in many 
cases) through explicit exceptions - by countervailing limitations. The Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is qualified, among other 
doctrines, by the required records exception, and the attorney client privilege, 
along with other limitations, by the crime-fraud exception. 
To sum up, the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done 
for litigation, not in preparing financial statements. Textron's work papers were ('" 
prepared to support financial filings and gain auditor approval; the compulsion of 
the -securities laws and auditing requirements assure that they will be carefully 
prepared, in their present form, even though not protected; and IRS access serves 
the legitimate, and important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive tax 
shelters. (footnote and internal citations omitted) 
c. Even after Textron, the government is still not home free when it 
wants to run barefoot through tax audit workpapers and tax opinions, and to run roughshod over 
work product protections. The D.C. Circuit accepted that dual-purpose documents could be 
covered by the work product doctrine, and it refused to find that disclosure to the auditing CPA 
firm constituted waiver of work product protection. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 106 
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5053 (D.C. Cir. 6/29/10). The government sought discovery of three 
documents in the possession ofDeloitte, Dow Chemical's independent auditor, that the taxpayer, 
claimed were attorney work product. One document was a draft memorandum prepared by 
Deloitte that summarized a meeting between Dow employees, Dow's outside counsel, and 
Deloitte employees about the possibility of litigation over a partnership in which Dow was a 
member and the necessity of accounting for such a possibility in an ongoing audit. The district 
court had concluded that, although the document was created by Deloitte, it was nonetheless 
Dow's work product because "its contents record the thoughts of Dow's counsel regarding the 
prospect of litigation." The second document was a memorandum and flow chart prepared by 
two Dow employees, an accountant and an in-house attorney. The third was a tax opinion 
prepared by Dow's outside counsel. The district court held that all three documents were 
protected under the work-product doctrine. On appeal, the government contends that the Deloitte 
memorandum was not work product because it was prepared by Deloitte during the audit 
process. It conceded that the other two documents were work product, but argued that Dow 
waived work-product protection when it disclosed them to Deloitte. 
• The Court of Appeals (Judge Sentell e) vacated the district 
court's decision that the memorandum prepared by Deloitte was work product and remand for in ( 
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camera review to determine whether it is entirely work product. It affirmed the district court's 
holding that Dow did not waive work-praduct pratectian when it disclosed the other two do.cuments 
to. Deloitte. In analyzing whether the Deloitte memarandum cauld be work praduct, the Court of . 
Appeals applied the "'because of' test, asking 'whether, in light of the nature af the dacument and 
the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or 
obtained because of the prospect of litigatian.'" It rejected the government's argument that the 
memarandum was not protected work product under United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F .22· 530 
(1982), reasoning that El Paso was decided under the "primary mativating purpose test," which is a 
different test than the "because of' test, as well as the government's argument that United States v. 
Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009), supported its position, reasaning that the halding in 
Textron was fact specific. In rejecting the gavernment's argument that the Deloitte memorandum 
cauld nat be work product because it was prepared in the course of a financial audit, the Court of 
Appeals held that a dacument can contain protected work-praduct material even though it serves 
multiple purposes, so long as the protected material was prepared because of the prospect of 
litigatian. 
• Hawever, having determined that the Deloitte memarandum 
could be work product, when it turned to whether it was work product, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the District Court lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation for its holding that the 
memorandum was purely work praduct and remanded for further consideration. Turning to waiver 
issue with respect to the other two documents, the Court of Appeals held that there was no waiver. 
Deloitte was neither a potential adversary in the matter with respect to which the documents had 
been prepared nor a conduit to other adversaries - the only relevant adversary was the IRS. "Daw 
had a reasanable expectation of canfidentiality because Deloitte, as an independent auditor, has an 
obligation to. refrain fram disclosing confidential client informatian." 
• We nate that ane left caast tax professor vented on this case 
so. vehemently that a casual observer might fear that he would burst a ventricle. 2010 lNT 125-1. 
2 . A stern warning against unwarranted blanket claims of privilege. 
Eulich v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6337 (N.D. Tex. 9/4/09). In cannection with an 
audit, the IRS summansed certain documents relating to. a Bahamian trust, and the taxpayer 
asserted attarney client privilege and wark praduct dactrine protection for 'voluminous 
dacuments" that were submitted for in camera review. The court (Judge Lindsay) determined 
that hundreds - we last count at over 400 - af dacuments were privileged in whale or in part, 
and that hundreds - we again last caunt at aver 400 - af dacuments were not privileged in 
whale or in part. The Judge Lindsay cancluded as fallaws: 
This review has placed an undue, and in many instances unjustified, burden on the 
caurt and its staff. It has stretched scarce judicial resources in a way never 
cantemplated by the court. In many instances, the court does not believe that the 
claim af privilege was met seq.ade in good faith. Petitioner is put on notice that 
the court will not tolerate such blanket claims of privilege and will impose 
sanctions as appropriate if such conduct recurs. (Emphasis in original.) 
C. Litigation Costs 
1 . Clarifying guidance on collecting attorney's fees from tbe IRS. REG-
111833-99, Regulatians Under I.R.C. Section 7430 Relating to. Awards of Administrative Casts 
and Attorneys Fees, 74 F.R. 61589 (11/25/09). The Treasury Department has published prapased 
regulatians relating to awards of administrative costs and attorneys fees under § 7430 to canfarm 
to. the amendments made in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act af 1998. Among the changes reflected in the proposed regulations are the follawing. 
(1) A taxpayer has ninety days after the date the IRS mails to the taxpayer a final decision 
determining tax, interest ar penalty, to file an applicatian with the IRS to recaver administrative 
costs. (2) A taxpayer has ninety days after the date the IRS mails to the taxpayer, by certified ar 
registered mail, a final adverse decision regarding an award af administrative costs, to. file a 
petition with the Tax Court. (3) Individuals filing joint.returns should be treated as separate 
taxpayers far purposes of determining net worth. (4) Trusts are subject to the net worth 
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requirements. (5) Clarifying changes address the calculation of net worth. (6) Several ( 
amendments to § 7430 in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 are reflected in the 
proposed regulations: (a) the hourly rate limitation is increased to $125; (b) difficulty of the 
issues presented and local availability of tax experts may be considered to increase an attorney's 
hourly rate; (c) a court should consider whether the IRS has lost cases with substantially similar 
issues in other circuit courts of appeal in deciding whether the IRS's position was substantially 
justified; (d) if an individual who is authorized to practice before the Tax Court or the IRS is 
representing the taxpayer on a pro bono basis, the taxpayer may petition for an award of 
reasonable attorneys fees in excess of the amounts that the taxpayer paid or incurred, as long as 
the fee award is ultimately paid to the individual or the individual's employer; (e) the period for 
recovery of reasonable administrative costs is extended to include costs incurred after the date on 
which the first letter of proposed deficiency ("30-day letter") is mailed to the taxpayer, but the 
taxpayer may be eligible to recover reasonable administrative costs from the date of the 30-day 
letter only if at least one issue (other than recovery of administrative costs) remains in dispute as 
of the date that the IRS takes a position in the administrative proceeding. 
D. Statutory Notice of Deficiency 
1. If you pay without a statutory notice, you can't get a refund. Bush v. 
United States, 599 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 3/31/10). During the pendency of a partnership level 
proceeding, the taxpayers entered into closing agreements with the IRS with respect to their 
§ 465 at-risk amounts in the partnership. The closing agreements did not waive the right to a 
deficiency notice. Subsequently, the IRS issued Notices of Adjustment, without issuing any 
deficiency notices, based on the application of the agreed upon at-risk amount in the closing 
agreements. The taxpayers paid the assessed taxes and sought a refund. A deficiency notice is 
not required if a tax liability issue has been resolved in a partnership-level proceeding. In that 
case any additional tax due is assessed as a computational adjustment, § 6230(a)(1), which 
§ 6231(a)(6) defines for this purpose as the "change in the tax liability of a partrier which 
properly reflects the treatment under this subchapter of a partnership item." But a deficiency ( 
notice is required if the additional tax asserted by the IRS to be due does not involve such a 
"computational adjustment." Thus, a deficiency notice is required if the deficiency is attributable 
to "affected items which require partner level determinations." § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i). The court 
(Judge Dyk), held for the government, concluding that on the facts of the case, the IRS's failure 
to issue a deficiency notice was harmless error. After first concluding that § 6213(a) "does not 
broadly provide for a refund of amounts paid by the taxpayer after assessment or provide for a 
refund where the taxpayer voluntarily pays the assessment before collection proceedings are 
initiated," the court continued as follows: 
The IRS did not issue a demand for payment (which is a predicate to collection, 
see I.R.C. § 6303) or initiate collection proceedings. The taxpayers do not ... seek 
repayment of funds improperly collected. Rather, the taxpayers paid the 
assessments and then sued for a refund, alleging that they are entitled to a refund 
simply because the IRS failed to issue the requisite notice, without regard to 
whether the tax was in fact owed, and without any showing that the taxpayers 
were prejudiced by litigating the tax issue in the refund proceedings rather than in 
the Tax Court. Nothing in the language of the statute confers such a refund right 
on the taxpayer, and the failure in the statute to provide for a refund under such 
circumstances strongly suggests that no such automatic refund was intended. 
• Finally, the court explained that despite the taxpayers not 
having received a deficiency notice, had they not voluntarily paid the tax, they could have had their 
day in Tax Court simply by not paying and seeking collection due process relief under § 6330 when 
the IRS subsequently took actions to collect the assessed taxes. 
2. The Tax Court loves its jurisdiction. Winter v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 
No. 12 (8/25/10). The taxpayer reported passed-through losses from an S corporation in which he 
was a shareholder in excess of the amount reported on his Schedule K -1. Rather that treat the 
adjustment resulting from the inconsistency as correction of a mathematical error, as provided by 
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(' § 6037, subject to summary assessment under § 6213(b), the IRS issued a deficiency notice with 
respect to both the adjustment resulting from disallowing the excess loss and the inclusion of 
unreported interest, dividends, and gambling income. The IRS issued a summary assessment 
based on the mathematical error only after the taxpayer had filed the Tax Court petition. The 
principal issue was whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction over the adjustment to the taxpayer's 
distributive share of S corporation income or whether the IRS was required to assess the tax 
related to the adjustment as a math error under § 6213(b), precluding the inclusion in the notice 
of deficiency of the increase in tax relating to that adjustment. Both the taxpayer and IRS argued 
that the court had jurisdiction, but the court nevertheless addressed the question, and in a 
reviewed opinion (10-1-1) by Judge Goeke, the Tax Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider 
the taxpayer's claim that his income from the S Corporation was less than the amount reported 
on the Schedule K-l he received from it. The decision was based on two alternative grounds; 
first, the taxpayer assigned error to the entire deficiency and the alleged unreported income was 
one of the IRS's adjustments contributing to that deficiency; second, pursuant to the Tax Court's 
overpayment jurisdiction (which the taxpayer had invoked), the Tax Court has "authority to 
decide all the issues necessary to determine the correct amount of income tax for the taxable year 
in issue," which even includes amounts that cannot be assessed because the statute of limitations 
on assessment and collection has expired. 
• Judge Holmes, in a long1 and lonely dissent, argued that the 
Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review the deficiency attributable to the inconsistency between the 
taxpayer's return and the S corporation's Schedule K-l with respect to the taxpayer. He reasoned 
that even though the IRS did issue a deficiency notice, it had no power to do so because § 6037 
required that the IRS treat the inconsistency solely as a mathematical error. That treatment would 
leave the taxpayer in the position of being required to pay the assessed amount and seek a refund. 
E. Statute of Limitations 
1. The courts hold that overstating basis is not the same as understating 
gross income, but- the Treasury Department ultimately plays its trump card by 
promulgating regulations. Section 6501(e)(I) extends the normal three-year period of 
limitations to six years if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount in excess of 25 
percent of the gross income stated in the return. Section 6229(c)(2) provides a similar extension 
of the statute of limitations under § 6229(a) for assessments arising out of TEFRA partnership 
proceedings. A critical question is whether the six year statute of limitations applies if the 
taxpayer overstates basis and as a consequence understates gross income. 
a. The Tax Court says overstating basis is not the same as 
understating gross income. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 
(6/14/07), Overstated basis resulted in an understatement of § 1231 gain. Looking to Supreme 
Court precedent under the statutory predecessor of § 6501(e) in the 1939 Code (Colony, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)), from which the six-year statute of limitations in 
§ 6229( c )(2) is derived and to which it is analogous, the Tax Court concluded that this 
understated gain was not an omission of "gross income" that would invoke the six year statute of 
limitations under § 6229( c )(2) applicable to partnership audits. . 
b. The Ninth Circuit likes the way the Tax Court thinks: 
Bakersfield Energy Partners is affirmed. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 
568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 6/17/09). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court on the grounds that 
the language at issue in the instant case was the same as the statutory language interpreted in 
Colony. The court noted, however, that "The IRS's interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A) is 
reasonable." 
c. And a judge of the Court of Federal Claims agrees. Grapevine 
Imports, Ltd v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505 (7/17/07). In a TEFRA partnership tax shelter 
case, the Court of Federal Claims (Judge Allegra) held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of 
limitations does not apply to basis overstatements, citing Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 
IThe dissent was 43 typewritten pages, while the majority opinion was only 14 pages long. 
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28 (1958). Section 6501(e), rather than § 6229(c)(2) as in Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP, 
applied because in earlier proceedings in the instant case (71 Fed. Cl. 324 (2006)), the court had 
held that § 6229 did not create an independent statute of limitations, but instead only provides a 
minimum period for assessment for partnership items that could extend the § 6501 statute of 
limitations, and because the FPAA was sent within this six-year statute of limitations under 
§ 6229( d) the statute of limitations with respect to the partners was suspended. 
d. But a District Court in Florida disagrees. Brandon Ridge 
Partners v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5347 (M.D. Fla. 7/30/07). The court refused to 
follow Bakersfield Energy Partners and Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year 
statute of limitations does apply to basis overstatements. The court reasoned that as a result of 
subsequent amendments to the relevant Code sections, the application of Colony, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) is limited to situations described in § 6501(e)(I)(A)(i), which 
applies to trade or business sales of goods or services. ["In the case of a trade or business, the 
term "gross income" means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods 
or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the 
cost of such sales or services."] The court reasoned that to conclude otherwise would render 
§ 6501(e)(I)(A)(i) superfluous. Because the transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of 
stock, which was not a business sale of goods or services, the gross receipts test did not apply. 
On the facts, the partners and partnership returns (and statements attached thereto), taken 
together "failed to adequately apprise the IRS of the true amount of gain on the sale of the ... 
stock." Thus, the partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was inapplicable. 
e. And a different judge of the Court of Federal Claims agrees with 
the District Court in Florida and disagrees with the prior Court of Federal Claims opinion by a 
different judge in Grapevine Imports. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189 
(1119/07). The court (Judge Miller) refused to follow Bakersfield Energy Partners and 
Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of .imitations does apply to basis 
overstatements. Judge Miller reasoned that an understatement of "gain" is an omission of gross 
income, and that omission can result from a basis overstatement as well as from an 
understatement of the amount realized. Like the Brandon Ridge Partners court, Judge Miller 
concluded that the application of Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), is limited to 
situations described in § 6501(e)(l)(A)(i), which applies to trade or business sales of goods or 
services. ("In the case of a trade or business, the term 'gross income' means the total of the 
amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are required to 
be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services.") Because the 
transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of a ranch, which was not a business sale of goods 
or services, the gross receipts test did not apply. On the facts, the partners' and partnership 
returns failed to adequately apprise the IRS of the amount of gain in a variant of the Son-of-Boss 
tax shelter. Accordingly, the partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was 
inapplicable. The amended order certified an interlocutory appeal and stayed the case pending 
further court order, because of the split of opinion between Salman Ranch, on the one hand, and 
Bakersfield Energy Partners and Brandon Ridge Partners, on the other hand. 
f. And the pro-government opinion by Judge Miller is slapped 
down by the Federal Circuit. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed.·Cir. 
7/30/09). Following Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), the Federal Circuit 
(Judge Schall, 2-1) held that "omits from gross income an amount properly includable therein" in 
§ 6501(e)(l)(A) does not include an overstatement of basis. Accordingly, the six-year statute of 
limitations on assessment did not apply - the normal three-year period of limitations applied. 
Judge Newman dissented. 
q. But a second District Court sees it the government's way. 
Home Concrete & Supply LLC v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. N.C. 10/21108). The 
court held that §6501(e) extends the statute of limitations for deficiencies attributable to basis 
overstatements that result in omitted gross income exceeding 25 percent of the gross income 
reported on the return. The court refused to follow the Tax Court's decisions in Bakersfield 
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( Energy Partners and Grapevine Imports, because it concluded that those cases were erroneously 
decided. 
h . A hiccup from Judge Goeke in the Tax Court: overstated basis in 
an abusive tax shelter is a substantial omission from gross income that extends the statute of 
limitations. Highwood Partners v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. I (8/13/09). The taxpayers 
invested through partnerships in foreign currency digital options contracts designed to increase 
partnership basis and generate losses marketed by Jenkens & Gilchrist (Son of Boss and 
miscellaneous other names). After expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, the IRS 
issued an FPAA to the partnership based on the six-year statute of §6501(e)(1) applicable if there 
was a greater than 25 percent omission of gross income on each partner's or the partnership's 
return. The court.(Judge Goeke) held that the digital options contracts produced § 988 exchange 
gain on foreign currency transactions, which, under the regulations, are required to be separately 
stated. The long and short positions of the options contracts were treated as separate transactions. 
Thus, failure to report the gain on the short position, not offset by losses on the accompanying 
stock sale, represented an omission of gross income. The court also rejected the taxpayer's 
argument that because the IRS asserted that the options transactions should be disregarded in 
full, there can be no omission of gross income from the disregarded short position. Finally, the 
court refused to apply the adequate disclosure safe harbor of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) because the 
taxpayer's netting of the gain and loss from the long and short positions was intended to mislead 
and hide the existence of the gain and did not apprise the IRS of the existence of the gain. 
i. But Judge Haines follows the Tax Court orthodoxy. Beard v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-184 (8/11/09). In a basis offset deal involving contributions of 
long and short positions in Treasury notes contributed to S corporations, the court (Judge Haines) 
granted summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that the basis overstatement attributable to 
the short sale was not an a substantial omission of gross income. Because the transaction 
involved Treasury notes, there were no § 988 issues involved. This holding is consistent with 
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 6117/09), and Salman 
Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 7/30/09). 
j . And the IRS loses again in the Tax Court. Intermountain 
Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (9/1/09). The court (Judge 
Wherry), again following Bakersfield Energy Partners LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 
(2007), granted summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that a basis overstatement is not a 
substantial omission from gross income that triggers the six year extended statute of limitations 
under § 6229. 
k. Finally, the IRS gets the upper hand with temporary 
regulations. T.D. 9466, Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 74 F.R. 49321 (9/24/09). 
Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-lT and 301.6501(e)-lT both provide that for purposes of 
determining whether there is a substantial omission of gross income, gross income as it relates to 
a trade or busi~ess includes the total amount received from the sale of goods or services, without 
reduction for the cost of goods sold, gross income otherwise has the same meaning as under 
§ 61(a). The regulations add that, "[i]n the case of amounts received or accrued that relate to the 
disposition of property, and except as provided in paragraph (a)(l)(ii) of this section, gross 
income means the excess of the amount realized from the disposition of the property over the 
unrecovered cost or other basis of the property. Consequently, except as provided in paragraph 
(a)(l)(ii) of this section, an understated amount of gross income resulting from an overstatement 
of unrecovered cost or other basis constitutes an omission from gross income for purposes of 
section 6229(c)(2)." 
1 . But the IRS still suffers from a hangover in cases on which the 
extended statute had run before the effective date of the regulations. UTAM. Ltd v. 
Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 2009-253 (11/9/09). Judge Kroupa followed Bakersfield Energy 
Partners to hold that the statute of limitations is not extended to six years pursuant to 
§ 6229(c)(2) or § 6501(e)(l)(A) as a result of a basis overstatement that causes gross income to 
be understated by more than 25 percent. 
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• Although the date of the decision was after the effective date ( 
of Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-IT and 301.6501(e)-IT, the result was dictated by prior law 
effective when the FP AA was issued in 1999. 
m. Judge Wherry shoves it up the Commissioner all the way to his 
"Colon(-y)" in a reviewed Tax Court decision that holds the Temporary Regulations invalid. 
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 11 (5/6/10) (reviewed, 
7-0-6), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (9/1/09) (granting summary judgment to the 
taxpayer, holding that a basis overstatement is not a substantial omission from gross income that 
triggers the six year extended statute of limitations under § 6229). On IRS motions to reconsider 
and vacate in light of Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-IT and 301.6501(e)-IT, the Tax Court 
(Judge Wherry) held that the Supreme Court's opinion in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 
U.S. 28 (1958), '''unambiguously forecloses the [IRS] interpretation' ... and displaces [the] 
temporary regulations." The first ground was that the temporary regulations were specifically 
limited their application to "taxable years with respect to which the applicable period for 
assessing tax did not expire before September 24, 2009," and in this case that period was not 
open as of that date. The second ground was that the Supreme Court had held in Colony that the 
statute was unambiguous in light of its legislative history, and foreclosed temporary regulations 
to the contrary. 
• Judges Halpern and Holmes concurred in the result. They 
stated that they were not persuaded by either of the majority's analyses, but that the temporary 
regulations should be invalidated on procedural grounds for failure to comply with the 
Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirement. 
2. Proposed Regulations provide an instruction manual on how to start 
running the otherwise endless statute of limitations on previously unreported listed 
transactions. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Period of Limitations on Assessment for Listed 
Transactions Not Disclosed Under Section 6011, REG-160871-04, 74 F.R. 55127 (10/7/09). The 
Treasury has published proposed regulations § 301.6501(c)-I(g) under § 6501(c)(10), which (' 
extends the statute of limitations when a taxpayer fails to disclose a listed transaction; the statute ' 
of limitations does not expire until one year after the earlier of (1) the date on which the taxpayer 
furnishes the required information, or (2) the date a material advisor (as defined in § 6111) 
satisfies the list maintenance requirements of § 6112 with respect to a request by the IRS. The 
proposed regulations specify the methods for subsequent disclosure of listed transaction that was 
not properly disclosed under § 6011. The extended statute of limitations applies only to the tax 
relating to the listed transaction, but the proposed regulations provide that tax with respect to the 
listed transaction includes, but is not limited to, adjustments made to' the tax consequences 
claimed on the return plus interest, additions to tax, additional amounts, and penalties that are 
related to the listed transaction or adjustments made to the tax consequences, as well as any item 
to the extent the item is affected by the listed transaction even if it is unrelated to the listed 
transaction. 
3 ~ A listed transaction is a listed transaction, is a listed transaction, 
period. A partner's statute of limitations can be determined in a TEFRA partnership level 
proceeding. Blak Investments v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 19 (12/23/09) (reviewed, 12-3). 
The taxpayers engaged in a Son of Boss type transaction in December 2001 and January 2002 
that first became a reportable transaction on 2/28/03, when Reg. § 1.6011-4 was promulgated. As 
of that date, they had already filed their 2001 return, but they had not yet filed their 2002 return. 
Reg. § 1.6011-4(e)(2) required them to attach a statement to their 2002 return disclosing the 
listed transaction, but when they filed their 2002 return on October 15, 2003, they failed to 
include the required statement. The IRS issued an FP AA on October 13, 2006, challenging the 
transactions as shams. Section 6501(c)(IO) was added by the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 applicable to tax years "with respect to which the period for assessing a deficiency did not 
expire before" 10/22/04, and the statute of limitations with respect to the taxpayers' transactions 
was open on that date. Section 6707 A, including the definition of listed transactions in 
§ 6707A(c), imposes penalties on failure to provide required information on reportable 
transactions on returns due after 10/22/04. Temp. Reg. §1.6011-4T (and Prop. Reg. § 1.6011-4), ( 
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( requiring disclosure of defined listed transactions were first published in 2000. In a reviewed 
opinion by Judge Haines, the majority first held that although the Tax Court's jurisdiction in a 
partnership proceeding generally is limited to determining "partnership items," an exception 
extends jurisdiction over whether the period of limitations has expired as to individual partners 
presents, because the expiration of the period of limitations can depend on facts that are peculiar 
to the individual partners, citing Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 
T.C. 533 (2000), appeal dismissed and remanded, 249 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2001), and Curr-Spec 
Partners, LP v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007- 289, affd. 579 F.3d 391(5th Cir. 2009). The 
majority rejected the taxpayers' argument that there are two types of listed transactions, those 
entered into before and those entered into after 10122/04, and that extension of the period for 
assessment under § 6501 (c)(1O) only applied to transactions for which a return was due after that 
date. The court concluded that the extension of the statute of limitations under § 6501 (c) (1 0) is 
effective for tax years for which the period of limitations had not expired on 10122/04, and that 
the enactment of the penalty provisions in § 6707 A has no bearing on the application of 
§ 6501(c)(10). "[I]t is of no consequence that the transaction in question became a reportable 
transaction after the transaction had already occurred. The legislative history expressly 
contemplated such a result." The court also held that Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T was valid and 
required disclosure of the taxpayers' transactions on their 2001 and 2002 returns. The court 
rejected the taxpayers' arguments that the temporary regulation violated Executive Order 12866, 
which requires Office of Management and Budget review of proposed significant regulatory 
actions, or that the temporary regulation violated the notice and comment requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, the statute of limitations remained open on the taxpayers' 
transactions under § 6501 (c)(1 0) until one year after the required disclosure was provided. 
• Judge Halpern Goined by Judges Foley and Holmes) 
dissented on the grounds that the Tax Court does not have the authority in a partnership-level 
proceeding to decide whether the statute of limitations bars the assessment of a resulting 
computational adjustment. The dissenters assert that the application of the statute of limitations to 
the subsequent assessment against the partners is neither a partnership item nor an affirmative 
defense to the FP AA. 
4 . The" statute of limitations remains open for any tax return in 
connection with which required information about foreign transfers is not reported to the 
IRS. Section 513 of the 2010 HIRE Act amended I.R.C. § 6501(c)(8) by providing that the 
statute of limitations remains open for any tax return relating to which information about foreign 
transfers is not furnished to the IRS and Treasury. The statute of limitations remains open until 
three years after the required information is furnished. Section 511 and 512 of the 2010 HIRE 
Act also provide for extended limitations for tax returns that are not fully compliant with respect 
to foreign assets. 
F. Liens and Collections 
1 . In this much-discussed case, taxpayer's poverty trumps a proposed 
levy. Vinatieri v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 16 (12/21109). The taxpayer submitted a 
settlement offer for delinquent taxes, but the IRS determined to levy on the taxpayer's wages and 
car. Even though the IRS concluded that the levy would create an economic hardship, the 
settlement officer determined collection alternatives to the levy, including an installment 
agreement, an offer-in-compromise, &nd reporting the account as currently not collectible, were 
not available because the taxpayer had not filed returns for several years. In a review of a § 6330 
CDP hearing, Judge Dawson held that it was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion for the IRS 
to proceed to levy on the taxpayer's wages and car, because a levy would have left the taxpayer 
impoverished. Section 6343(a)(I) requires that the IRS must release a levy upon all, or part of, a 
taxpayer's property if it determines that the levy creates an economic hardship due to the 
taxpayer's financial condition. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) provides that a levy creates an economic 
hardship due to the financial condition of an individual taxpayer and must be released "if 
satisfaction of the levy in whole or in part will cause an individual taxpayer to be unable to pay 
his or her reasonable basic living expenses." Because the taxpayer had demonstrated that a levy 
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would render her unable to pay her reasonable basic living expenses, the IRS was barred from ( 
levying. Judge Dawson rejected the IRS's argument that because the taxpayer was not in 
compliance with the filing requirements for all required tax returns, its determination to levy was 
not unreasonable. 
• The requirement that taxpayer be currently in compliance 
with his or her obligations to the IRS under its "currently not collectible" ("CNC") program does 
not apply to relief under § 6343. 
2."1 would gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today." T.D. 9473, 
Agreements for Payment of Tax Liabilities in Installments, 74 F.R. 61525 (11125/09). The 
Treasury Department has promulgated final Reg. § 301.6159-1, dealing with rules governing the 
acceptance and rejection by the IRS of proposed installment agreements, the terms of installment 
agreements, modification or termination by the IRS, and appeal procedures when the IRS rejects 
or terminates an installment agreement. Among the provisions is a requirement that the IRS 
review partial payment installment agreements every two years to determine whether the 
financial condition of the taxpayer changed enough to warrant an increase in the payments. The 
IRS may terminate an installment agreement if the taxpayer provides materially inaccurate or 
incomplete information in connection with a requested financial update. The IRS will generally 
notify the taxpayer in writing at least 30 days prior to terminating an installment agreement and 
describe the reason for the termination, after which the taxpayer may provide information 
showing that the IRS's reason is incorrect. Appeals procedures are provided. The IRS cannot 
levy during the time an installment agreement is pending, unless an installment agreement 
request was made solely to delay collection. The statute of limitations on collection under § 6502 
of the Code is suspended for the period that a proposed installment agreement is pending, plus 30 
days following a rejection, and during any appeal. 
3. Nuanced differences in the statutory subsections result in different 
. periods for suspending the statute of limitations on collections. Severo v. Commissioner, 586 
F.3d 1213 (5th Cir. 11120/09), aff'g 129 T.C. 160 (11115/07). Section 6503(h) suspends the (' 
running of the period of limitations on collection from the date of the taxpayer's bankruptcy' , 
petition was filed to the date six months after the bankruptcy court issues a discharge order. The 
more limited suspension of the period of limitations in § 6503(b), which applies to judicial 
proceedings generally when the taxpayer's assets are under control of a court, does not apply in 
bankruptcy situations. 
4. Ever-expanding Tax Court jurisdiction over CDP appeals. Michael v. 
Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 10 (10/8/09). Judge Goeke held that a settlement of the 
government's counterclaim in a prior refund suit for § 6694 penalties' does not preclude Tax 
Court jurisdiction to review a § 6330 CDP determination with respect to collection of the 
settlement amount. The District Court's dismissal of the refund action with prejudice on the basis 
of the settlement agreement does not render the administrative statutory collection remedies 
unavailable. Nor does the District Court's retention of jurisdiction for a 60-day enforcement 
period preclude the IRS from pursuing statutory collection remedies, such as a levy. Thus, the 
Tax Court had jurisdiction to review the IRS's determination to sustain the levy and to determine 
whether respondent may collect the unpaid penalties by levy. 
5. You only imagined that a discharge in bankruptcy from personal 
liability for back income taxes really got you off the hook. Wadleigh v. Commissioner, 134 
T.C. No. 14 (6/15/10). This case involved a review of the IRS's determination in a § 6330 CDP 
hearing not to release a levy on the taxpayer's pension. The tax lien had not been perfected by 
filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, and prior to the IRS issuing its Notice oflntent to Levy, the 
taxpayer's personal liability for the income taxes in question had been discharged in bankruptcy. 
The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held that because the taxpayer's pension was an excluded asset 
under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) that was never part of the bankruptcy estate - in contrast to an 
exempt asset, which initially is part of the bankruptcy estate but which is unavailable to satisfy 
creditor's claims - the § 6231 unperfected tax lien on the taxpayer's pension survived his 
bankruptcy and could be enforced notwithstanding his personal discharge. However, the lien was 
not enforceable until the pension entered payout status. Nevertheless, Judge Marvel remanded ( 
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( the case to the Appeals Division, but retained jurisdiction, because the record was inadequate to 
determine whether the IRS abused its discretion in levying on the taxpayer's retirement income, 
in the face of the taxpayer's claim that the levy would result in economic hardship by leaving 
him destitute. 
6. Just because the IRS thinks it's not worth trying to levy on it doesn't 
necessarily mean it's not a fraudulent conveyance if you give it away. Rubenstein v. 
Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 13 (6/7/10). The taxpayer's father, who was insolvent and had 
substantial unpaid income tax liabilities of which the taxpayer was aware, transferred to the 
taxpayer for little or no consideration the condominium in which they both resided, which was 
worth approximately $44,000. In the course of evaluating an offer in compromise previously 
submitted by the father, but which was rejected, the IRS had determined that the net realizable 
equity value in the condominium was zero. After the transfer, the IRS asserted transferee liability 
equal to the condominium's fair market value on the date of the transfer on the ground that the 
transfer was constructively fraudulent under Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(FUFTA). Under Florida law the condominium was the father's homestead, and thus was 
generally exempt from creditor's claims under nonbankruptcy law. However, the FUFTA 
excludes from the definition of "assets" property that is "generally exempt under nonbankruptcy 
law." On this basis the taxpayer argued that the condominium was not an "asset" for purposes of 
the FUFTA and its transfer to him thus was not avoidable. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held 
that because a homestead property is reachable by the United States through judicial process to 
enforce collection of unpaid income tax liabilities, even if it is exempt from the claims of other 
creditors under state law, the homestead condominium was not "generally exempt under 
nonbankruptcy law" within the meaning of the FUFTA. Thus, the condominium was an "asset" 
for purposes of the IRS's claim under the FUFTA. Furthermore, because the care that the 
taxpayer had provided for his father was not bargained for, but was provided out of love and 
respect, it did not constitute "reasonably equivalent value" for the condominium within the 
meaning of the FUFTA. Accordingly, the transfer was fraudulent. Finally, the IRS was not 
equitably estopped from asserting transferee liability by virtue of having previously determined 
that the condominium had zero net equity value. . 
7 . Here's a case in which a partner's draw is "salary or wages," much to 
his dismay. United States v. Moskowitz, Passman & Edleman, 603 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 4/29/10). 
The Second Circuit held that a continuing levy on "salary" under § 6331(e) reached a partner's 
"near-weekly" draw against the law firm's profits. Reg. § 301.6331-1(b)(1) defines "salary or 
wages" to '" include[] compensation for services paid in the form of fees, commissions, bonuses, 
and similar items.'" (emphasis supplied by the court). Because the partner's draw was 
"compensation for services," the court concluded that it was within the sweep of the Regulation, 
and thus § 6331(e). The court rejected the law firm's argument that payments of partnership 
draw to the partner were not "salary or wages" under § 6331 ( e) at the time of the levy because 
'''a partner only realizes income on the last day of the partnership's taxable year.'" 
8. No need for actuarial values to decide how much of the entirety the 
tax-deadbeat hubby owned. United States v. Barr, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5590 (6thCir. 8/4/10). 
In an opinion by Judge Rogers, the Sixth Circuit held that to satisfy a husband's separate tax 
liability, the government could levy on his one-half interest in a house owned with his wife in 
tenancy by the entirety under Michigan law. The taxpayer's wife was entitled to only one-half of 
the sales proceeds, despite her longer life expectancy. 
G. Innocent Spouse 
1. That regulation ain't got no equity and it ain't got no empathy, so it's 
invalid. The Tax Court majority responds to "the sound of [congressional] silence." Lantz v. 
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.8 (4/7/09) (reviewed, 12-4). The taxpayer sought equitable relief 
from joint income tax liability under § 6015(f), but the IRS denied relief on the ground that she 
had not requested relief within two years from the IRS's first collection action, as required by 
Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I). Consequently, the IRS did not reach the substantive issues of the claim. In 
a reviewed opinion by Judge Goeke, joined by eleven judges, with four dissents, the Tax Court 
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held Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I) to be invalid as applied to § 6015(t) relief. (Following the Golsen 
rule, the Tax Court applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), because the Seventh Circuit held in Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States,142 
F.3d 973,979 (7th Cir. 1998), that regulations issued under general or specific authority of the 
. IRS to promulgate necessary rules are entitled to Chevron deference; Reg. § 1.6015-5 was issued 
under both a general grant of authority under § 7805 and a specific grant of authority in 
§ 6015(h).) The court focused on the explicit inclusion of a two-year deadline in both § 6015(b) 
and § 6015(c}, in contrast to the absence of any deadline in § 6015(t), to find that the regulation 
was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute under the Chevron standard. 
'''It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely' when it 
'includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another''' . 
... We find that by explicitly creating a 2-year limitation in subsections (b) and (c) 
but not subsection (t), Congress has "spoken" by its audible silence. Because the 
regulation imposes a limitation that Congress explicitly incorporated . into 
subsections (b) and (c) but omitted from subsection (t), it fails the first prong of 
Chevron . ... 
Had Congress intended a 2-year period of limitations for equitable relief, then of 
course it could have easily included in subsection (t) what it included in 
subsections (b) and (c). However, Congress imposed no deadline, yet the 
Secretary prescribed a period of limitations identical to the limitations Congress 
imposed under section 6015(b) and (c). 
• As a result, the IRS abused its discretion in failing to consider 
all facts and circumstances in the taxpayer's case. Further proceedings are required to fully 
determine the taxpayer's liability. . 
a. You don't have to actually know the IRS denied § 6015(b) relief 
for the statute of limitations on seeking review to have expired, but you can always turn to 
§ 6015(f), which for now appears to have an open-ended period for review. Mannella v. 
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 10 (4/13/09). The IRS sent the taxpayer a notice of intent to levy 
and notice of the right to a § 6330 CDP hearing on 6/4/04. On 1111/06, more than two years later, 
the taxpayer requested § 6015 relief from joint and several liability, which the IRS denied on the 
grounds that the request was untimely. The taxpayer claimed that she did not receive her notice 
of intent to levy because her former husband received the notices, signed the certified mail 
receipts, and failed to deliver of inform her of the notices. Judge Haines held that actual receipt 
of the notice of intent to levy or of the notice of the right to request relief from joint and several 
liability is not required for the 2-year period in which to request relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c) 
to begin. The taxpayer's request for relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c) was not timely. However, the 
taxpayer's claim. for relief under § 6015(t), was timely because Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 
No.8 (4/7/09), held that Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I), requiring a request for relief within two years 
from the IRS's first collection action, is invalid as applied to § 6015(t) relief. 
. b. But the ms will fight this one to the bitter end! CC-201O-005, 
Designation for Litigation: Validity of Two-Year Deadline for Section 6015(t) Claims Under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I) (3/12/10). This Chief Counsel Notice states that because the issue 
of the validity of the two-year deadline in Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(l) for filing a claim for § 6015(t) 
relief, which was held to be an invalid regulation in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.8 
(2009), has been was designated for litigation by the Office of Chief Counsel, the IRS will 
continue to deny claims for relief under § 6015(t) as untimely and will not settle or concede this 
issue. However, depending on the facts of the case, the merits of the § 6015(t) claim might be 
conceded. 
c . And the IRS's bitter-end fight to validate the regulation ended up 
in the Seventh Circuit, where Judge Posner denied the existence of "audible silence." Lantz v. 
Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 6/8/10). The taxpayer was described as "a financially 
unsophisticated woman whose husband, a dentist, was arrested for Medicare fraud in' 2000, 
convicted and imprisoned. They had been married for only six years when he was arrested and 
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( there is no suggestion that she was aware of, let alone complicit in, his fraud." She received a 
packet that included a notice of a proposed levy on her in 2003, but did not respond because her 
estranged husband told her "he'd deal with the matter." He asked the IRS to be sent the 
application form for seeking innocent-spouse relief, explaining that his wife was an "innocent 
spouse," but he died before filing it. In 2006, the IRS applied taxpayer's $3,230 income tax 
refund for 2005 to her joint and several liability for 1999 of more than $1.3 million. 
"Unemployed and impecunious, she applied for innocent-spouse relief but the IRS turned her 
down because she'd missed the two year-deadline .... " The Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner), 
sustained the regulation and agreed with the IRS's denial of relief, stating, " ... any statute of 
limitations will cut off some, and often a great many, meritorious claims." 
• Judge Posner denied the existence of "audible silence" in the 
following words: 
But even if our review of statutory interpretations by the Tax Court were 
deferential, we would not accept "audible silence" as a reliable guide to 
congressional meaning. "Audible silence," like Milton's "darkness visible" or the 
Zen koan "the sound of one hand clapping," requires rather than guides 
interpretation. Lantz's brief translates "audible silence" as "plain language," and 
adds (mysticism must be catching) that "Congress intended the plain language of 
the language used in the statute." 
• In sustaining the regulation Judge Posner reasoned as 
follows; 
Agencies .:. are not bashful about making up their own deadlines[,] ... and because 
it is as likely that Congress knows this as that it knows that courts like to borrow a 
statute of limitations when Congress doesn't specify one, ·the fact that Congress 
designated a deadline in two provisions of the same statute and not in a third is 
not a compelling argument that Congress meant to preclude . the Treasury 
Department from imposing a deadline applicable to cases governed by that third 
provision"; if there is no deadline in subsection (t), the two-year deadlines in 
subsections (b) and (c) will be set largely at naught because the substantive 
criteria of those sections are virtually the same as those of (t) .... 
We must also not overlook the introductory phrase in subsection (f)---"under 
procedures prescribed by the [Treasury Department]"-or the further delegation 
in 26 U.S.C § 6015(h) to the Treasury to "prescribe such regulations as are 
necessary to carry out the provisions of' section 6015. In related contexts such a 
delegation has been held to authorize an agency to establish deadlines for 
applications for discretionary relief. 
• The opinion concludes with the hope that the IRS would 
grant taxpayer relief under § 6343 from its levy on taxpayer by declaring the taxes "currently not 
collectible" as follows" 
Ironically, the Service declared the taxes owed by Lantz's husband - the crooked 
dentist - "currently not collectible." She is entitled a fortiori to such relief, and 
there is no deadline for seeking it. We can at least hope that the IRS knows better 
than to try to squeeze' water out of a stone.5 
2. See no evil, hear no evil, but speak evil of ex-spouse - a perfect 
formula for § 6015 relief. Phemister v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-201 (9/2/09). The 
taxpayer was entitled to relief from liability on a tax deficiency attributable to her ex-husband's 
medical practice under § 6015(b) where she had no meaningful involvement with the business 
and the adjustments resulted from his failure to substantiate claimed expenses. Although his 
business income supported the taxpayer, it was more than sufficient to have provided support 
without regard to the disallowed expenses. Thus, the disallowed expenses did not result in any 
meaningful financial benefit to the taxpayer. The taxpayer also was entitled to § 6015(t) 
5 But cf, Exodus 17:1-7 and Numbers 20:1-13. 
107 
equitable relief. She was divorced from her ex-husband, she had no meaningful involvement ( 
with the business, his adjustments resulted from his failure to substantiate claimed expenses; she 
did not know who kept her husband's books and records, and there was no evidence she 
reviewed any of his claimed deductions. 
3. One spouse pays and other spouse doesn't and no one is innocent. One 
is just more cooperative with the IRS. Jordan v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 1 (1111110). The 
Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that spouses may separately agree to a waiver of the lO-year 
period of limitations on collections for a year with respect to which they filed a joint return. The 
waiver may be effective with respect to one spouse, but not with respect to the other spouse if the 
other spouse did not also execute the waiver or has the right to repudiate it. 
4 • The statute might not have correctly articulated the statutory cross 
reference, but the Tax Court got the drift of congressional intent anyway. Adkison v. 
Commissioner, 129 T.C. 97 (10/16/07). The Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to review a 
claim for apportioned liability relief under § 6015(c) when the tax liability in question relates to 
partnership income and the deficiency notice on which the jurisdiction was asserted to be based 
is invalid because the partnership items are subject to determination in a TEFRA partnership 
level proceeding that has not yet been resolved. Section 6230(a)(3)(A), which still refers to 
former § 6013(e), the statutory predecessor of § 6015, evidences congressional intent that the 
spouse of a partner can initiate a claim for innocent spouse relief with respect to a deficiency 
attributable to an adjustment of a partnership item only after the IRS issues a notice of 
computational adjustment following the completion of the partnership-level proceeding. Judge 
Cohen concluded that Congress simply overlooked the need to correct the cross references in 
§ 6230 when it replaced § 6013(e) with § 6015. 
a. Affirmed on other grounds: The Tax Court had jurisdiction, 
but cannot grant any relief until the TEFRA proceeding is. concluded~ Adkison v. 
Commissioner, 592 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1121/10). Judge Bybee's opinion for the Ninth Circuit 
described the Tax Court's holding as "dismiss[ing] for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that ( 
because a separate partnership proceeding involving the transaction from which the deficiency 
arose was already pending, the Commissioner did not "assert" a deficiency against Adkison 
within the meaning of [§ 6015(e)(I)(A)." However, Judge Bybee concluded that the Tax Court 
did have jurisdiction, because nothing in § 6320 divests the Tax Court of jurisdiction under § 
6015. He found that "the Commissioner, joined by the Tax Court, has confused the availability 
of a remedy with the question of the Tax Court's jurisdiction." However, he continued to 
conclude that: 
Although ... the Tax Court has jurisdiction over Adkison's § 6015 petition, the 
Tax Court's instincts were correct: in light of the ... TEFRA proceeding ... , there is 
no "appropriate relief available" to Adkison." TEFRA plainly contemplates that 
when a partnership proceeding is pending, the Commissioner will not assert a 
deficiency against a taxpayer-partner until the partnership proceeding determines 
the liability of the partnership, and consequently, the partners. ... Once the 
. TEFRA proceeding is concluded, the partners are entitled to a "final partnership 
administrative adjustment," id. § 6223(a)(2), their tax deficiency is determined, 
and at that point, the spouse of a partner may file a petition for relief under § 
6015. 
• Thus, the judgment was affirmed on the grounds that no 
remedy was available, even though there was jurisdiction. 
• We think Judge Bybee was confused by the phrase "in the 
case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted" in § 6015(e) and concluded that 
the Tax Court has jurisdiction even though the deficiency notice is invalid. A long line of case law 
holds that the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction in every case in which a "deficiency is asserted," 
to use Judge Bybee's phrase, but only in those cases in which a valid deficien:cy notice has been 
issued. If the deficiency notice was issued prematurely, it was not valid, and if the deficiency notice 
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( is not valid, although the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to "redetermine" the asserted deficiency, the 
IRS nevertheless is barred from assessing the tax. 
5. The widow inherits the ability to make a standalone § 601S(c) election, 
even though § 601S(b) and § 601S(f) relief were foreclosed by the pleadings in the prior 
deficiency case. Deihl v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.7 (2/23/10). The taxpayer and her late 
husband had contested deficiencies for 1996, 1997, and 1998 in Tax Court proceedings in 2004. 
The petition in that proceeding had raised the issue of § 6105 relief for 1996, but not for 1997 or 
1998; however, in the stipulation of facts for the consolidated cases, the claim for relief from 
joint and several liability was withdrawn. Only the taxpayer's husband signed the petition in the 
deficiency proceeding. The taxpayer did not (1) sign any court documents in the case, (2) review 
the petitions or the stipulations of facts, or (3) agree to any of the stipulations. Her husband and 
their (his) lawyer did not discuss the documents with the taxpayer, and she saw them for the first 
time at trial in the instant case. The taxpayer'did not meet with any IRS personnel, participate in 
any settlement negotiations with the IRS, or sit in on any such meetings between her attorneys 
and the IRS during the litigation in the earlier case, although she was called as a witness and 
testified briefly. The taxpayer's husband died after the trial but before a final order was entered. 
After the decision was entered, the taxpayer filed an administrative claim for relief from joint 
and several liability for all three years, which the IRS denied on the ground that the claim was 
barred by res judicata under § 6015(g)(2). The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) held that § 6015(g)(2) 
applied because the Tax Court entered final decisions for 1996 through 1998. However, because 
§ 6015 relief was raised only in the pleadings for 1996, § 6015 relief for 1997 and 1998 was not 
an issue in the prior proceeding, and because the taxpayer did not meaningfully participate in the 
prior preceding, the exception in § 6015(g)(2) applied for 1997 and 1998 and the taxpayer was 
not barred from seeking relief for those years. Furthermore, because the petition in the 2004 
proceeding did not specifically invoke § 6015(c), and the taxpayer was ineligible to make a 
§ 6015 election at the time because her husband was alive, a § 6015(c) election was not an issue 
in the prior proceeding, the taxpayer was not barred from seeking § 60 15( c) apportioned liability 
for 1996. However, relief from joint and several liability for 1996 was raised by the petition and 
thus was at issue in the earlier proceeding, and § 6015(g)(2) barred the taxpayer from claiming 
relief from joint and several liability under § 6015(b) and (f) for 1996. 
6 . Pyrr~ic victory on the meaning of "no reason to know." Greer v. 
Commissioner, 595 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2117/10). The taxpayer sought § 6015(b) relief with 
respect to a deficiency attributable to her husband's disallowed tax shelter deductions and 
credits. In the Tax Court, Judge Goeke found that "rather than having '''no reason to know' of 
the tax understatement, as required for relief, she 'chose not to know,'" and denied relief. In 
affirming, the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Moore, adopted the test of Price v. 
Commissioner, 887 F2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989), under which "in erroneous-deduction cases, '[a] 
spouse has "reason to know" of the substantial understatement if a reasonably prudent taxpayer 
in her position at the time she signed the return could be expected to know that the return 
contained the substantial understatement.'" The court rejected application of the knowledge of 
the transaction test, which applies to income omission cases, on the following reasoning. 
The knowledge-of-the-transaction test leaves room for a taxpayer to claim 
innocent-spouse relief in omitted-income claims, because the understatement 
arises in such cases from information being left off a return, and the spouse 
otherwise may not have known or had reason to know. that information. In 
erroneous-deduction cases, the understatement arises from information being 
included on the return, so a spouse who signs a tax return necessarily learns of the 
transaction. The knowledge-of-the-transaction test writes the innocent-spouse 
provision out of the law in such cases. A more nuanced approach is thus required, 
especially given that an understatement arising from a deduction usually is not 
obvious from the face of a tax return. A taxpayer who knows how much money 
the family earned will know that tax has been understated if income is omitted 
from the return, as it is common knowledge that income is taxable .... By contrast, 
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a taxpayer who is aware of an investment mayor may not know that tax benefits 
claimed on its basis are impermissible, depending on that taxpayer's level of 
sophistication and how much he or she knows about the investment. .... The Price 
test takes account of this difference. 
• Nevertheless, relief was denied because the Tax Court did 
not clearly err; "[T]he low level of taxes owed relative to the income reported ... should have given 
Mrs. Greer pause." Section 6015(f) equitable relief also was denied, on the ground that the taxpayer 
failed to demonstrate economic hardship. 
• Note that current Reg. §1 .6015-3(c)(2)(i)(b)(I), which was 
effective for year in which the taxpayer sought relief but which was not cited by the court, expressly 
provides: "In the case of an erroneous deduction or credit, knowledge of the item means knowledge 
of the facts that made the item not allowable as a deduction or credit." 
7 . It's tough to get back money you never paid the IRS, even if you 
might be an innocent spouse. Kaufman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-89 (4/27110). The 
Tax Court held that - assuming for the sake of argument that the surviving spouse would be 
entitled to § 6015(f) relief - no relief was available because she was seeking a refund of amounts 
paid by her husband's estate, not amounts paid by her. 
H. Miscellaneous 
1 . Claims for a method for hedging risk in commodities trading are held 
not to concern patent-eligible subject matter. This leads to the possible conclusion that tax 
strategies are not patentable. However, the Federal Circuit did not overrule the State Street 
case and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 
(Fed. Cir. 10/30/08) (9-3), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (6/1/09). The 
Federal Circuit (Judge Michel) affirmed a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences that claims for a method for managing (hedging) the risks in commodities trading 
did not constitute a patent-eligible subject matter. The meaning of a patentable "process" under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 ["Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine [etc.] ... 
may obtain a patent therefore .... ] includes only the transformation of a physical object or 
substance, or an electronic signal representative of a physical object or substance." 
a. Federal Circuit is affirmed, in that the hedging method did not 
constitute a patent-eligible subject matter, but the Supreme Court's long-awaited opinion leaves 
the law farkockteh [utterly messed up] and leaves tax practitioners farblonjet [completely 
confused]. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (6/28/10). Tax method patents appear to be 
permissible under the Court's opinion if they constitute a process related to a machine (and that 
test is not the exclusive test). Moreover, business method patents are not categorically excluded 
from patentability. There is much more, but it is patent law and not of interest to non-masochistic 
tax practitioners. 
2 . Two bites at the apple for the IRS, because the apples are different 
varieties. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.3 (8/24/09). The 
trust was the shareholder of four corporations that sold all of their assets for cash, resulting in 
large capital gains. Following the asset sales, the trust sold all of the stock of the corporations to 
a midco - actually named Midco - which purportedly sheltered the corporations' capital gains 
with losses from newly contributed high basis, low value assets, following which the assets of 
the corporations were stripped. Initially, the IRS asserted a deficiency against the trust on the 
theory that the corporations had been constructively liquidated while still owned by the trust and 
the trust had received the cash balances held by the corporations. A docketed Tax Court case on 
this issue was settled with the IRS conceding that there was no deficiency. Subsequently, all four 
corporations entered into closing agreements with the IRS under which substantial taxes were 
due with respect to the asset sales. At that time, however, all four of the corporations were 
insolvent. The IRS asserted transferee liability againstthe trust, and the trust raised the defenses 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Judge Goeke held that neither res judicata nor collateral 
estoppel applied. The cause of action in the deficiency cases was different than the cause of 
action in the transferee liability case. The deficiency case dealt with the trust's fiduciary income 
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( tax -liability on the sale of the stock in the corporations. That determination would not have 
required the trust to pay the unpaid tax liabilities of the corporations. The trust's liability as 
transferee differs from the trust's income tax liability. Collateral estoppel did not apply because 
no facts were determined in the earlier proceeding that concluded with the IRS's concession. 
Because the question whether there were liquidating distributions to the trust was not litigated 
and was not essential to the decisions in the deficiency actions, collateral estoppel did not bar the 
IRS from asserting in the transferee action that there were liquidating distributions from the 
corporations to the trust. 
3 . The taxpayer won the complex legal issue, inadvertently conceded the 
critical factual issue, and thus lost the case. Ron Lykins. Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.5 
(9/2/09). A deficiency asserted against the taxpayer corporation for 1999 and 2000 was resolved 
in a Tax Court case, Ron Lykins, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2006-35. The taxpayer 
incurred an NOL in 2001, and the taxpayer requested and received a tentative refund attributable 
to carrying back the NOL to 1999 and 2000 before the IRS issued the deficiency notice. The 
deficiency notice did not refer to the NOL carrybacks from 2001 or take into account the refunds 
in its computation of tax liability. Subsequently, the IRS disallowed the tentative NOL 
carrybacks and taxpayer raised the issue of the NOL carrybacks, but the Tax Court held that 
there was no deficiency without regard to the NOL carrybacks, neither party having put on 
evidence as to the NOL carrybacks. After initially allowing the tentative refund attributable to 
the NOL carrybacks, the IRS disallowed them and summarily assessed the amounts of the 
tentative refunds pursuant to § 6213(b )(3). The IRS gave notice of intent to levy and the taxpayer 
requested a CDP hearing. Following the CDP hearing the IRS issued a notice of determination to 
proceed with collection, and the taxpayer appealed. The taxpayer did not attempt to prove the 
merits of the 2001 NOL in either the CDP hearing or the Tax Court, but argued that under res 
judicata, the 2006 decision in the original deficiency case barred the IRS from asserting that it 
owed more taxes for 1999 and 2000. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) first found that collateral 
estoppel did not bar the taxpayer from raising the 2001 NOL carryback, because the merits of the 
2001 NOL were not "actually litigated" in the prior deficiency case. More importantly, he held 
that even assuming that either party could have litigated the NOL in the prior deficiency case, res 
judicata did not bar either the taxpayer or the IRS from raising or disputing the 2001 NOL 
carryback and its effect upon the 1999 and 2000 tax liabilities. The reason res judicata did not 
bar relitigation of the impact of the NOL carryback was that § 6511 (d)(2)(B) explicitly permits 
the taxpayer to pay the summary assessments and pursue an overpayment remedy for NOL 
carrybacks without the bar of res judicata. On the other side of the coin, although § 6212(c)(l) 
generally bars the IRS from issuing a second notice of deficiency after a taxpayer has filed a Tax 
Court petition, § 6213(b)(1) and (3) expressly allow the IRS to determine an additional 
deficiency that results from a tentative carryback refund even if the IRS has previously issued a 
deficiency notice of for the carryback year and the taxpayer has filed a Tax Court petition. The 
court emphasized that it was not holding simply that § 6212(c)(1) by itself trumps res judicata, 
and that the IRS avoids res judicata whenever it is permitted by § 6212(c)(1) to determine an 
additional deficiency, but that §§ 6411, 6212(c)(1), and 6213(b)(3) create a unique procedure for 
tentative carryback refunds, because recapture of a tentatively allowed refund is not ordinarily 
the subject of a taxpayer's petition in a deficiency case; However, in the end the court held for 
the IRS, concluding that because the taxpayer failed to carry the burden of proving its loss in 
2001 and establishing the validity of the carrybacks to 1999 and 2000, having conceded the issue 
by not raising it the CDP hearing, the proposed levy to collect the summary assessment would be 
upheld. 
4 0 Electronic filing to be required beginning in 2011. Section 17 of 
WHABA mandates that the IRS require electronic filing by "specified tax return preparers" for 
all tax returns filed after 12/31110. Specified tax return preparers are "all return preparers except 
those who neither prepare nor reasonably expect to prepare ten or more individual income tax 
returns [including returns for estates and trusts] in a calendar year." 
50 Burton Kanter got in trouble again, and this time it followed him to 
the grave. Investment Research Associates. Ltd. v. Commissioner, ToC. Memo. 1999-407 
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(12/15/99). In a 600-page opinion, Burton Kanter was held liable for the § 6653 fraud penalty by 
reason of his being "the architect who planned and executed the elaborate scheme with respect to 
'" kickback income payments .... " 
a. At first, he was unable to wriggle out, the way he did 25 years 
ago when he was acquitted by a jury. (His partner was convicted and imprisoned. See United 
States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981).) The 
taxpayers subsequently moved to have access to the special trial judge's "reports, draft opinions, 
or similar documents" prepared under Tax Court Rule 183(b). They based their motion on 
conversations with two unnamed Tax Court judges that the original draft opinion from the 
special trial judge was changed by Judge Dawson before he adopted it. (Kanter's attorney later 
revealed the names of the two judges, when asked at oral argument to the Seventh Circuit, as Tax 
Court Judge Julian Jacobs and Chief Special Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos. See the text at 
footnote 1 of Judge Cudahy's dissent in the Seventh Circuit Kanter Estate opinion, below.) They 
were turned down because the Tax Court held that the documents related to its internal 
deliberative processes. See, Tax Court Order denying motion, 2001lNT 23-31 (4/26/00) and (on 
reconsideration) 2001 lNT 23-30 (8/30100). 
b. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer 
Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit. Ballard v. Commissioner, 
321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2/13/03), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
the Tax Court decision and rejected the taxpayers' argument that changes allegedly made to the 
original draft opinion from the special trial judge by Judge Dawson before he adopted it were 
improper. Judge Fay stated: 
Even assuming Dick's [taxpayers' lawyer's] affidavit to be true and affording 
Petitioners-Appellants all reasonable inferences, the process utilized in this case 
does not give rise to due process concern. While the procedures used in the Tax 
Court may be unique to that court, there is nothing unusual about judges 
conferring with one another about cases assigned to them. These conferences are 
an essential part of the judicial process when, by statute, more than one judge is 
charged with the responsibility of deciding the case. And, as a result of such 
conferences, judges sometimes change their original position or thoughts. 
Whether Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared drafts of his report or 
subsequently changed his opinion entirely is without import insofar as our 
analysis of the alleged due process violation pertaining to the application of [Tax 
Court] Rule 183 is concerned. Despite the invitation, this court will simply not 
interfere with another court's deliberative process. 
The record reveals, and we accept as true, that the underlying report adopted by 
the Tax Court is Special Trial Judge Couvillion's. Petitioners-Appellants have not 
demonstrated that the Order of August 30, 2000 is inaccurate or suspect in any 
manner. Therefore, we conclude that the application of Rule 183 in this case did 
not violate Petitioners-Appellants' due process rights. Accordingly, we deny the 
request for relief and save for another day the more troubling question of what 
would have occurred had Special Trial Judge Couvillion not indicated that the 
report adopted by the Tax Court accurately reflected his findings and opinion. 
c. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer 
Kanter's Estate loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Seventh Circuit. Estate of Kanter v. 
Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per curiam) (2-1), q/J'g in part and rev 'g in part 
T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The court found that the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's original 
report was proper, following the Eleventh Circuit's Ballard opinion. It affirmed the findings on 
deficiencies, fraud and penalties, but reversed on the issue of the deductibility of Kanter's 
expenses for his involvement in the aborted sale of a purported John Trumball painting of 
George Washington because "Kanter has shown a distinct proclivity to seek income and profit 
through activities similar to the failed sale of the painting." 
• Burton Kanter died on October 31, 2001. 
112 
( 
( 
( 
( d. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated but taxpayer 
Lisle's Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue in the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v. 
Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 7/30/03), aff'g in part and rev'g in part T.e. Memo. 
1999-407. The Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit· 
decisions upholding the nondisclosure of the Special Trial Judge's original report by the Tax 
Court. 
e. Justice Ginsburg to Tax Court judges: "You Article I judges 
don't understand your own rules, so let me tell you what you meant when you adopted 
them in 1983." Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (3/7/05) (7-2), reversing and remanding 
337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) and 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2/13/03). Justice Ginsburg held 
that the Tax Court may neither exclude from the record on appeal nor conceal from the taxpayers 
the original draft reports of Special Trial Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b) or under any 
statutory authority. 
• Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, joined by 
Justice Thomas, states that the "Tax Court's compliance with its own Rules is a matter on which we 
should defer to the interpretation of that court." 
f. The Eleventh Circuit orders that the Special Trial Judge's 
report be added to the record . .Ballard v. Commissioner, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. '50,393 (11th Cir. 
5/17/05). 
q. Tax Court changes its rules. (9/20/05). The Tax Court adopted 
amendments to Tax Court Rules 182 and 183, relating.to Special Trial Judges' reports in cases 
other than small tax cases. The Special Trial Judge's recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are to be served on the parties, who may file written objections and responses. 
After the case is assigned to a regular Judge, any changes made shall be reflected in the record 
and "[ d]ue regard shall be given to the circumstance that the Special Trial Judge had the 
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and the finding of fact recommended by the 
Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to be correct." 
h. The Eleventh Circuit remands the case to the Tax Court -
after reinstating the Special Trial Judge's report. Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 
(l1th Cir. 1112/05) (per curiam). The case was remanded to the Tax Court with the following 
instructions: (l) the "collaborative report and opinion" is ordered stricken; (2) the original report 
of the special trial judge is ordered reinstated; (3) the Tax Court Chief Judge is instructed to 
assign this case to a previously-uninvolved regular Tax Court Judge; and (4) the Tax Court shall 
proceed to review this matter in accordance with the Supreme Court's dictates and with its 
newly-revised Rules 182 and 183, giving "due regard" to the credibility determinations of the 
special trial judge and presuming correct fact findings of the trial judge. 
i. And the Fifth Circuit remands it too. Estate of Lisle v. 
Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 11122/05) (per curiam). The case was remanded to the Tax 
Court with orders to: (l) strike the "collaborative report" that formed the basis of the Tax Court's 
ultimate decision; (2) reinstate Judge Couvillion's original report; (3) refer the case to a regular 
Tax Court judge who had no involvement in the preparation of the "collaborative report," who in 
dealing with the remaining issue of tax deficiency must give "due regard" to the credibility 
determinations of Judge Couvillion, presuming that his fact findings are correct unless 
manifestly unreasonable; and (4) adhere strictly hereafter to the amended Tax Court Rule in 
finalizing Tax Court opinions. 
j . On remand, in a 458-page opinion Judge Haines of the Tax 
Court pours out Kanter and Ballard. Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-21 
(2/1/07). The Tax Court (Judge Haines) found that certain of the Special Trial Judge's findings 
of fact were "manifestly unreasonable" because they were "internally inconsistent or so 
implausible that a reasonable fact finder would not believe [the recommended finding]" or they 
were "directly contradicted by documentary or objective evidence." Judge Haines therefore 
found that the Kanter-related entities were shams, that "Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle participated in 
a complex, well-disguised scheme to share kickback payments earned jointly by Kanter, Ballard, 
and Lisle," and that they earned income during the years at issue which they failed to report. 
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• Judge Haines found that - based upon factors such as ( 
(1) failure to report substantial amounts of income, (2) concealment ofthe true nature of the income 
and the identity of the earners of the income, (3) use of sham, conduit, and nominee entities, 
(4) reporting Kanter's and Ballard's income on IRAs [and another entity's] tax returns, 
(5) commingling of Kanter's and Ballard's income with funds belonging to others, (6) phony loans, 
(7) false and misleading documents, and (8) failure to cooperate during the examination process by 
engaging in a "strategy of obfuscation and delay" - the Commissioner demonstrated by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that Kanter and Ballard filed false and fraudulent tax returns for each of the 
years at issue. 
• Judge Haines held that the Tax Court is "obliged to review 
the recommended fmdings of fact and credibility determinations set forth in the STJ report under a 
'manifestly unreasonable' standard of review, and ... may reject such fmdings of fact and credibility 
determinations only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, [it] conclude[s] that the 
recommended finding of fact or testimony (l) is internally inconsistent or so implausible that a 
reasonable fact finder would not believe it, or (2) is not credible because it is directly contradicted 
by documentary or objective evidence." Furthermore, Judge Haines held that a special trial judge's 
credibility determinations may be rejected under the "manifestly unreasonable" standard of review 
without rehearing the disputed testimony. " 
• Judge Haines further found that the appropriate standard for 
determining whether the assignment of income doctrine should be applied had been appropriately 
articulated in United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917,919-920, as follows: 
To shift the tax liability, the assignor [taxpayer] must relinquish his control over 
the activity that generates the income; the income must be the fruit of the contract 
or the property itself, and not of his ongoing income-producing activity .... This 
means, in the case of a contract, that in order to shift the tax liability to the 
assignee the assignor either must assign the duty to perform along with the right 
to be paid or must have completed performance before he assigned the contract; (" 
otherwise it is he, not the contract, or the assignee, that is producing the 
contractual income - it is his income, and he is just shifting it to someone else in 
order to avoid paying income tax on it. 
k. And the beat goes on, with a judicial recognition that 
structural complexity is the norm for "a knowledgeable tax attorney." Ballard v. 
Commissioner, 522 F.3d 1229 (lIth Cir. 417108). The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Fay) reversed, 
vacated and remanded T.C. Memo. 2007-21 (2/1/07) (Haines, J.), with instructions to "enter an 
order approving and adopting Judge Couvillion's original report as the opinion of the Tax 
Court." The reason assigned was that Judge Haines "did not presume Judge Couvillion's findings 
to be correct or give Judge Couvillion's credibility determinations their due deference," 
concluding that 
It is no surprise that a knowledgeable tax attorney would use numerous legal 
entities to accomplish different objectives. This does not make them illegitimate. 
Unfortunately such "maneuvering" is apparently encouraged by our present tax 
laws and code. 
1. "One for all and all for one." Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 
541 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 8/25/08), is to the same effect as Ballard. 
m. A former member of the University of Chicago Law School 
faculty, members of which took a pro-Kanter stand during the entire litigation because the 
School was getting big bucks from Kanter and/or his estate, decided the last appeal in this matter 
in favor of Burton Kanter's estate. Result: The late Burton Kanter = 1; the IRS = zero; the Tax 
Court = minus 1. Did we mention that the former faculty member was married to a current 
member of the faculty? Kanter v. Commissioner, 590 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 12/1/09). The Seventh 
Circuit reversed, vacated and remanded T.C. Memo. 2007-21 (2/1/07), with instructions to "enter 
an order approving and adopting the STJ's report as the decision ofthe Tax Court." Judge Wood 
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( found that the STJ's findings were not "clearly erroneous" but "freely acknowledge[d] that a 
rational person could just as easily have come to the opposite conclusion on this record." 
• On his federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 
1989, Burton Kanter reported that he had no income tax liability. That return position has been 
vindicated. So it goes. 
n. Chutzpah on steroids by this influential Chicago family. According 
to Tax Analysts, the Kanter family has called for removal of several Tax Court judges. "Taxes, 
taxes, we don't have to pay no steenking income taxes." 2010 TNT 44-1 (3/8/10). "As attorneys 
for the Kanter family, we call on the president, who has the power to remove a Tax Court judge, 
to immediately institute an investigation on whether such removal is justified," Lanny J. Davis of 
McDermott Will & Emery told Tax Analysts. "We also call on the committees of Congress that 
have oversight of the Tax Court to institute an investigation of Judge Dawson and other Tax 
Court judges who appear to have been at least complicit in knowing about Judge Dawson's 
pattern of deception and not reporting him to senior authorities or, even worse, participated in a 
cover-up of his deception in the summer of 2005 after the Supreme Court forced the disclosure 
of Judge Couvillion's original opinion." 
• The Kanter family is also upset because the IRS is auditing 
Burton Kanter's estate tax return. Why on earth would the IRS do something like that? 
6 . When the ms says it's going negative on a private letter ruling you 
better withdraw it the way the Rev. Proc says to. Does this taxpayer really think that 
captioning the case as "Anonymous v. Commissioner" will help hide from the IRS? 
Anonymous v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.2 (1/19/10). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that 
it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the issuance of private letter ruling after the taxpayer failed to 
withdraw the request following notification that the ruling would be adverse. (The Tax Court 
does have jurisdiction to determine whether certain items in a private letter ruling must be 
redacted prior to publication.) Judge Goeke summarized taxpayer's argument (before rejecting it) 
as follows: 
Petitioner ... argues that the [administrative Procedure Act] provides this Court 
with the authority to order respondent not to disclose the PLR at issue because the 
PLR was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Petitioner alleges 
section 6110(:t)(3) grants the Court the express authority to review written 
determinations open to public inspection like PLRs. Petitioner contends that the 
contents of the PLR are contrary to law and thus respondent acted arbitrarily, 
capriciously, and in bad faith in issuing it. Petitioner further argues that for the 
same reason the PLR should not be disclosed to Department of the Treasury 
officials. 
7. "The whistleblower talks twice." Chief Council Notice CC-2010-004 
(2/17/1 0). This Chief Counsel notice clarifies the limitations on contacts between IRS employees 
and informants, including informants who have filed claims under § 7623, by permitting more 
than one contact with informants [including those informants who are current employees of the 
taxpayer]. There are safeguards to prevent the informant from becoming an instrument or agent 
of the government, as well as a prohibition on accepting any information from an informant who 
is the taxpayer's representative in any administrative matter pending before the IRS. 
8 . Congress discovers that corporations as well as unincorporated 
businesses might cheat less if payors rat them out to the IRS. The 2010 Health Care Act 
amended § 6041 to extend to payments to corporations the information reporting requirement for 
all payments by a business to any single payee (other than a payee that is a tax exempt 
corporation) aggregating $600 or more in a calendar year for amounts paid in consideration for 
property or services. However, the expanded rule does not override other specific Code 
provisions that except payments from reporting, for example, securities or broker transactions as 
defined under § 6045(a) and the regulations thereunder. The new rule is effective for payments 
made after 12/31/11. 
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• There is a move in Congress to repeal this provision in ( 
exchange for for tax increases on multinational corporations. 
9 • Reporting, reporting, there's lots of health care reporting. 
a. Employer reporting, Act 1. The 2010 Health Care Act amended 
§ 6051 of the Code to require reporting on each employee's annual Form W-2 the value of the 
employee's health insurance coverage sponsored by the employer for taxable years beginning 
after 12131110. 
b. Employer reporting, Act 2. The 2010 Health Care Act added new 
§ 6056 to the Code and amended § 6724( d) to impose health insurance reporting requirements on 
employers. Applicable large employers subject to the employer responsibility provisions of new 
§ 4980H, and other employers who offer minimum essential coverage to their employees under 
an employer-sponsored plan and pay premiums in excess of 8 percent of employee wages, must 
report specified health insurance coverage information to both its full-time employees and to the 
IRS. An employer who fails to comply with these new reporting requirements is subject to the 
penalties for failure to file an information return and failure to furnish payee statements, 
respectively. The new rules are effective for calendar years beginning after 2013. 
c. Insurer reporting. The 2010 Health Care Act added new § 6055 
to the Code and amended § 6724( d). Insurers, including employers who self-insure, that provide 
minimum essential coverage to any individual must report certain health insurance coverage 
information to both the individual and to the IRS. An insurer who fails to comply with these new 
reporting requirements is subject to the penalties for failure to file an information return and 
failure to furnish payee statements, respectively. The new rules are effective for calendar years 
beginning after 2013. 
10. Disclosure of return information is OK if the purpose is verify 
eligibility 1 ineligibility for cost-sharing benefits and an advance § 36B premium credit 
through an American Health Benefits Exchange. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 6103 
to the Code to allow the IRS to disclose to HHS certain return information of any taxpayer ( 
whose income is relevant in determining the amount of the tax credit or cost-sharing reduction, 
or eligibility for participation in the specified State health subsidy programs (Le., a State 
. Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social Security Act, a State's children's health 
insurance program under title XXI of such Act, or a basic health program under § 2228 of such 
Act). 
11. IRS releases recommendations that paid tax return preparers would 
be required to register. IR-201O-1, 2010 INT 2-1 (114/10). The IRS released a list of 
recommendations that would require that individuals who sign a tax return as a paid preparer pay 
a user fee to register online with the IRS and obtain a preparer tax identification number [PTIN]. 
All preparers - except attorneys, CPAs and enrolled agents - would have to pass competency 
exams and complete 15 hours of annual CPE in federal tax law topics. The IRS proposes to 
expand Circular 230 to cover all signing and nonsigning return preparers. Registered preparers 
would be listed on a publicly-searchable data base and would be required to have PTlNs in 2011. 
a; We wish we had Karen's confidence in Accenture. The IRS Office 
of Professional Responsibility is not at all concerned with the task of registering paid tax 
preparers. That is because Accenture will be the vendor to establish a system for on-line 
registration, with a target date of 9/1110. Accenture will undoubtedly bring to this task the same 
thoughtful foresight and judgment it used when it selected Tiger Woods as its leading 
spokesperson. 2010 INT 85-24 (5/4110). The IRS announced that Accenture National Security 
Services, LLC, will be the vendor to establish a system for on-line registration of paid tax return 
preparers. "The vendor will develop and maintain the registration application system and address 
related questions." Karen Hawkins, Director of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility 
recently stated that she was not worried about registration of paid preparers because Accenture 
would take care of it completely. 
b. Some of us learned about the concept of "fee simple" in school but 
these will not be "simple fees"; instead there will be mUltiple fees - some of which will be raked 
off by Accenture. REG-139343-08, User Fees Relating to Enrollment and Preparer Tax ( 
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Identification Numbers, 75 F.R. 43110 (7/23110). Registration for an identifying number, 
together with a $50 fee will be required for all tax return preparers who prepare all, or 
substantially all, of a return or claim for refund of tax after 12/31/10. Accenture may charge a 
"reasonable fee" that is independent of the $50 user fee. 
• The IRS later confirmed that the user fee for the first year of 
registration will be $64.25; the excess $14.25 will permit Accenture to ''wet its beak." 
c. The ms issued proposed regulations which would regulate tax 
return preparers. REG-138637-07, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal 
Revenue Service, 75 F.R. 51713 (8119110). These proposed regulations would amend Circular 
230 to apply to all paid return preparers and identify exactly which preparers have a registration 
obligation. They would also change the general Circular standard of contact from "more likely 
than not" to "reasonable basis" [sic]. 
Specifically, the proposed regulations establish "registered tax return preparers," 
as a new class of practitioners. Sections 10.3 through 10.6 of the proposed 
regulations describe the process for becoming a registered tax return preparer and 
the limitations on a registered tax return preparer's practice before the IRS. In 
general, practice by registered tax return preparers is limited to preparing tax 
retJ,lrns, claims for refund,. and other documents for submission to the IRS. A 
registered tax return preparer may prepare all or substantially all of a tax return or 
claim for refund, and sign a tax return or claim for refund, commensurate with the 
registered tax return preparer's level of competence as demonstrated by written 
examination. The proposed regulations also revise section 10.30 regarding 
solicitation, section 10.36 regarding procedures to ensure compliance, and section 
10.51 regarding incompetence and disreputable conduct. 
Proposed regulations under section 6109 of the Code (REG-134235-08) published 
in the Federal Register (75 FR 14539) on March 26,2010, also implement certain 
recommendations in the Report. The proposed regulations under section 6109 
provide that, for returns or claims for'refund filed after December 31, 2010, the 
identifying number of a tax return preparer is the individual's preparer tax 
identification number (PTIN) or such other number prescribed by the IRS in 
forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance. The proposed regulations under 
section 6109 provide that the IRS is authorized to require through other guidance 
(as well as in forms and instructions) that tax return preparers apply for a PTIN or 
other prescribed identifying number, the regular renewal of PTINs or other 
prescribed identifying number, and the payment of user fees. 
12. This whistleblower gets a chance to let the Tax Court decide whether 
or not he was whistling in the dark. Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.4 (7/8/10). The 
Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) held that it has jurisdiction under § 7623(b)(4) to review the denial of 
a claim for a whistleblower award. The court rejected IRS's argument that the Tax Court's 
jurisdiction is limited to appeals of a determination of the amount of the award. 
13. Might this case lead to DOMA becoming the Twenty Eighth 
Amendment? Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 106 AFTR2d 2018-5184 (D. Mass. 
7/8/10). District Court Judge Tauro held that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 
which limits the meaning of the word "marriage" to "a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife," and provides that "the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or wife" for purposes of all federal laws is an unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection in violation the equal protection principles embodied in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Joint return filing status under the Code was one of the 
issues addressed in the case; also addressed were goveniment benefits available to married 
individuals, e.g., employee health benefits, social security benefits. 
14. The Constitution does not require Appeals Officers for CDP hearings 
to be appointed by the President. Tucker v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.6 (7/26/10). The 
taxpayer requested a CDP hearing after the IRS issued a notice of filing of a tax lien. After the 
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settlement officer had upheld the tax lien notice, the taxpayer requested a remand for a hearing to ( 
be heard by an officer appointed by the President or the Secretary of the Treasury, in compliance 
with the Appointments Clause of U.S. Const., art.n; sec. 2, cl. ·2·. Judge Gustafson held that an 
"officer or employee" or an "appeals officer" under § 6320 or § 6330 is not an "inferior Officer 
of the United States" for purposes of the Appointments Clause. They are instead properly hired, 
pursuant to § 7804(a), under the authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The 
taxpayer's motion to remand was denied. 
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES 
A. Employment Taxes 
1 . Wisdom from the Mount. Medical residents may be students for 
FICA taxes. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida Inc., 486 F.3d 1248 (11th 
Cir. 5/18/07). Section 3121(b)(1O) provides that employment taxes are not payable with respect 
to services performed in the employ of a college or university by a student who is enrolled and 
regularly attending classes. The government argued that legislative history with respect to the 
repeal of an exemption for medical interns in 1965 (former § 3121(b)(13)) established as a 
matter of law that medical residents are subject to employment taxes. The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that § 3121(b)(10) is unambiguous in its application to students and that the statute 
requires a factual determination whether the hospital is a "school, college, or university" and 
whether the residents are "students." 
a. This is no April fool. The Minnesota District Court· also fmds that 
medical residents at the University of Minnesota are students. Regents of the University of 
Minnesota v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1532 (D. Minn. 4/1/08). The university's 
summary judgment motion was granted by the District Court, which held that medical residents 
at the University of Minnesota are not subject to employment taxes under the student exclusion 
of § 3121(b)(l0). The court reiterated its conclusion that the full-time employee exception in 
Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d), as amended in 2004, is invalid. 
b. The District Court finds that the Mount Sinai Medical Center ( 
is a school and the residents are students. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of 
Florida, Inc., 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5373 (S.D. Fla. 7/28/08). After the decision in Minnesota v. 
Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), Mount Sinai Medical Center obtained refunds for FICA 
taxes paid in 1996-1997. The United States filed suit against the Medical Center for erroneous 
refunds. Following the Eleventh Circuit's direction to make a factual determination whether the 
program qualifies for the § 310 1 (b)(1 0) exception, the District Court found that the Medical 
Center's residency programs were operated as a "school, college, or university," that residents 
were present for training in patient care, which was an intrinsic and mandatory component of the 
training, and that the residents were "students" who were regularly enrolled and attending 
classes. The court also found that the students' performance of patient care services was incident 
to their course of study. 
c. South Dakota medical residents are also students. Center for 
Family Medicine v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5623 (D. S. Dak. 8/6/08). Following 
Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), the South Dakota District Court held that 
medical residents in the Center for Family Medicine (CFM) and University of South Dakota 
School of Medicine Residency Program (USDSMRP) were eligible for the student exception to 
the definition of employment under § 3101(b)(l0). The court rejected the government's assertion 
that CFM was not a school, college or university because CFM was affiliated with a non-profit 
hospital. The court found that CFM's work includes teaching its medical residents the skills 
required to practice in their chosen profession. The court also concluded that the students were 
"enrolled" in the institution and that their attendance at noon conferences and medical rounds 
established that the students regularly attended classes. Tossing a small bone to the government, 
the court held that chief residents in the programs, who are essentially coordinators for the 
residency programs, were not students. 
d. Residents in Chicago are also students. University of Chicago 
Hospitals v. United States, 545 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 9/23/08). The court affirmed the district ( 
\ 
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( Court's denial of the government's motion for summary judgment based on the government 
argument that medical residents are per se ineligible for the student exemption from employment 
taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The court indicates that a case-by-case analysis is required to 
detenriine whether medical residents qualify for the statutory exemption. 
e. And ditto for medical residents in Detroit. United States v. 
Detroit Medical Center, 557 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2/26/09). Reversing the District Court's summary 
judgment, the Sixth Circuit joins the lineup holding that medical residents at the seven Detroit 
area hospitals operated by the Detroit Medical Center in a joint program with Wayne State 
University, which provides graduate medical education, may be students entitled to exemption 
from employment taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The court remanded the case for further 
development of the record regarding the nature of the residents' relationship to the hospitals and 
the education program. The court indicated that further development of the record would not 
preclude deciding the matter on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed summary 
judgment that the stipends paid to medical residents were not scholarships or fellowships 
excludible from income under § 117. The court found both that the stipends were received in 
exchange for services and that the medical residents were not candidates for a degree as required 
for exclusion under the terms of § 117. 
f. And ditto again for Sloan-Kettering. United States v. Memorial 
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 563 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 3/25/09). Following similar decisions in the 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed 
summary judgment for the United States holding that the District Courts for the Northern and 
Southern Districts of New York erred in holding as a matter of law that medical residents at the 
Albany Medical Center and the hospitals of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center were 
not eligible for exclusion from employment taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The cases were remanded 
to the trial courts for factual determinations whether the residents were students and whether the 
hospitals were schools. 
q. But the tide turns against the Mayo Clinic; however, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to the Eighth Circuit. Mayo Clinic residents mayor may not be students, 
the Supreme Court will decide. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United 
States, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 6/12/09), cert. granted, 6/10/10. For purposes of the student 
exclusion from FICA taxes under § 3121(b)(10), Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c) and (d), limit the 
definition of a school, college, or university to entities whose "primary function is the 
presentation of formal instruction." Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) provides that to qualify as a 
"student" rather than be classified as an employee, any services rendered must be "incident to 
and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study" at the institution for which the student 
provides the services. Furthermore, under the regulation, a person whose work schedule is 40 
hours or more per week is a full-time employee rather than a student. The District Court, in 
granting refunds of employment taxes, declared the regulation invalid. Applying the deference 
standard of Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Dej Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the 
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment for the United States. The 
court concluded that application of the exemption only to students pursuing a course of study 
who are not full time employees is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The court declined 
to consider whether the portion of the regulation limiting the definition of a school or college is 
valid because the medical residents were not students under the regulation in any event. 
h. And the IRS throws in the towel on refund claims for FICA 
taxes paid before April Fools' Day, 2005. I.R. 2010-25 (3/2/10). The IRS has decided to accept 
the position that medical residents are exempt from FICA taxes under the student exception and 
will issue refunds to hospitals, universities, and medical residents who have filed claims for 
refunds of FICA taxes paid before 4/1/05, which is the effective date of amendments to Reg. 
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2 providing that employees who work 40 hours or more during a week are not 
eligible for the student exception. 
2. FICA in paradise. Zhang v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 263 (Fed. Cl. 
9/22/09). Nonresident aliens, Chinese. nationals who were temporary contract workers in the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, were subject to FICA taxes. The 
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Commonwealth is statutorily connected to Guam, which is a U.S. territory, through a covenant ( 
that causes the Commonwealth to be considered within the U.S. for FICA purposes. The court 
noted that the covenant mandates that, except for FICA tax proceeds, income and other tax 
revenues shall be remitted to the treasury of the Commonwealth instead of the U.S. Treasury. 
3. REG-137036-08. Section 3504 Agent Employment Tax Liability, 75 F.R. 
1735 (1/12/10). Proposed regulations include Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 
withholding taxes within the scope of current regulatory authority that allows employers to meet 
their FICA tax obligations for dom~stic in-home services through an agent as provided in § 3401. 
The agent files a single return for multiple employers using the agent's employer identification 
number. 
4. The gamble doesn't payoff and this tribe sings the blues. Blue Lake 
Rancheria v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-683 (N.D. Calif. 1/7/10). Section 3306(c) 
excludes from employment for FUTA purposes "service performed . . . in the employ of an 
Indian tribe, or any instrumentality" thereof. Section 3309 also allows Indian tribes to opt out of 
paying state unemployment taxes if the tribe reimburses the state for actual costs of providing 
unemployment benefits to the tribe's employees. Mainstay is in the business for providing leased 
employees. It provides over 39,000 employees to business in three states. Mainstay is controlled 
by Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development Corporation, a tribal corporation. (The tribe has 
53 members.) Mainstay sought refund of over $2 million of FUTA taxes claiming that its 
employees were the employees of an Indian tribe. The court concluded that the tribal exception 
operates to eliminate the existence of statutory employment "where services performed in a 
common law relationship between an employer and employee would normally lead to the 
existence of "employment." The court then reasoned that "'employment' must be defined by 
reference to the common law employer, and that the statutory employer must be liable." The 
court holds, "that the exception to the definition of 'employment' for 'services performed ... in 
the employ of an Indian tribe, or any instrumentality' thereof, § 3306( c )(7), is only available 
when an Indian tribe is the common law employer of the employees in question. When an Indian ( 
tribe is merely the statutory employer, the applicability of this exception depends upon the ' 
employee'S relationship with his or her common law employer. Where the common law 
employer is not an Indian tribe, and where no other exemption under § 3306( c) applies, the 
statutory employer will be liable under FUTA." The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument 
that the Indian tribe was not a common law employer of the leased employees and the exemption 
therefore did not apply. 
5. We don't need no steenking payroll taxes! New Code § 3111(d)(I), 
added by the 2010 HIRE Act, excuses employers from paying the employer's share of OASDI 
taxes from 3/19/10 - sort of, see below - through 12/31/10 for wages paid to newly hired 
previously unemployed workers. However, unless employer elects out of the payroll tax holiday, 
wages paid to a qualified individual do not qualify for the § 51 work opportunity credit during 
the one-year period beginning on the date that the qualified employer hired the employee. 
• A "qualified" employee is an individual who (l) starts 
employment after 2/3/10 and before 1/1/11; (2) provides an affidavit, under penalties of perjury, 
certifying that he has not been employed for more than 40 hours during the 60-day period ending on 
the date his employment begins; (3) has not been hired to replace another employee who was 
discharged without cause; (4) is not related to the employer or a more than 50 percent owner of the 
stock of a corporate employer, in a manner that would disqualify him for the work opportunity 
credit under § 51(i)(l), i.e., a long list of relatives, including, inter alia, all ancestors and 
descendants, brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews, and close in-laws; however aunts, uncles, 
cousins and outlaws appear to be OK. 
• Wages paid during the first calendar quarter of 2010, i.e., 
between 3119110 and 3/31/10, do not actually qualify for complete forgiveness of the OASDI tax. 
Rather, the amount by which the OASDI tax for wages paid during the first calendar quarter of2010 
would have been reduced if the tax holiday had been in effect for that quarter is treated as a payment 
against the employer's OASDI tax on other employees in the second calendar quarter of2010. 
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• The tax waiver applies only to non-governmental employers 
except that it also applies to a public institution of higher education. The tax waiver ends on 
12/31/10. 
6 . Funding health care by making the ill tax more progressive; Section 
1301, as amended by the 2010 Health Care Act, increases the employee portion of the HI tax is 
increased by an additional tax of 0.9 percent on wages in excess of a threshold amount. The 
threshold amount is $250,000 of the combined wages of both spouses on a joint return ($125,000 
for a married individual filing a separate return. The threshold is $200,000 for all other 
individuals. The employer must withhold the additional ill tax, but in determining the 
employer's withholding requirement and liability for the tax, only wages that the employee 
receives from the employer in excess of $200,000 for a year are taken into account, and the 
employer disregards the employee's spouse's wages. I.R.C. § 3102(t). The employee is liable for 
the additional 0.9 percent HI tax to the extent the tax is not withheld by the employer. Section 
1402(b), as amended, imposes an additional tax of 0.9 percent self-employment income above 
the same thresholds, The threshold amount is reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of 
wages taken into account in determining the FICA tax with respect to the taxpayer. No deduction 
under § 164(t) for the additional SECA tax, and the alternative deduction under § 1402(a)(12) is 
determined without regard to the additional SECA tax rate. The additional tax applies to wages 
received in taxable years after 12/31/12. 
7. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 424 B.R. 237, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-
1110 (W.D. Mich. 2/23110). Severance payments made to pre-petition and post-petition 
employees who were involuntarily terminated were treated as wage-replacement social benefits 
rather than taxable remuneration and wages subject to FICA tax. The court concluded that under 
§ 3402(0) (which treats supplemental unemployment compensation benefits as wages for 
withholding) supplemental unemployment compensation was not "wages" and therefore was not 
taxable for purposes of FICA. 
• The result is contrary to the holding in CSX Corp. v. United 
States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
8. S corporation "John Edwards gambit" dividends may be treated as 
wages. Watson v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2624 (S.D. Iowa 5/27/10). Using a 
common tax reduction device, David Watson formed an S corporation that was a member of 
Watson's accounting firm. The S corporation contracted with the accounting firm to provide 
services. Watson was paid a salary of $24,000 as an employee of the S corporation, on which the 
S corporation paid employment taxes. The remainder of the S corporation income, approximately 
$200,000 per year, was distributed to Watson as a dividend, not subject to employee taxes. The 
IRS recharacterized the dividends as wages. The S corporation paid an assessment and brought a 
refund action. In a motion for summary judgment the S corporation asserted that its intent 
controls whether amounts paid are wages and that it intended to pay dividends in the amount of 
cash on hand after the payment of wages. Citing a long line of authorities in support of its 
position, the District Court held that the S corporation's "self proclaimed intent" to pay salary 
does not limit the government's ability to recharacterize dividends as wages. The court indicated 
that whether amounts paid to Watson were remuneration for services is a question of fact. 
• The court's opinion concluded with the following passage: 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff points the Court to the 
following oft-cited statement of Judge Learned Hand: 
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister 
in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as law as possible. 
Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes 
any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are 
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more 
in the name of morals is mere cant. 
See Pl.'s Reply Br. at 5 n. 2 (quoting Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Newman, 159 F.2d 848,850-51 (2d Cir.1947) (L. Hand, J., dissenting)). While the 
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Court agrees fully with Judge Learned Hand, it would remind Plaintiff of Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes' succinct, yet equally eloquent statement in Compania 
General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue: "Taxes are 
what we pay for civilized society." 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). Indeed, "the greatness of our nation is in no small part due to the 
willingness of our citizens to honestly and fairly participate in our tax collection 
system." Manley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo 1983-558 
(Sept. 12, 1983). Thus, while Plaintiff is free to structure its financial affairs in 
such a way as to avoid paying "more [taxes] than the law demands," Plaintiff is 
not free to structure its financial affairs in a way that avoids paying those taxes 
demanded by the law. In this case, the law demands that Plaintiff pay employment 
taxes on "all remuneration for employment," and there is clearly a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether the funds paid to Watson, in actuality, qualify as 
such. 
9 . Contract workers are employees, and taxpayer gets no help from 
§ 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. Bruecher Foundation Services Inc v. United States, 105 
A.F.T.R. 2d 2010-_ (5th Cir. 6/18/10). In 1999-2000 the taxpayer employed 13-16 workers as 
contractors in its foundation repair, landscaping and grading business. The taxpayer claimed 
deductions for the workers' compensation as "contract workers" but filed no Form 1099s for the 
workers. The IRS initiated an audit of employment tax liabilities without notifying the taxpayer 
and without infonning the taxpayer of the § 530 safe harbor (pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 
2763, 2885-86) as required by the statute. When the taxpayer was notified of the audit the 
taxpayer filed a Form 1099 for each of the workers. Section 530 bars reclassification of workers 
as employees if (l) the worker was not treated as an employee for any period, (2) the employer 
filed all returns, including information returns, in a manner consistent with treating the worker as 
an independent contractor, and (3) the employer had a reasonable basis under common law 
standards for treating the worker as an independent contractor. The court rejected the taxpayer's 
assertion that it complied with the § 530 requirement that it filed returns consistent treating the 
employees as independent contractors. Although the court was not willing to go as far as the IRS 
argument that timely fonns were always required, the court indicated that the taxpayer's strategic 
. filing of the required returns after the IRS assessed the tax was not compliance with the statute. 
The court also held that the IRS's failure- to give early notice of its audit and the availability of 
§ 530 did not shift the burden of proof to the government. Finally, the court accepted the IRS 
position that the workers were employees under common law standards. 
10. The Tax Court follows the Sixth and Second Circuits to hold that pre-
2009 employment tax liability of a disregarded LLC must be paid by the sole-member. 
Medical Practice Solutions. LLC v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.7 (3/31/09). Following the 
decisions in Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), and McNamee v. Dept. of 
the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007) [both of which upheld the validity of the "check-the-
box" . regulations in the same context, applying Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. De! 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)], the Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the check-the-box 
regulations treating a single member entity that does not elect to be treated as a corporation as a 
disregarded entity, Reg. § 301.7701-3(b), are valid and as a result the sole member of a 
disregarded limited liability company is responsible for the L.L.C.'s unpaid employment taxes. 
After 1/1/09, under Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv), a disregarded entity is treated as a corporation 
for purposes of employment tax reporting and liability. The court rejected the taxpayer's 
argument that the amendment to the regulations, which reverses the prior rule, demonstrates that 
the prior regulation imposing employment tax liability on the sole-member of the disregarded 
entity was unreasonable. The court stated that, "In light of the emergence of limited liability 
companies and their hybrid nature, and the continuing silence of the Code on the proper tax 
treatment of such companies in the decade ·since the present regulations became effective, we 
cannot conclude that the above Treasury Regulations, providing a flexible response to a novel 
business form, are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." 
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a . The First Circuit agrees. Britton v. Shulman, 106 A.F. T .R.2d 
2010-_ (1st Cir. 8/24110). In a one-paragraph memorandum opinion, the First Circuit finds no 
error or abuse of discretion in the Tax Court opinion in Medical Practice Solutions, LLC v. 
Commissioner. 
B. Self-employment Taxes 
C. Excise Taxes 
1 . Employers who aren't willing to pay health insurance premiums on 
their employees must pay Uncle Sam a very healthy nondeductible excise tax. Under 
§ 4980H, added by the 2010 Health Care Act and effective after 12/31/13, an applicable large 
employer, i.e., an employer that employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees during 
the preceding calendar year, that fails to offer its full-tirrie employees and their dependents the 
opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an employer sponsored health 
insurance plan is subject to an assessable excise tax if (l) there is a waiting period, or (2) any of 
its employees are certified to the employer as having enrolled in health insurance coverage 
purchased through an American Health Benefits Exchange with respect to which a premium tax 
credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid to such employee or employees. (An employee 
is eligible for the premium credit if the employer does not offer health insurance for all its full-
time employees, it offers minimum essential coverage that is unaffordable ("unaffordable" 
means a premium required to be paid by the employee that is more than 9.5 percent of the 
employee's household income), or it offers minimum essential coverage under which the plan's 
share of the total allowed cost of benefits is less than 60 percent.) For an employer not offering 
coverage, the amount of the excise tax amount for any month equals the number by which full-
time employees exceeds 30-employees (regardless of how many employees are receiving a 
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction) multiplied by $166.67 (one-twelfth of $2,000). The 
amount is nothing to sneeze at. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS 
AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 39-
40 (JCX-18-10 3/21110) gives the following example: 
For example, in 2014, Employer A fails to offer minimum essential coverage and 
has 100 full-time employees, ten of whom receive a tax credit for the year for 
enrolling in a State exchange-offered plan. For each employee over the 30-
employee threshold, the employer owes $2,000, for a total penalty of $140,000 
($2,000 multiplie.d by 70 ((100-30)). This penalty is assessed on a monthly basis. 
• For each full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit 
or cost-sharing subsidy through an American Health Benefits Exchange for any month, the monthly 
excise tax equals one-twelfth of $3,000. The tax is capped, however, by the amount that would have 
been the excise tax if the employer had provided no coverage. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT 
OF 20 1 0," AS AMENDED, IN COMBINA nON WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT," 39-40 (JCX-18-1O 3/21/10) gives the following example: 
For example, in 2014, Employer A offers health coverage and has 100 full-time 
employees, 20 of whom receive a tax credit for the year for enrolling in a State 
exchange offered plan. For each employee receiving a tax credit, the employer 
owes $3,000, for a total penalty of $60,000. The maximum penalty for this 
employer is capped at the amount of the penalty that it would have been assessed 
for a failure to provide coverage, or $140,000 ($2,000 multiplied by 70 ((100-
30)). Since the calculated penalty of $60,000 is less than the maximum amount, 
Employer A pays the $60,000 calculated penalty. This penalty is assessed on a 
monthly basis. 
• The excise tax is not deductible as a business expense under 
§ 162. The restrictions on assessment under § 6213 do not apply. 
2 . Did Congress call them fees, instead of excise taxes, because there are 
no percentages in the formulae or because they are earmarked to fund PCORTF? New 
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§ 4375, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, imposes a fee on each health insurance policy, to be 
paid by the insurer, of$2 ($1 for years ending in U.S. fiscal year 2013) multiplied by the average 
number of lives covered under the policy, and new § 4376 imposes ~ like fee on self-insured 
health plans, to be paid by the employer. The fees are earmarked to fund the Patient Centered 
Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF), to carry out provisions in the Act relating to 
comparative effectiveness research. 
3. That's not a 'nice healthy" tan, it's a "dangerous pre-cancer glow." 
New § 5000B of the Code imposes a 10 percent sales tax on the amount paid for indoor tanning 
services. The tax is collected by the service provider and remitted to the IRS quarterly. The tax 
kicks in on 6/1/1 0, just in time for the summer tanning season. 
4 . A nondeductible tax on Cadillacs, and we're not talking about any 
G.M. cars here. New § 49801, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, imposes an excise tax on 
insurers if the aggregate value of employer-sponsored health insurance coverage and health 
benefits (except separate dental and optic coverage) for an employee (including former. 
employees, surviving spouses and any other primary insured individuals) exceeds a threshold 
amount. The amount of the tax is 40 percent of the aggregate value that exceeds the threshold 
amount. For 2018, the threshold amount is $10,200 for individual coverage and $27,500 for 
family coverage, multiplied by the health cost adjustment percentage (a multiplier designed to 
increase the thresholds if the actual growth in health care between 2010 and 2018 exceeds the 
projected growth for that period), increased by an age and gender adjusted excess premium 
amount. The threshold amounts are increased for individuals who have attained age of 55 who 
are non-Medicare eligible and receiving employer-sponsored retiree health coverage or who are 
covered by a plan sponsored by an employer the majority of whose employees covered by the 
plan are engaged in a certain high risk professions. For a self-insured group health plan, a Health 
FSA or an HRA, the excise tax is paid by the entity that administers the plan. If the employer 
acts as the plan administrator, the excise tax is paid by the employer. Employer-sponsored health 
insurance coverage includes both insured and self-insured health coverage excludable from the 
employee's gross income; for a self-employed individual, the coverage for any portion of which 
a deduction is allowable under § 162(1). If an employer reports to insurers, plan administrators, 
and the IRS a lower amount of insurance cost subject to the excise tax than required, the 
employer is subject to a penalty equal to the sum of any additional excise tax that each such 
insurer and administrator would have owed if the employer had reported correctly and interest 
attributable to that additional excise tax. The excise tax is not deductible under the income tax. 
• Although the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation did 
not score this provision for revenue effects, because its effective date is outside the 5-year window 
for scoring revenue effects, despite being in the "Revenue Provisions" of the Act, Congress does not 
really intend that provision raise much revenue. It intends to discourage employers from providing 
high cost, i.e., Cadillac, health plans. 
XII. TAX LEGISLATION 
A. Enacted 
1. H.R. 3548, the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Act of 2009, 
P.L. 111-92 ("WHABA"), was signed by President Obama on 1116/09. 
2. H.R. 3326, the 2010 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-118, which 
contains the COBRA subsidy extension at § 1010, was signed by President Obama on 12/19/09. 
3. H.R. 4462, P.L. 111-126, was signed into law by President Obama on 
1122/10. The law permits donors who itemize deductions on their 2009 tax returns to deduct on 
their 2009 returns any charitable contributions for the relief of victims of the Haitian earthquake 
made in cash after 1/11/1 0 and before 3/1/10. 
4. H.R. 4691, the Temporary Extension Act of 2010, P.L. 111-144, was 
signed by President Obama on 3/2/10. The signing ceremony consisted of a "TEA party" at 
which the president was tea-bagged, i.e., tea bags were thrown at him. 
5 . The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment ("HIRE Act"), P.L. 111-
147, was signed by President Obama on 3/18/10. It is a $17.6-billion ''jobs package." 
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( 6. H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA" 
- pronounced "pee-pac-a"), P .L.111-148, was signed by President Obama on 3/23/10. 
7. H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 
("2010 Health Care Act" or "2010 Reconciliation Act"), P.L. 111-152, was signed by President 
Obama on 3/30/10. 
8. The Continuing Extension Act of 2010, P.L. 111-157, was signed by 
President Obama on 4/15/10. It extends the COBRA subsidy to May 31,2010. 
9. HR 3962, the Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare 
Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010, P.L. 111-192, was signed by President Obama 
on 6/25/10. 
10. The Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement Act of 2010, P.L. 111-
198, was signed by President Obama on 7/2/10. 
11. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, P.L. 111-240, was signed by 
President Obama on 9/27/10. This Act will create millions upon millions of good paying jobs. 
B. Pending 
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